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yes / In recent years, there has been increasing concern about unethical conduct within corporate business, not least because of the scandalous behaviour of former chief executives at top blue chip companies such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat and Volkswagen. These scandals have not only threatened the privileged position of senior corporate employees but also the solvency of the companies they manage and lead. The high profile cases of corporate crime and corruption that occurred in the early 2000s together with the 2008 Wall Street bailouts (Sorokin 2010) and the growth in criminal prosecutions since (Garrett 2014) have raised the profile of business ethics to an unprecedented level. Greater public sensitivity towards and awareness about the unlawful and immoral conduct of firms in the United States and elsewhere, has created demand for organizations to become more accountable and socially responsible and prompted greater regulatory scrutiny. It has also served to highlight the embryonic (Ciulla 2005) and delimited (Freidland 2012) state of research and scholarship on business ethics, where the focus has tended to remain on leadership (Kellerman 2012). A neglected, though important, line of ethical enquiry concerns followership (Kellerman, 2008). Corporate wrongdoing would be less formidable and extensive if it was not aided and abetted. Two key questions arise. First, what prompts followers to support rather than oppose bad leaders? Second, what can be done to stem or at least curtail their allegiance to bad leaders?

Submitted by ANA KARLA PEREIRA RODRIGUES (anakarla_@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-29T13:49:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1490911 bytes, checksum: 8dfe7fdde29c102ab866fdfcd65627d0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-29T13:49:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1490911 bytes, checksum: 8dfe7fdde29c102ab866fdfcd65627d0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-02 / Hiring private armies or private security forces for a specific action, in favor of governments, corporations or civil society organizations – as opposed to the public formalities of war declaration between States with broad national goals –, generated one of the most relevant contemporary global markets. Yugoslavia, Colombia, Somalia, Nigeria, Ukraine, Iraq and the Levant: every insecure stage, after the end of the Cold War, counted on private military and security companies (PMSCs) for supporting roles or for staying at the backstage. Considering this innovative commercial aspect of today’s conflicts, this work counts on such non-State actors as protagonists, and its theme is the regulation of PMSCs. The problem that the dissertation examines is the insertion of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) – launched in 2010, as part of the Swiss Initiative – in the multilevel governance of such a market, based especially on the works of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Gunther Teubner on constitutionalism beyond the State. Through documental research and inductive methods, the text points out the main issues on the market for force and discusses the inapplicability or insufficiency of treaties that discipline trade, such as GATS, or conflict, such as the Geneva Conventions; besides, it sheds light on the current debate about a binding instrument at the United Nations and explains soft law initiatives, like the Montreux Document. Finally, it reads the ICoC and examines its advantages and limitations, with reference to reviewed literature. The research, therefore, aims at presenting the possibilities of regulating actors in need of hard law, based on theoretical contributions that reclaim the “constitutionalization of markets”. Keywords: Privatization of international security. Multilevel regulation. / A contratação de exércitos privados ou de forças de segurança para uma atuação pontual e específica, em favor de Governos, de corporações ou de entidades da sociedade civil – em oposição às públicas formalidades da declaração de guerra entre Estados com propósitos nacionais amplos –, gestou um dos mais relevantes mercados globais contemporâneos. Iugoslávia, Colômbia, Somália, Nigéria, Ucrânia, Iraque e Levante: todos os palcos de insegurança, após o fim da Guerra Fria, contaram com empresas militares privadas ou empresas de segurança internacional (ESIs) nos bastidores ou como coadjuvantes. Considerando essa inovadora faceta comercial dos conflitos hodiernos, o presente trabalho tem esses atores não-estatais como protagonistas, e seu tema é a regulação de ESIs. A dissertação problematiza a inserção do Código Internacional de Conduta Para Provedores de Serviços de Segurança Privada (ICoC) – lançado, em 2010, no contexto da Iniciativa Suíça – na governança multinível desse mercado, baseando-se especialmente nos trabalhos de Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann e Gunther Teubner sobre constitucionalismo além do Estado. Com pesquisa documental e com método indutivo, o texto aponta os principais problemas do mercado da força e discute a inaplicabilidade ou a insuficiência dos tratados que disciplinam o comércio, como o GATS, ou o conflito, como as Convenções de Genebra; explica, ainda, a situação atual do debate de um instrumento vinculante na ONU e as iniciativas de “soft law”, como o Documento de Montreux. Enfim, apresenta uma leitura do ICoC e examina seus trunfos e limitações, fazendo referência à literatura revisada. A pesquisa, afinal, visa a discutir as possibilidades de regulação de atores que carecem de “hard law”, a partir de aportes teóricos que reclamam a “constitucionalização de mercados”.