Thesis advisor: Ryan Chahrour / Expectations formation is central to macroeconomics. Households, firms, and policymakers must form expectations not only about fundamentals, but about what other agents’ beliefs are, because others’ beliefs will determine their actions. The three essays in this dissertation examine empirically and theoretically how agents use both public and private information to form expectations. The first two essays combine a models of optimizing behavior and forecasting with data on the macroeconomy, financial prices, and macroeconomic forecasts to examine the extent to which economic agents learn about the macroeconomy from financial prices and monetary policy actions. The third essay examines theoretically how members of a committee use public and private information to form beliefs when they care both about having accurate forecasts and coordinating actions with others. All three essays emphasize that frictions in expectations formation are a salient feature of the world, and understanding the extent and importance of those frictions is important for both positive and normative questions in macroeconomics and finance. Beliefs about the future determine the willingness of financial market participants to save and invest, and theory suggests they should value more highly assets which are expected to pay higher returns during recessionary periods when consumption is otherwise low. Hence, financial prices reflect macroeconomic expectations. In the first essay, titled "Macroeconomic Disagreement in Treasury Yields," I explore how agents with idiosyncratic, private information form beliefs about both the macroeconomy and the beliefs of other agents. Using data on United States Treasury debt, the macroeconomy, and individual inflation forecasts, I estimate the precision of bond traders’ information about the macroeconomy and how much they disagree with each other. I allow for traders to learn both from private signals and from asset prices, which aggregate the beliefs of all the traders in the market. I find that bond prices are moderately informative about macroeconomic variables, but are the source of most of the information traders have about monetary policy and the beliefs of others. In contrast to studies which assume full information, risk premia are much less important than slow-adjusting interest rate expectations for explaining the behavior of long-run yields. The most important signal for bond traders appears to be the Federal Reserve’s short-run rate, which encodes information about the macroeconomy and the central bank’s intended future policy. Nevertheless, the fact that traders held disparate beliefs about the macroeconomy, and especially about the long-run inflation target of the Federal Reserve, elevated long-term yields on average. The first essay demonstrates empirically that financial market participants learn about the macroeconomy from monetary policy actions. However, it is silent on how monetary policymakers form beliefs about the macroeconomy, or how the information in monetary policy rates endogenously affects macroeconomic outcomes. In the second essay "Your Guess is as Good as Mine: Central Bank Information and Monetary Policy," I use data on private sector forecasts and forecasts from the Federal Reserve Board staff to examine the typical assumption of common information between firms and monetary policymakers. Using forecasts from a survey of professional forecasters and from the Federal Reserve Board staff, I show evidence against the typical assumption of common information between monetary policymakers and the private sector, and also that policymakers are, at best, only weakly better at forecasting than private forecasters. Based on this evidence, I augment an otherwise standard monetary policy model by relaxing the common information assumption. Instead, I assume there is idiosyncratic, private information among price-setting firms, and between firms and the central banker. Firms combine private information about aggregate conditions with the observed monetary policy rate to form expectations about fundamentals and the beliefs of rival firms. The central banker must form expectations about firms’ beliefs because those beliefs will determine inflation and overall economic activity. But as a result of their differences in information sets, firms must form expectations about other firms’ expectations, and what the central banks’ expectations of their expectations are. I examine the ability of this model to fit the data and find that the model can capture features of both firm and central bank inflation expectations, but in the absence of imperfect information among households, it is difficult to simultaneously match the forecast data and data on real activity. This result points to the sensitivity of models with dispersed information to the underlying assumptions about how central bankers will respond to exogenous shocks. The second chapter emphasized how the assumptions economists make regarding monetary policymakers’ information is critical for understanding their actions. Motivated by this example, my third chapter "Information Investment in a Coordination Game" explores