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[Preface] " ... the focus of this inquiry is limited to some of the connections between conscientious objection in South Africa and the worship and imitation of Christ. More specifically, at the most general level this essay is an attempt to explore six questions: What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? Why are some Christians conscientious noncombatants? Is it appropriate to worship Christ? Does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance? And is there a prescription for servile compliance? These are, however, not the only questions which are raised in this essay. Nor are they the only questions which can and need to be asked. But they are the questions which interest me. In addition, they have not received as much attention as they deserve".

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2005. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-87).

Despite its ubiquity in debate over the justifiability of civil disobedience and conscientious objection, “conscience” remains an opaque concept. The attempt to define and employ it properly is not a purely academic exercise. The political language and behavior we associate with conscientiousness are empty to the point of being vulnerable to co-option by manifestly non-conscientious, violent, and reactionary movements. My argument is that the ease with which political actors adopt the language of conscience is due, not poor public understanding of the concept of “conscience,” but to the concept itself. In modern philosophical interpretations of conscience, such as that of Martin Luther and John Locke, the conscience is reified as a moral faculty or interior conversation of the individual. This is a departure from classical views of conscientiousness (for instance, Augustine’s), which emphasize the shared, fragile and habitual nature of conscience. Once “conscientiousness” is reified as “conscience,” it becomes difficult to characterize, except in negative terms, as an inner space free from tradition and force. My thesis is that the co-option of the language of conscience stems, in part, from the empty and conflicted characterization of philosophy in modern contract theory. One example of this conflicted characterization of conscience is the abortive project of distinguishing civil disobedience and conscientious objection. In law, politics, and philosophy, it is difficult to offer sound reasons for distinguishing these latter categories, despite frequent attempts to do so. The attempt fails on conceptual as well as practical grounds. I criticize two prominent treatments of civil disobedience and conscientious objection in evidence of this claim (John Rawls and Michael Walzer). When it comes to the language of conscience, modern American culture has committed the philosophic fallacy (John Dewey). We have substituted the clear divisions and images created by conscientious movements for the process that created them. I argue that “conscience” is best seen as a quality of healthy debate between adversaries—debates over problems so fundamental that they will be carried on in extra-legal and even illegal spheres. Conscience is a not a language that just any political actor can speak at will. It is a series of decisions that indicate to a public that we are not political enemies but political adversaries, seeking a political future together (Chantal Mouffe).

The protection of the emerging right of conscientious objection to military service is one of the most challenging questions in international human rights law. The primary objective of this doctoral thesis is to clearly identify the minimum international legal standards on the phenomenon of conscientious objection to military service as emerging from the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies. Furthermore, this study aims to explore and assess how the Member States of the Council of Europe are effectively implementing these standards within their domestic laws and practice. The implementation of legal standards on conscientious objection in the Council of Europe varies considerably between the 47 Member States of the organisation due to a rapidly transforming sociopolitical landscape that affects the speed in which legislative and procedural amendments take place. Some of the themes explored throughout this thesis include: the legal contours of the right to conscientious objection to military service, including the grounds legally accepted to justify a conscientious objection; procedural guarantees with regard to the application process to be granted conscientious objectors status; the provision of accurate information to members of the public affected by mandatory military service and the extension of these principles to professional members of the armed forces. The thesis is structured as a thematic presentation of applicable international human rights standards and State practice and explores common issues, best practices and future challenges between the Member States of the organisation. The study does not merely aspire to describe the present situation in the Council of Europe, but rather aims to contribute to academic know ledge by proposing the development of a more coherent framework of legal and procedural obligations, based on the need to review and adapt national legislation in accordance to indicators and benchmarks derived from the Council's standard-setting policies.

