The main purpose of this study is to find out the relationship between the characteristics of board composition and earnings management. It is a case study of steel industry and telecommunications industry ,which have state-owned enterprises after privatization. From the perspective of earnings management, the Modified Jones Model is used for the detection of earnings management ,and the period of the study samples is from 2005 to 2007. There are six independent variables .They are the proportion of shareholding directors and supervisors, the pledged share ratio of directors and supervisors , the proportion of shareholding foreign investors, the proportion of shareholding government, the number of independent directors and the if the board has set the labor director or not. SPSS statistical software is used to do empirical analysis. The empirical results of this study shows that there is significant positively correlated between the proportion of shareholding directors and supervisors and earnings management ; there is significant negatively correlated between the proportion of shareholding foreign investors and earnings management ; there is significant negatively correlated between the proportion of shareholding government and earnings management. Above all , part of the variables of characteristics of board composition in this study are not significantly affected earnings management , resulting in some of the hypotheses do not hold .Thus, this study suggests that the concept of corporate governance in Taiwan is not already universal yet in the study samples, and Taiwan's independent directors just set up in the beginning stages of implementation. Besides, the labor director only interest in the labor rights issues, not in earnings management issues , and also they do not have the ability to judge them.

A firm’s participation in cartel depends upon the potential problems that may arise due to price fixing and the incentives provided to the management. The top levels of management such as the board of directors and the CEO are responsible for deciding if the firm will participate in the cartel and manage the corporate governance activities of collusive price fixing agreements. This study aims to identify which characteristics of the participating firms’ boards of directors and CEOs are associated with cartel formation. It analyses the empirical investigation of cartel participation of firms, taking into account corporate governance characteristics as such as board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics, and CEO compensation scheme. The study is focused on UK cartel firms which has the highest representation in the sample. A total number of 150 cartel firms in 52 cases from all around the world between the years 1990 to 2008 are involved in this study, of which 114 are UK firms. Therefore, this study is dominated by UK firms. The challenge of this study is that the personal attributes of CEOs and boards can make a significant contribution to the risk profile of a cartel being formed. This indeed would be to ‘diagnose’ organisational culture in a quite radical direction. The study suggests and finds that some corporate governance attributes are associated with cartel formation. The results reveal consistency with prior researches, that cartel firms have different corporate governance relative to a control sample in the three years prior to cartel formation. Specifically, the study concludes that UK-based cartel firms characterised by having larger board size compared to non-cartel firms; lower percentage of independent directors (non-executive); higher average of board remuneration; less likely that cartel is formed by family-owned and controlled firm (large shareholders); having older CEOs represented on the board; having CEO who served a less number of years as a director; less likely to have a female CEO represented; more likely to have CEOs who’s combined CEO-chairman position; and a higher average of CEOs bonuses and compensation packages.