This paper tests the relationship between corporate governance and corporate value and the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. A ¡§Governance Index¡¨ is built based on three aspects of the company governance structure: 1. the performance of the broad of directors, 2. ownership structure 3. involvement of capital markets. This index is used as a proxy measure of the effectiveness of the governance mechanism. We propose the firms under good governance should outperform those under poor governance. This paper finds a striking relationship between Governance Index and firm performance. The results imply that the Governance Index built in this paper is successful in evaluating the effectiveness of the governance mechanism of firms in Taiwan.

I | P a g e Abstract This thesis primarily focuses on the construction of a firm-specific index measuring the quality of corporate governance in the most liquid Czech and Croatian companies. The index is made by following OECD recommendations on construction of composite indicators. It allows comparison of best practices implementation on the overall level, and it also provides with a comprehensive analogy in terms of various governance domains performance. These domains are represented by four sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, Shareholders' Rights, and Transparency and Disclosure. Initial assumption, stating that the Czech companies should have higher overall Corporate Governance Index score than the Croatian companies, is approved. Moreover, the Czech companies have stronger performance in three sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, and Transparency and Disclosure, whereas the Croatian companies have negligible advantage solely with regard to the Shareholders' Rights Sub-index.

Agency theories suggest that governance matters more when agency conflicts are potentially more severe. However, empirical studies often do not control for the potential severity of agency conflicts. I show that the marginal benefit of governance varies with the free cash flow level, a proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts. As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes incrementally more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes incrementally more value-destroying. This is consistent with the hypothesis that better governance helps resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions when a firm has more free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). This study highlights the importance of controlling for the potential severity of agency conflicts in governance studies and provides an improved method to estimate the marginal benefit of a governance mechanism.

Agency theories suggest that governance matters more when agency conflicts are potentially more severe. However, empirical studies often do not control for the potential severity of agency conflicts. I show that the marginal benefit of governance varies with the free cash flow level, a proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts. As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes incrementally more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes incrementally more value-destroying. This is consistent with the hypothesis that better governance helps resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions when a firm has more free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). This study highlights the importance of controlling for the potential severity of agency conflicts in governance studies and provides an improved method to estimate the marginal benefit of a governance mechanism.

Yes / This study examines the relationship between corporate governance compliance and firm performance in the UK. We develop a Governance Index and investigate its impact on corporate performance after controlling for potential endogeneity through the use of a more robust methodology, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation. Our evidence is based on a sample of 435 non-financial publicly listed firms over the period 1999–2009. In contrast to earlier findings in the UK literature, our results suggest that compliance with corporate governance regulations is not a determinant of corporate performance in the UK. We argue that results from prior studies showing a positive impact of corporate governance on firms’ performance may be biased as they fail to control for potential endogeneity. There may be a possibility of reverse causality in the results of prior studies due to which changes in the internal characteristics of firms may be responsible for the corporate governance compliance and performance relationship. Our findings are based on GMM, which controls for the effects of unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity and thus present more robust conclusions as compared to the findings of previously published studies in this area.

Cette thèse, en s’attaquant à un problème central de la théorie financière contemporaine — la bonne gouvernance des sociétés — débouche sur la construction d’un indice actionnarial de bonne gouvernance à destination d’un public académique ou professionnel. En mettant en évidence les principaux problèmes observés en matière de gouvernance dans le monde (chapitre 1), une modélisation des interactions des agents conduit à la formulation d’un indice ad hoc (chapitre 2), qui peut être intégré à une stratégie internationale d’investissement en bonne gouvernance (chapitre 3). Une telle stratégie procure à l’investisseur un avantage pécuniaire, aussi bien en horizon long, qu’en périodes de turbulences (chapitre 4). / This dissertation, focusing on a prominent problem of modern finance theory — effectiveness of corporate governance — leads to the building of a corporate governance- based stock index, which can be very useful to the academic and business community. Thanks to a state of the art of governance problems around the world (chapter 1), a simple pattern of agents interactions is build and helps to design an ad hoc index (chapter 2). An international investment strategy based on this speci?c index provides consistent returns for the investor (chapter 3), as well in long run horizon as in turbulent time (chapter 4).

