This paper examines the relationship between firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, and board diversity. Board diversity is measured by age differentials, gender diversity, board size, number of board members with higher education, and number of nationali-ties included in the board. The data were collected from firms on the OMX Stockholm 30, for the years 2006-2010. Because data were collected from 5 years, a panel type re-gression is used. Furthermore the regression of this paper corrects for time specific ef-fects. This paper contributes to the field of research by investigating the Swedish market in a quantitative manner and using these specific five explanatory variables as a measure of board diversity. The result of this paper shows a clear overall relationship between board diversity and firm performance. More specifically, the education and nationality variables are not significant. The size variable is significant and negatively correlated to firm performance, while the gender and age variables show a significant and positive re-lationship to firm performance.

Styrelsen i ett företag är tänkt att utgöra en funktion för övervakning och rådgivning till den högsta ledningen. Det är styrelsens ansvar att förvaltningen av företaget sköts på bästa möjliga sätt. En faktor som påverkar hur bra styrelsens arbete blir är styrelsens sammansättning. Företagets framgång kan sägas hänga samman med styrelsens sammansättning och kompetens. Det är viktigt att styrelsen kan kommunicera och utbyta erfarenheter. Då en styrelse arbetar som en grupp och ansvarar för företagets organisation och förvaltning krävs det att denna grupp kan samarbeta och på ett aktivt och effektivt sätt arbeta, för att utveckla och förbättra företagets framtid. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka och få en förståelse för hur en styrelse sätts samman. Vad det är som ligger bakom valet av styrelseledamöter samt vad styrelsens sammansättning har för betydelse för styrelsearbetet. Vi har avgränsat oss till att undersöka hur en styrelse sätts samman och vad denna sammansättning har för betydelse. Vi har därmed inte tittat på företaget som respektive styrelse arbetar för. Vi har heller inte undersökt hur styrelsearbetet har påverkat företagets verksamhet. Vår forskning har bedrivits explorativt och uppsatsen är skriven med en kvalitativ ansats. Vi har använt ett induktivt arbetssätt. Vårt arbete har följt den traditionella forskningsprocessen som består av olika steg som tar sin början i en frågeställning och slutligen mynnar ut i ett resultat som grundar sig på tolkningar. Befintliga teorier och en teoretisk referensram har används för att analysera det empiriska material som har samlats in genom intervjuer. Vi har kommit fram till att en styrelse sätts samman med hjälp av en valberedning eller utan valberedning då ägarna själva väljer ut styrelsemedlemmar. Det är bolagsstämman som tar det slutliga beslutet om vilka som ska sitta med i styrelsen. Vår uppfattning är att tillsättningen av styrelsen är mer formell i större bolag med fler ägare än i mindre och familjeägda bolag. Styrelseledamöterna väljs dels på grund av deras kompetens och dels för att de har god branschkännedom. De personliga egenskaperna väger tungt vid valet av ledamöter. Eftersom styrelsen arbetar tillsammans som en grupp är det viktigt att de olika medlemmarna fungerar tillsammans och kan samarbeta.

The main purpose of this study is to find out the relationship between the characteristics of board composition and earnings management. It is a case study of steel industry and telecommunications industry ,which have state-owned enterprises after privatization. From the perspective of earnings management, the Modified Jones Model is used for the detection of earnings management ,and the period of the study samples is from 2005 to 2007. There are six independent variables .They are the proportion of shareholding directors and supervisors, the pledged share ratio of directors and supervisors , the proportion of shareholding foreign investors, the proportion of shareholding government, the number of independent directors and the if the board has set the labor director or not. SPSS statistical software is used to do empirical analysis. The empirical results of this study shows that there is significant positively correlated between the proportion of shareholding directors and supervisors and earnings management ; there is significant negatively correlated between the proportion of shareholding foreign investors and earnings management ; there is significant negatively correlated between the proportion of shareholding government and earnings management. Above all , part of the variables of characteristics of board composition in this study are not significantly affected earnings management , resulting in some of the hypotheses do not hold .Thus, this study suggests that the concept of corporate governance in Taiwan is not already universal yet in the study samples, and Taiwan's independent directors just set up in the beginning stages of implementation. Besides, the labor director only interest in the labor rights issues, not in earnings management issues , and also they do not have the ability to judge them.