This thesis discusses the politics of conscientious objection in Turkey within a framework of citizenship. In this study citizenship is identified with being political and conceived as a process comprised of acts and practices. According to this conception, while practices reproduce the discourse of citizenship in a given context, acts are the deeds that challenge this discourse. Conscription, within this framework, is defined as a citizenship practice which re/produces the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of the Turkish citizenship. Conscientious objection is approached as an act of citizenship that contests and challenges the established citizenship regime in the country. This challenge and contestation is presented through the interviews with the conscientious objectors and activists as well as a review of the already published material by and on them. Conscientious objection challenges the citizenship regime in Turkey on three inter-related grounds: 1. It challenges and exposes the militaristic content of the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. 2. It challenges the political content of &lsquo / Turkishness&rsquo / &ndash / that is the nationalistic content of Turkish citizenship- with particular reference to Kurdish issue / and 3. It challenges the prevailing gender roles and the values of hegemonic masculinity in Turkey.

The right to freedom of conscience is protected by international conventions and declarations of human rights that have been ratified by Sweden. Nationally, the issue of health professionals’ right to freedom of conscience in the abortion care is not resolved by public inquiry. This has led to that Sweden has been notified to the European Committee of Social Rights on the grounds that the country is considered to be violating the Council of  Europe Resolution 1763 and that the proper question to be determined by regulations of the interests that are balanced, based on their legal value in relation to each other. Freedoms, rights and obligations conflict with each other. In Norway the health professionals are legally entitled to abstain from performing and assisting abortion, which the employer is obliged to consider in organizing its activities. In light of the countries different regulations but similar legal traditions, the study includes an empirical comparison of health care employees experiences of conscience in the context of the abortion care. How the Swedish law relates to the legal ruling and normative rules of conscience and whether a right to conscientious objection can be derived from case law, is examined in the study. The legal investigation shows that Sweden does not recognize and guarantee freedom of conscience in the abortion care. The fact that career choices are based on voluntariness speaks in the essay against a right to conscientious objection. This is proved by the ECHR and the European Commission's general view that the manifestations attributable to belief or religion can not be considered a subject to discrimination, if the situation includes possible obstacles to religious practice can be traced to volunteerism. The essays empirical comparison is displaying what the complexity of freedom of conscience means in abortion activities organized by different legal systems. The informantsworking inSwedenfear thataconscience clauseshalllimit women’s rightto abortionandthat health professionalsshould not havean equivalentapproach tothe patients.Furthermore they fearedproblemsrelated toorganization andwork environment.The informantsworking in Norwayhave experiencedproblemsthrough conflictsbetween health professionalsrelated toreservationright. / Rätten till samvetsfrihet skyddas av internationella konventioner och deklarationer om mänskliga rättigheter som Sverige har ratificerat. Nationellt har frågan om vårdpersonals rätt till samvetsfrihet inom abortvård dock inte bemötts genom offentlig utredning. Detta har föranlett att Sverige anmälts till Europeiska kommittén för sociala rättigheter på grund av att landet betraktas bryta mot Europarådets resolution 1763 samt att rättsfrågan får bedömas utifrån reglering av de intressen som avvägs, utifrån bestämmelsernas rättsliga värde i förhållande till varandra. Friheter, rättigheter och skyldigheter står emot varandra. I Norge ges vårdpersonal lagenlig rätt att reservera sig från att utföra och assistera abortingrepp, vilket arbetsgivaren är skyldig att beakta vid organisering av verksamheten. Mot bakgrund av ländernas skilda reglering men liknande rättstraditioner görs en empirisk komparation av arbetstagares upplevelser av samvetsfrihet inom ramen för abortvård. Vidare bemöts hur svensk rätt förhåller sig till rättsligt styrande och normerande bestämmelser av samvetsfrihet och huruvida en rätt till samvetsvägran kan härledas ur rättspraxis. Av rättsutredningen framgår att Sverige inte erkänner och garanterar samvetsfrihet inom abortvård. Att yrkesval bygger på frivillighet bemöts i uppsatsen emotsäga en rätt till samvetsvägran. Detta styrkes av Europadomstolens och Europeiska kommissionens generella åsikt om att manifestation hänförlig till övertygelse eller religion inte kan anses vara föremål för diskriminering om situationen som inkluderar möjliga hinder för religionsutövning kan härledas till frivillighet. Uppsatsens empiriska komparation visar på den komplexitet som samvetsfrihet innebär inom abortverksamheter styrda av skilda rättsordningar. Informanterna som arbetar i Sverige befarar att en samvetsklausul ska inskränka kvinnors rätt till abort och att vårdpersonalen inte ska ha ett likvärdigt förhållningssätt till patienterna. Vidare befaras problematik hänförlig till organisering och arbetsmiljö. Informanterna som arbetar i Norge har upplevt problematik genom konflikter mellan vårdpersonal hänförlig till reservationsrätten.