Yes / This study develops a 'comply or explain' index which captures compliance and quality of explanations given for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes in UK and Germany. In particular, we explain, how compliance and quality of explanations provided in non-compliance disclosures, and various other internal corporate governance mechanisms, affect the market valuation of firms in the two countries. A dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator is employed as the research technique for our analysis, which enabled us to control for the potential effects of endogeneity in our models. The findings of our content analysis suggest that firms exhibit significant differences in compliance, board independence and ownership structure in both countries. The 'comply or explain' index is positively associated with the market valuation of UK firms suggesting that compliance and quality governance disclosure is value relevant in the UK. Institutional blockholders' ownership is however, negatively associated with the market value of firms, which raises questions about the monitoring role of institutional shareholders in both countries. We argue that both compliance and explanations given for non-compliance are equally important, as long as valid reasons and justifications for non-compliance are provided by the reporting companies. These findings thus imply that the 'comply or explain' principle is working well and that UK and German companies could benefit from the flexibility offered by this principle. With respect to the role of board size, board independence, ownership structure, and institutional ownership of firms, this study offers policy implications.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The adoption of good practical of corporate governance opens space for a more transparent management, decrease the asymmetry of information and the conflict of agency, making possible the maximization of value in the company. The main objective of this study is to investigate evolution and the determinants of quality of practical of corporate governance, as well analyzing if relation exists between the quality of these practical of governance and the performance of nonlisted the Brazilian companies of open capital in stock exchange, in period between 2003 and 2007. The sample is composed for 120 companies in 2003, 53 companies in 2004, 94 companies in 2005, 79 companies in 2006 and 64 companies in 2007. The data had been collected directly of System DIVEXT and the use of econometrical techniques of multiple linear regression. The results had shown that the nonlisted open companies are predominantly of familiar property and they are more frequently in the regions Southeastern and South. Relating to the determinants of practical of corporate governance, it was verified that the performance and the size of the company positively influence the pointer of the quality of the practical of corporate governance. The results also indicate a positive relation enter the quality of the corporate governance and the return on the assets of the company, confirming that better practical of governance tend to present in better performance. / A adoção das boas práticas de governança corporativa abre espaço para uma gestão mais transparente, diminuindo a assimetria de informações e o conflito de agência, possibilitando a maximização de valor na empresa. O objetivo principal deste estudo é investigar a evolução e os determinantes da qualidade das práticas de governança corporativa, bem como analisar se existe relação entre a qualidade dessas práticas de governança e o desempenho das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto não listadas em bolsa de valores, para o período de 2003 a 2007. A amostra é composta por 120 empresas em 2003, 53 empresas em 2004, 94 empresas em 2005, 79 empresas em 2006 e 64 empresas em 2007. Os dados foram coletados diretamente do Sistema DIVEXT da CVM e utilizado técnicas econométricas de regressão linear múltipla. Os resultados mostraram que as empresas abertas não listadas são predominantemente de propriedade familiar e estão mais presentes nas regiões Sudeste e Sul. Quanto aos determinantes das práticas de governança corporativa, verificou-se que o desempenho e o tamanho da empresa influenciam positivamente o indicador da qualidade das práticas de governança. Os resultados também indicam uma relação positiva entre a qualidade da governança corporativa e o retorno sobre os ativos da empresa, confirmando que melhores práticas de governança impactam em melhor desempenho. / Recife, PE