Research on holding bank¡¦s risk-taking behavior have focused on the effect on the performace. Using data in Taiwan, this paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership, franchise value and domestic bank¡¦s risk-taking behavior. ¡@This paper includes independent variances of total return risk, systematic risk and idoiosyncratic risk derived from the capital market, and includes dependent variances of managerial ownership, franchise value, financial leveal, operating leveal and total assets. ¡@This research indicates that: ¡@1.manager ownership is negatively related to both total return risk, systematic risk and idoiosyncratic risk. ¡@2.franchise value is negatively related to both total return risk and idoiosyncratic risk, and unlated to systematic risk. ¡@3.financial leveal is unrelated to both total return risk ,systematic risk and idoiosyncratic risk. ¡@4.operating leveal is positively related to both total return risk and idoiosyncratic risk, and unlated to systematic risk. ¡@5.total assets is unrelated to both total return risk, systematic risk and idoiosyncratic risk.

The inside is controlled to want to reach enterprise's goal , improve business efficiency , strengthening enterprise's physique , promoting the mechanism with indispensable competitiveness of enterprises, Taiwan is going through August of 1995, staff's practicing fraud case at the basic level of maximum amount in a Taiwanese financial history --After country's ticket case causes great losses of country's ticket , ' the inside is controlled ' relevant topic boiling reporting , making a self-criticism without restraint. Several things of shaking compatriots will recur again in 2003 , will include: Incident of steal and sell customer's stock , the financial card of the bank happen in the same year and is stolen by side recording , national treasurying etc. that famous in October to speak to the staff of law office of law, the relevant newspapers and magazines mention the question that ' the inside is controlled ' again, this topic causes everybody's concern once again too. This research case company, in order to set up the reason law lawyer's office of remarkable reputation for many years in the bar , only because the inside controls and causes the fraud case of breaking into the staff to defalcate improperly. This research audits the criterion communique No. 99 with U.S.A. ' check the financial statemant to the doing in the test amount that is deceived ' Three risk factors that the composition pointed out in (Conskderations of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit ) practices fraud: Inducement and pressure (incentive/pressure), five major key elements of the attitude and rationalized (attitude/rationalization ) , and the chance (opportunity ) and composition that the inside control, control the environment , risk and assess , control the activity , information and communicate and supervise etc. to analyse the production reason of the incident and disappearance of controlling the system of inside that this case practice fraud. The result shows , an office lacks the system to restrain, totally places the control of different potential risks of the office on people's moral character , must examine the system in proper and management way again in fact.

This thesis is based on the stock listing electronic companies in TSE and OTC. There are two purposes of this paper. First, to understand what the difference between failure and non-failure firms under financial factors and corporate governance indicators. And second, to compare with the different material frequency, the predictive ability and the correlation regarding the enterprise crisis reveals the variable whether has a difference. The experiment results show that: By independent-sample t test and logistic regression, we find that under the quarterly financial statements, the profit index is the most manifest factor and the next is debt ratio. The closer to the time of the distress, the more factors in operating efficiency that make the two kinds of the firms differ. Financial distress firms have the higher account receivable turnover rate. In corporate governance factors, the proportion of family members holdings and the rate of directors¡¦ shareholding are the most two important variables. The results from yearly financial reports are similar to which from quarterly financial statements. Profit index and liquidity index can be the prior indications to judge whether a firm gets financial crisis or not. In independent-sample t test, the cash flow from operation ratio and times interest earned are marked variables in the first and second year before bankrupt. The diversity of traditional financial index and the corporate governance variables between failure firms and normal firms are very obvious in the first year previous to failure. In corporate governance factors, the proportion of family members holdings and the extent of the shares as collateral by the board of directors are the most important variables. Regardless of yearly or quarterly financial statements, the closer to the time of the distress, the more different variables appear. The average percentage of correctly classified firms is 80.13% from the 8th to 5th quarter previous to the distress better than 2nd year previous to the distress. Compared with the average accurate prediction rate from the 4th to 1st quarter, the predicting ability from 1st yearly financial statement is better. But the 1st and 2nd accurate rate are 92.54% and 93.44%, the average is 93%. In other words, we can overcome the time lag and raise the predictive ability by using quarterly reports rather than yearly financial statements.

