Thesis--Bremen University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

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This study examines marathon successions, which I define as instances where a permanent successor is not chosen at the time of a CEO departure. Marathons have become increasingly prevalent over the last ten years and represent the majority of succession decisions surrounding forced turnovers from 1995-2005. Firms implementing marathon successions around forced turnovers have strong internal governance structures, as measured by board size, director ownership, percentage of outside directors, and dual Chairman/CEO appointments. In addition, I find little evidence supporting the argument that extending the succession process through the use of a marathon leads to increases in uncertainty and/or agency costs in the form of horizon problems. Lastly, I find positive and significant announcement returns for forced marathon successions. These results provide insight into the succession process and the role of strong internal corporate governance in evaluating and implementing succession decisions.

Due to the globalisation trend, notable changes have pushed a distinctive interest in addressing corporate governance problems; either in emergent economies of Asia and Latin America Countries or in the transitional economies that spread over Eastern Europe. Further, a series of corporate scandals, in the US and Europe, has undermined confidence in both public company executives and the auditors. Formulating effective corporate governance measures is a complex task for legislators.The purpose of this study is to determine whether governance is seen from a broad stakeholder perspective in the Latin American Andean region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and also to provide an in depth analysis and comparison of the reasons organisations in the region want to implement corporate governance principles, whether it is because their want to be accountable to their stakeholders or because they want to show their legitimacy. The non-binding OECD 2004 principles of corporate governance conjunction with the CAF (Andean Development Corporation) will be utilised in the study as an benchmark. The study has generated significant information about the corporate governance challenges facing listed companies trading in the Latin America’s Andean region. It is hoped that the research results will serve as an aid to better focusing the future policy dialogue in the region. It is anticipated in this sense they will facilitate upcoming analysis and debate.

Zugl.: Oestrich-Winkel, Europ. Business School, Diss.

Corporate increase their competitive advantage by M&A. It is a recent trend over the world. It is important to make a distinctive plan for M&A. In addition, the process of M&A must follow the rules of business and corporate governance. The study analyzes the re-election of the board of the directors of China Development Financial Holding Corporation. In the perspectives of corporate governance, politics, economics, and social-culture, we study that Chinatrust Financial Holding Company acquired the control of China Development Financial Holding Corporation by the proxy contest. And we discuss some issues of government¡¦s role, ¡§Chinatrust rule¡¨, and other investor¡¦s role.

This study focuses on one specific company case-study. In addition, a questionnaire was also distributed within the broader accounting community. Feedback was then analyzed to shed light on cognition of-and compliance with-business ethics and regulations. In order to implement corporate governance well, accounting staff should strengthen their own competence in their professional domain, and then ensure the rights of the company, the stockholders and the stakeholders. In this study it was found that, in general, accountants who are more familiar with accounting regulations will more frequently check if they are abiding by the rules or not. It was also concluded that accountants should continue to seek more efficient methods to improve their working practices, so as to better fulfill their assigned roles. At the same time, management teams should work to improve the accountants¡¦ judgment and fully support them in reconciling any potential conflict of interest.

ABSTRACT Due to the global economic depression, enterprise bankruptcy and reorganization cases are increasing tremendously during the recent years. However, the current laws and regulations respecting reorganization and bankruptcy are not comprehensive enough to help the enterprises and protect the rights and interests of creditors and investors. It is a common place that the court could not render decision immediately and precisely while the enterprises file for reorganization when encountering financial problems, due to lack of sufficient information or clear provisions of laws. Therefore, some enterprises that were worthy to give assistance and should have had a chance to regenerate their business, had fallen into the destiny of bankruptcy. On the contrary, some other enterprises use the Bankruptcy Law as their protector to have their cunning maneuver happened all the time. By the comparison of the R.O.C. and America bankrupt systems, the author has tried to find out how to appraise the enterprise while a financial crisis occurs. It is the author's hope that this thesis could provide the investors with an accurate and effective assessment principle to assist the enterprises out of the predicament, and furnish the government a helpful reference for amending the bankruptcy law. This thesis includes the comparison of the differences between R.O.C. and American bankrupt systems, some certain grave Chinese and American enterprises bankruptcy and reorganization cases that happened in the recent years, as well as the analyses of the relevant provisions of Company Law, Bankrupt Law, Law Governing Merger of Financial Institutions, Financial Holding Company Law, and Merger and Acquisition Law. The objects of all these analyses and comparison are to interpret the insufficiency and implicit points of current laws and regulations. This thesis has also applied and analyzed some theories about corporate governance. This research does not cover the procedures of liquidation and personal bankruptcy.

ABSTRACT This paper tests the influence of family control on corporate governance. It empirically examines the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms by analyzing the forced turnovers of top executive officers in Taiwan manufacturing companies. We divide samples into family firms and non-family firms, and also into firms in the high-tech industry and firms in the traditional industry. The result shows that corporate governance in family firms differs from that in non-family firms. In the traditional industry, the top executive turnover is related to performance for family firms, and it implies the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanism. However there is no evidence to prove the efficiency of governance mechanism for non-family firms in the traditional industry. In the high-tech industry, the influence of family control on corporate governance is not significantly observed, but there is significant evidence to show the well functioning of governance mechanism in non-family firms. Overall, these results suggest that both family control and industry characteristic do influence the efficiency of corporate governance.

Is there any requirement for the optimal governance system in Taiwan? Without focusing on the pure relationship with variable and index, the study started from developing a model to explain the sample in Taiwan We try to simulate the corporate governance mechanisms from the idea of John and Kedia (2003). The three primary forces came from (1)aligning the manager¡¦s incentives with that of shareholders,(2) monitored debt, and (3) takeovers. In the model, we divided the sample of Taiwan listed company in 1996-2004 into four groups: Alignment-Based(AB),Pre-Commitment-Based(PB),Intervention-Based(IB) and Well-Divided(WD). From our observation, the ratio of IB company is arising, AB and PB are decreasing. Therefore, we infer that the external governance mechanisms are well developing in Taiwan, like external shareholder and takeover markets. Also, we established the transformative model of governance system in order to explain the index variation result from changing in governance system. Past study indicated that the governance systems in Taiwan are family-based systems. We found that the external and intervening mechanism, growing with the developing financial market, could be more powerful in corporate governance today.