Governança corporativa pode ser entendida como o conjunto de mecanismos de incentivo e controle, internos e externos, que visam a minimizar os custos decorrentes do problema de agência. O tema é importante por ser bem difundida a hipótese de que as práticas de governança afetam o desempenho das empresas. Esta tese tem como objetivo avaliar se os mecanismos de governança são exógenos e se exercem influência sobre o valor de mercado e a rentabilidade das companhias abertas no Brasil. A pesquisa foi dividida em três partes inter-relacionadas. A primeira parte investigou os determinantes da qualidade da governança corporativa, isto é, os fatores que fazem com que algumas empresas apresentem um nível de governança maior do que outras submetidas a um mesmo ambiente contratual. Como aproximação para a qualidade da governança corporativa, construiu-se um índice de governança para as 161 companhias componentes da amostra. O resultado principal desta primeira parte sugere que a estrutura de propriedade influencia a qualidade da governança corporativa. Especificamente, encontrou-se uma relação negativa significante entre o excesso de direito de voto em posse do acionista controlador e a qualidade da governança. Os resultados também indicaram que as empresas maiores, emissoras de ADRs e com melhor desempenho apresentam, em média, melhor governança corporativa. A segunda parte do estudo investigou os determinantes da concentração da propriedade, isto é, os fatores que fazem com que o acionista controlador detenha um percentual maior de ações nas companhias abertas. Aplicando técnicas de dados em painel para o período de 1998 a 2002, os resultados indicaram que a concentração da propriedade não parece ser determinada de forma endógena por outras variáveis corporativas. Os resultados, todavia, dependem do método de estimação dos coeficientes empregado, já que se obteve significância estatística pelo método dos Mínimos Quadrados Ordinário mas não pelos procedimentos de Efeitos Aleatórios e de Efeitos Fixos, que se mostraram mais adequados. A terceira parte da pesquisa investigou a relação entre governança e desempenho por meio de diferentes abordagens econométricas em escala crescente de complexidade. Os resultados não indicaram uma influência significante e consistente da qualidade da governança sobre o desempenho das empresas, já que houve mudança no sentido da relação entre o nível de governança e algumas variáveis de desempenho quando foi aplicada a abordagem de equações simultâneas, em relação aos resultados obtidos nas regressões múltiplas com equações isoladas. Das variáveis de desempenho testadas, Q de Tobin foi a que mostrou a relação positiva mais consistente com a qualidade da governança. Como outros resultados importantes, observou-se que as empresas com menor concentração do direito de voto em posse do controlador, menor nível de endividamento, maior proporção de intangíveis, maior tamanho, emissoras de ADRs e com ações mais líquidas apresentaram, em média, melhor desempenho. A discrepância dos resultados obtidos na relação entre governança corporativa e desempenho, em função da abordagem econométrica empregada, destaca a necessidade de um maior desenvolvimento da teoria sobre governança corporativa, de forma a melhor especificar, por meio de equações estruturais, os relacionamentos entre os diferentes mecanismos de governança. / Corporate governance can be defined as the set of incentive and control mechanisms designed to minimize the costs deriving from the managerial agency problem. The subject is important since it is well spread the hypothesis that governance practices impact firm’s performance. This thesis aims at evaluating if governance mechanisms are exogenous and if they influence market value and profitability of listed companies in Brazil. The research is divided into three interrelated sections. The first section investigated the determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality, trying to uncover which firm’s observable characteristics lead some companies to achieve higher governance ratings than others in the same contractual environment. In order to obtain a proxy for corporate governance quality, a governance index was built for the sample of 161 firms. The main result of the first section suggests that ownership structure influences corporate governance quality. Specifically, it was found a significant negative relationship between the excess of voting shares held by controlling shareholder and corporate governance rating. Furthermore, the results indicated that larger companies, ADR issuers, and firms with better performance have, on average, better corporate governance. The second section investigated the determinants of ownership concentration in Brazil. The analysis aims at uncovering which firm’s characteristics lead some controlling shareholders to have higher concentration of shares. By applying panel data techniques for 1998 to 2002 period, the results indicated that ownership concentration doesn’t seem to be endogenously determined by other corporate variables. The results, however, are sensitive to coefficients’ estimation method. Statistically significant coefficients were found when Ordinary Least Squares were applied. However, this method appeared to be less adequate than Random Effects and Fixed Effect procedures, whose resulting estimates revealed that none of the explanatory variables’ coefficients were statistically significant. The third section investigated the relationship between corporate governance and performance through different econometric approaches in increasing level of complexity. The results didn’t indicate a significant and consistent influence of governance quality on corporate performance, since there was a sign change of the relation between governance level and some performance variables when the simultaneous equation approach was applied, compared with the results obtained by the single equation regressions approach. From the performance variables used, Tobin’s Q showed the more consistent positive relation with governance level. The results also suggest that firms with lower voting rights’ concentration held by controlling shareholder, lower debt level, higher proportion of intangibles assets, larger size, more liquid shares and ADRs issuers show, on average, better performance. The discrepancy of the results on the relation between corporate governance and performance, due to the econometric approach employed, highlights the need for a better development of corporate governance theory, in order to improve the specification, through structural equations, of the relationships between different governance mechanisms.

