No description available.

Thesis (doctoral)--University of London, 2000. / BLDSC reference no.: DX211156.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, MO, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 382-421).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1914.

published_or_final_version / English Studies and Comparative Literature / Master / Master of Arts

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<p> <i>Charting Memory, Bob Evans Snapshot,</i> and <i>Mapping Reality</i> began as a personal quest that evolved into an exploration of the relationship of time and space, through the photographic lens, and the relationship they have to memory.</p>

The intentionally ambiguous title of my thesis suggests both the notion of the object at which literary criticism is directed and also the notion of the objective toward which it is directed. The first involves the problems of the identity and ontological status of the literary work, while the second involves the two primary aims of literary criticism: interpretation and evaluation. These four issues are individually analyzed in separate chapters, and my positions on them are presented and defended, while rival positions are critically examined. Moreover, I demonstrate that all four issues are conceptually very closely related and that positions on one inevitably influence positions on the others. [Continued in text ...]

This thesis is in two chapters. Chapter one is about intentions. Literary theorists have, by and large, dismissed their relevance to interpretation, so it will be useful to consider what exactly is being ignored. Therefore, I devote chapter one to a clarification of the nature and role(s) of intention within the interlocking network of basic propositional attitudes. I argue that intentions incorporate both a functional and a representational dimension, triggering actional mechanisms and structuring the process of practical reasoning. / Chapter two is about interpretation. I open the chapter with an examination of extreme conventionalist theses, arguing that their success depends on an unjustifiably strict demarcation between intentionality and textuality. Appropriating aspects of Donald Davidson's work in the philosophy of language, I argue for the recognition of linguistic communication as a form of intentional action. I then defend this thesis against more moderate conventionalist theories to offer a viable approach to the interpretation of literary works.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [392]-401).