Recent accounting scandals and current global financial crisis have brought new demands on the whole corporate world. The call for better corporate governance is strengthening in all business areas including tax. Tax non -- compliance brings substantial risks for both tax payers and tax revenue authorities. The way how companies manage their tax risks can significantly influence their overall financial performance and reputation. The paper deals with issues of tax non -- compliance as a lack of good corporate governance practice. The main goal of the paper is to put tax into the concept of corporate governance. Moreover, the paper deals with the concept of tax risk management as a way of how tax compliance in general could be enhanced and introduces the current international practice in this field.

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Thesis (M.Com. (Accounting))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Economic and Business Sciences, 2016 / The focus of this study is to provide a view of the extent of strategy disclosures made by companies in both the developed market and the emerging market. The study also provides empirical evidence on the differences in the extent of strategy disclosures between developed and emerging markets. From the results of the study, it can be concluded that the emerging market companies have better strategy disclosures in their annual reports than companies in the developed market. [Abbreviated abstract. Open document to view full version]

Specifics of Anglo-Saxon and Continental corporate governance This thesis deals with the comparison of Anglo-Saxon and Continental approaches to corporate governance. Although the title of this thesis might evoke that the main theme of this thesis is a comparison of two different models of corporate governance, the basis for this work is the opposite. The author aims to make use of the compari- son of selected corporate governance issues in the various legal systems of both the Anglo-Saxon and Continental models of corporate governance to find out how sig- nificantly the current Anglo-Saxon and Continental model of corporate governance differs, whether there is a convergence or divergence between these two models and whether it makes sense to divide legal systems' approaches to corporate governance on the basis of these two models or not anymore. The thesis is divided into five (5) chapters, where the first chapter is a brief intro- duction to corporate governance issues followed by chapters dedicated to selected issues of corporate governance in joint-stock companies after. These four (4) main issues explored in the thesis are: the internal organization of the administrative bod- ies of joint-stock companies, the independence and objectivity of the corporation's administrative bodies, the...

This study provides empirical evidence on the role of ultimate ownership structure in explaining the variations in firms' cost of equity capital across 21 countries. Using four implied cost of equity proxies, the results show that the large discrepancy between ownership and control rights of the ultimate owner has a positive and significant impact on the firm's cost of equity capital, after controlling for traditional risk factors known in empirical literature. The finding lends support to the entrenchment effect in that the expropriation of the minority investors by the controlling owners increases the systematic risk of the company thereby increases the firm's external financing cost. Further analyses demonstrate that both the legal and extra-legal institutions play an important tank in constraining the higher equity cost as induced by the concentrated ownership structure. In particular, in countries with broad disclosure requirements, strong securities regulations enforcement, keen market competition and high tax compliance, the positive relation between the cost of equity capital and the ownership-control divergence of the ultimate owner is less pronounced. The findings suggest that the institutional factors are effective corporate governance mechanisms and are significant in explaining the international variations in the cost of equity capital. / Chu, Sin Yan Teresa. / Adviser: Woody Wu. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2121. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-73). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

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This dissertation is an examination of the incentives, opportunities and disincentives for earnings management. The research was conducted for the listed, commercial banks in Cyprus. The period examined includes the years 2002-2011, for which the required information was available. After having considered the literature review, the regulations that affect banks’ financial reporting and the results from interviews conducted the research hypotheses were formulated and tested with regressions. The conclusions drawn from this empirical analysis are as follows. The existence of a cash bonus and leverage did not create incentives for earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals. This finding was observed because the bottom line profit was not considered in cash bonus decisions. In addition, most of the banks’ debt was in the form of deposits; deposit schemes do not include covenants that have to be met like other debt contracts. Discretionary accruals were therefore saved so that they could be used to manage earnings and increase regulatory capital. The evidence suggests that when the capital adequacy ratio was low, earnings were managed in order to artificially boost the capital base. The empirical results confirm that regulators perceived banks as being adequately capitalized and hence did not scrutinize bank practices. Banks were then able to grow and to grant loans very generously. Recognition of more interest revenue helped to cover higher interest paid to depositors and also helped executives to earn their bonus. The evidence also suggests that when the CEO was also the chairman of the board, the quality of earnings deteriorated. However, when directors owned shares and as board independence increased, the quality of earnings was improved. Considering the recent financial crisis and that one of the largest banks has collapsed, the results of this thesis should be of great importance to boards and their audit and remuneration committees, shareholders, depositors, auditors and the supervisory authorities.