Submitted by Noeme Timbo (noeme.timbo@metodista.br) on 2017-05-30T18:14:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Kawai .pdf: 1449796 bytes, checksum: cc2bd093c4529296f07cab636da59c5a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-30T18:14:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Kawai .pdf: 1449796 bytes, checksum: cc2bd093c4529296f07cab636da59c5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This study aimed to investigate the influence of corporate governance and three of its internal mechanisms: board of directors, concentration of ownership control and identity of the controlling shareholder, on the management of results in Brazilian listed companies, listed on BM&FBOVESPA. Results quality variables derived from the discretionary accruals determined by two models used as proxy for results management: Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) and McNichols (2002), from 2009 to 2015. As proxy of corporate governance was the corporate governance index prepared by Leal, Carvalhal and Ievorlino (2015) adopted for the year 2015. The comparison between two groups made through non-parametric tests indicating a non-significant relationship between corporate governance and results management, which do not support the theory that corporate governance inhibits results management. In order to verify the relationship between the internal mechanisms of corporate governance and results management, multiple linear regressions using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. In which independent variables: board of directors, control concentration and controller identity; Together with the control variables: return on assets, leverage and company size did not present a statistically significant relationship with the corporate governance dependent variable. There was a negative relationship between company size and results management in both models and the variable return on assets presented a negative relation with the McNichols model. The study suggests that the internal mechanisms of corporate governance are not sufficient to inhibit the management of results measured by models that detect them through discretionary accruals. / Este estudo teve como objetivo investigar a influência da governança corporativa e três de seus mecanismos internos: conselho de administração, concentração de controle de propriedade e identidade do controlador, sobre o gerenciamento de resultados nas empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, não financeiras, listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Foram utilizados como proxy de gerenciamento de resultados as variáveis de qualidade de resultados derivados dos accruals discricionários determinados por dois modelos: o Kang e Sivaramakrishnan (1995) e o McNichols (2002), no período de 2009 a 2015. Como proxy de governança corporativa foi adotado o índice de governança corporativa elaborado por Leal, Carvalhal e Ievorlino (2015), para o ano de 2015. A comparação entre dois grupos foi feita por meio de testes não paramétricos indicando uma relação não significativa entre governança corporativa e gerenciamento de resultados, que não confirmam a teoria de que a governança corporativa inibe o gerenciamento de resultados. Para verificação da relação dos mecanismos internos da governança corporativa com gerenciamento de resultados utilizou-se regressões lineares múltiplas pelo método dos Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários (MQO) em que variáveis independentes: conselho de administração, concentração de controle e identidade do controlador; juntamente com as variáveis de controle: retorno sobre ativo, alavancagem e tamanho da empresa não apresentaram relação estatisticamente significante com a variável dependente da governança corporativa. Houve uma relação negativa entre tamanho da empresa com gerenciamento de resultados nos dois modelos e a variável de retorno sobre ativo apresentou relação negativa com o modelo de McNichols. O estudo sugere que os mecanismos internos da governança corporativa não são suficientes para inibir o gerenciamento de resultados medidos por modelos que os detectam por meio de accruals discricionários.