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I examine the market reaction to merger announcements and the long-term post-merger stock price performance of newly merged firms. For a sample of 484 acquiring firms completing mergers between 1993 and 2000, the average value-weighted abnormal announcement date return (market-adjusted) is a statistically significant -1.02%. On average, this reaction is more negative for firms with "good governance." Specifically, a governance index comprised of three governance variables is significantly negative in a multivariate regression of announcement date abnormal returns. Comp is the percentage of CEO salary consisting of equity incentives (including stock options and restricted stock grants), InsideOwn is the percentage of the firm owned by officers and directors, and InstOwn is the percentage of the firm owned by large outside block shareholders. Value-weighted calendar-time portfolios consisting of the full sample of acquirers exhibit significant abnormal returns of 9.12%, 33.84% and 55.8% for the 12, 36 and 60 months following the merger, respectively. This overperformance is limited to the value-weighted portfolios. There is calendar-time evidence of abnormal performance for some subsamples on a risk adjusted basis. However, when compared to a control group, abnormal performance is limited to large glamour acquirers on a 12-month horizon, large cash acquirers on a 36 and 60-month horizon, and small focusing acquirers on a 60-month horizon. Multivariate analysis of long-run returns reveals that use of equity and corporate diversification are associated with lower post-merger performance. With regard to governance and long-run stock returns, there is also evidence that suggests higher levels of incentive compensation for CEOs is associated with more successful merger transactions for long-term investors.

This paper tests the relationship between corporate governance and corporate value and the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. A ¡§Governance Index¡¨ is built based on three aspects of the company governance structure: 1. the performance of the broad of directors, 2. ownership structure 3. involvement of capital markets. This index is used as a proxy measure of the effectiveness of the governance mechanism. We propose the firms under good governance should outperform those under poor governance. This paper finds a striking relationship between Governance Index and firm performance. The results imply that the Governance Index built in this paper is successful in evaluating the effectiveness of the governance mechanism of firms in Taiwan.

In the modern enterprises, the capital structures are made up by the specific or the non-specific populace sources. In the separation of management rights and ownership, their common interests may not be the same, so the agency problems are arising. In recent years, the public has serious doubts about unreasonable compensation of directors with higher ranks. The study samples are companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2007, but excluding banks and insurance companies. This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The corporate governance variables include director stock ownership, the pledged share ratio of directors, chairman of the board as general manager, percent of independent directors on the board, the average compensation of directors, foreign investors¡¦ ownership, and institutional ownership in the firm. The empirical results show that chairman of the board as general manager who has significant influence on earnings management in the whole industry, electronic industry, and non-electronic industry; the average compensation of directors with higher ranks have significant influence on earnings management in the whole industry and non-electronic industry. In different industries, some empirical results support the hypotheses while other hypotheses do not hold. Thus, this research study has believed that the interconnection between the corporate governance variables and earning management will be affected by characteristics of certain industries. In addition, this research study has also found that there are no direct relationships between corporate governance and earnings management. Hence, the corporate governance in Taiwan is still considered not long enough and can not become an independent factor to affect earnings management inhibition of behavior. Therefore, certain parts of hypotheses will not establish.