Cette thèse porte sur le rôle du compromis politique dans des conflits liés à la pluralité religieuse. Comment prendre une décision collective lorsque le désaccord touche aux convictions religieuses de certains groupes ? Le compromis est défini comme une procédure de prise de décision collective reposant sur des concessions réciproques. Nous en proposons une analyse conceptuelle ainsi qu’une défense de type procédural que nous illustrons par des cas précis de disputes mobilisant des acteurs religieux, en particulier les controverses françaises sur l’objection de conscience au service militaire et sur l’avortement. L’intérêt de réfléchir au compromis en relation avec la pluralité religieuse est l’antithèse supposée entre religion et compromis. Tandis que la politique est souvent décrite comme « l’art du compromis », le religieux est perçu comme le domaine de l’absolu et de l’intransigeance. Notre argument n’a pas pour objectif de confirmer cette assertion ou de l’infirmer : il ne s’agit pas de démontrer que les personnes religieuses sont plus ou moins conciliantes que leurs homologues séculiers. Nous soulignons, en revanche, la valeur procédurale du compromis notamment lors de disputes opposant des acteurs à religieux à une loi de l’État libéral et séculier. Si la politique est bien « l’art du compromis », elle ne se réduit pas au seul marchandage des intérêts. De même, si la religion touche au sacré et au non-négociable, la coexistence et la coopération dans une société plurielle ne se font pas sans concessions. / This dissertation deals with the role of political compromise in conflicts stemming from religious diversity. How can a collective decision be made when disagreement affects the religious convictions of some groups? Compromise is defined as a decision-making procedure based on reciprocal concessions. I propose a conceptual analysis and a procedural defense of compromise which I illustrate with cases of disputes that have mobilized religious actors, especially the French controversies on conscientious objection to military service and on abortion. Reflecting on compromise in relation to religious diversity is interesting because of the putative antithesis between religion and compromise. While politics is often described as the “art of compromise,” religion is perceived as the realm of the absolute and the intransigent. My argument is not intended to confirm or to invalidate this assertion. I do not demonstrate that religious people are more or less conciliatory than their secular counterparts. I emphasize, however, the procedural value of compromise particularly in disputes opposing religious actors and the law of the liberal and secular state. If politics is “the art of compromise,” it can not be reduced to a mere bargaining of interests. Similarly, if religion touches the sacred and the non-negotiable, coexistence and cooperation in a plural society are not achieved without concessions.

yes / In recent years, there has been increasing concern about unethical conduct within corporate business, not least because of the scandalous behaviour of former chief executives at top blue chip companies such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat and Volkswagen. These scandals have not only threatened the privileged position of senior corporate employees but also the solvency of the companies they manage and lead. The high profile cases of corporate crime and corruption that occurred in the early 2000s together with the 2008 Wall Street bailouts (Sorokin 2010) and the growth in criminal prosecutions since (Garrett 2014) have raised the profile of business ethics to an unprecedented level. Greater public sensitivity towards and awareness about the unlawful and immoral conduct of firms in the United States and elsewhere, has created demand for organizations to become more accountable and socially responsible and prompted greater regulatory scrutiny. It has also served to highlight the embryonic (Ciulla 2005) and delimited (Freidland 2012) state of research and scholarship on business ethics, where the focus has tended to remain on leadership (Kellerman 2012). A neglected, though important, line of ethical enquiry concerns followership (Kellerman, 2008). Corporate wrongdoing would be less formidable and extensive if it was not aided and abetted. Two key questions arise. First, what prompts followers to support rather than oppose bad leaders? Second, what can be done to stem or at least curtail their allegiance to bad leaders?