Ko, Iat Meng. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-55). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Research Method --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Real Estate Holding Measures --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Free Cash Flow Measure --- p.6 / Chapter 2.3 --- Corporate Governance Measures --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Outside Blockholder Ownership --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- CEO Compensation --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Merger and Acquisition Effect --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Endogeneity Problem of Acquisition --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- The Data --- p.16 / Chapter 4 --- Empirical Results --- p.19 / Chapter 4.1 --- Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance --- p.19 / Chapter 4.2 --- M&A Effect --- p.20 / Chapter 4.3 --- Self-Selection Correction --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Estimating the Probability of Acquisition´ؤ Probit Estimation --- p.22 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Self-Selection Model --- p.23 / Chapter 4.4 --- Effects of Target Firms --- p.24 / Chapter 4.5 --- Changes in Profitability Around Acquisition --- p.25 / Chapter 4.6 --- Sub-samples --- p.26 / Chapter 4.6.1 --- Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance --- p.27 / Chapter 4.6.2 --- M&A Effect --- p.28 / Chapter 4.6.3 --- Self-Selection Correction --- p.28 / Chapter 4.6.4 --- Effects of Target Firms --- p.29 / Chapter 4.6.5 --- Changes in Profitability Around Acquisition --- p.29 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.51 / Bibliography --- p.53

Yang, Bin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-63). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review and Some Discussions --- p.6 / Chapter 3. --- Measuring Corporate Governance --- p.11 / Chapter 3.1. --- Overview --- p.11 / Chapter 3.2. --- Ownership Concentration --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.1. --- Overview --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- Herfindahl Index --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2.3. --- Controlling Largest Shareholder's Ownership --- p.16 / Chapter 3.3. --- Check-and-balance of Ownership --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3.1. --- Overview --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3.2. --- Balance Index --- p.18 / Chapter 3.4. --- Controlling owner alone --- p.18 / Chapter 3.5. --- Separation of Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights --- p.19 / Chapter 3.6. --- Principal-Agent Problem between the largest shareholders and managers --- p.20 / Chapter 3.6.1. --- Duality --- p.20 / Chapter 3.6.2. --- Managerial Ownership..........................................................Error! Bookmark not defined / Chapter 3.7. --- Board Composition --- p.21 / Chapter 4. --- Measuring Public Governance --- p.23 / Chapter 5. --- Determinants of Real Estate Holdings --- p.27 / Chapter 6. --- Data and Empirical Methodology --- p.29 / Chapter 6.1. --- Data Summary --- p.29 / Chapter 6.2. --- Empirical Examination --- p.31 / Chapter 7. --- Statistics and Regression Results --- p.36 / Chapter 7.1. --- Summary Statistics --- p.36 / Chapter 7.2. --- Regression Result --- p.38 / Chapter 7.2.1. --- Univariate results and multivariate results of 22 countries in the Panel A --- p.38 / Chapter 7.2.2. --- Univariate results and multivariate results of 42 countries in the Panel B --- p.45 / Chapter 7.2.3. --- Univariate results and multivariate results of 13 Western European countries and 9 Eastern Asian countries --- p.47 / Chapter 7.2.4. --- Interaction Effects --- p.51 / Chapter 8. --- Robustness Check --- p.52 / Chapter 9. --- Conclusions --- p.58 / References --- p.60

Based on the institutional logic that enterprises will conform with the immediate cultural values and settings in a nation, the important influence of culture on corporate governance has been acknowledged in recent research. It has been shown that the quality of corporate governance varies strongly within regions and globally. Therefore, tests of cultural influences on single components of corporate governance or surrogates thereof have been conducted and their outcomes discussed. This research investigates the influence of culture on corporate governance using all 6 Hofstede cultural dimensions and a uniquely broad set of corporate governance factors that are present in reality. Using 565,787 year observations relating to 18,344 companies in 41 countries for the years 2010-2015, the results of cross-sectional regression analysis with appropriate control variables is presented. The ensuing results further enhance our understanding of culture's influence on the composition of the board of directors and will help regulators and lawmakers in their endeavors to improve relevant legislation as well as allow multinational companies to design effective and reliable corporate governance structures in their enterprises. In my analysis, I find a substantial influence of cultural dimensions on the structural elements of the composition of the board of directors around the globe. In particular board independence, time on the board, gender diversity, and absolute size of the board are impacted by the surrounding cultural environment of the enterprise. These results also hold true in a robustness test with alternative cultural dimensions. A final moderating test gives some evidence of the moderating influence the cultural environment has on the relationship between board structural elements and the quality of corporate governance.