theoretically how members of a committee who are uncertain about others’ beliefs decide on a binary action, and how their decision to pay close attention to public or private signals is related to their desire to accurately forecast versus coordinating their behavior with others. I show that when it is assumed that information decisions among committee members are symmetric - everyone pays the same amount of attention to the same things - there is a unique outcome of the coordination game. However, I further show that it is difficult to guarantee that committee members will all choose a symmetric allocation of information. Aside from the direct cost of acquiring better information, allocating attention to more accurate signals can harm welfare when coordination motives are dominant. In a set of numerical exercises, however, I show that it is possible for a unique equilibrium to exist, and that actions that do not have a large impact on the payoffs of committee members (such as changing the size of the committee) may nevertheless have large impacts on the accuracy of the committee’s forecasts. This suggests a possible tension between the welfare of the committee, which benefits from consensus, and the welfare of those affected by the committee’s actions, which likely depends on whether the committee takes the objectively correct action. My dissertation has important implications for both academic economists and policymakers. Understanding the sources of business cycle fluctuations and the determinants of asset prices requires grappling with the fact that people have differences in beliefs. Empirical evidence suggests that agents’ beliefs are shaped by both idiosyncratic forces and by public announcements and policy decisions, and economists’ models need to reflect these features of the world. Policy, too, is affected by the information available to policymakers, and to understand how policymakers have acted in the past and should act in the future, it is necessary to take seriously the ways their belief formation deviates from the full information rational expectations benchmark.

[pt] Esta tese incorpora três ensaios acerca de fixação de preços com informação rígida e dispersa (IRD). A estrutura básica mistura o modelo de rigidez de informação proposto em Mankiw and Reis (2002) com o modelo de informação dispersa descrito em Morris and Shin (2002). No capítulo 1, obtémse o equilíbrio do jogo assumindo que as firmas se deparam com complementaridade estratégica em suas decisões de preço. Neste contexto, as firmas tomam suas decisões de preço utilizando a informação disponível para prever os preços das outras firmas e a demanda agregada nominal, o fundamento da nossa economia. Estuda-se a importância de cada parâmetro do modelo em vários contextos. No capítulo 2, estende-se o modelo IRD para analisar como a comunicação do banco central interfere na fixação de preços. Como informação pública ajuda às firmas a prever o estado atual da economia e as ações uma das outras, ela ajuda na sincronia dos preços. Este efeito faz a variância da inflação aumentar com a precisão da informação pública. Além disso, o bem-estar da sociedade é afetado pelo fato de que as firmas tomam suas decisões de preços sem considerar como isto influenciará a decisão das outras firmas. No capítulo 3, utilize-se o modelo com IRD para analisar como a fixação de preços muda quando a taxa de juros, além de ser um instrumento de política capaz de influenciar a dinâmica do fundamento, também é vista como um sinal público que informa a visão da autoridade monetária acerca do estado atual da economia. Sob este arcabouço, firmas utilizam a taxa de juros para embasar suas decisões de preços. Obtêm-se também os parâmetros ótimos do instrumento de política (para três medidas diferentes de bem-estar), considerando-se que o banco central sabe que as firmas extraem informação de suas ações. / [en] This thesis encompasses three essays on price setting under stickydispersed information (SDI). The baseline framework mixes the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) with dispersed information models like Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007). In Chapter 1, we derive the equilibrium of the game assuming that firms face strategic complementarity on their pricing decisions. In this context, firms take their pricing decisions using information to build expectations on the prices set by other firms and on the current state of aggregate nominal demand - the fundamental of the economy. In Chapter 2, we extend the SDI model to analyze how central bank communication affects price setting. As public information help firms to infer the current state of the economy and one another s prices, it improves price synchronization. This effect makes inflation variance increase with the precision of the public information. Social welfare is affected by the fact that firms do not internalize how their prices change other firms pricing decisions. In Chapter 3, we use a SDI model to analyze how price setting changes when the interest rate is a policy instrument that not only partially drives the fundamental dynamics, but also it is understood as a public signal that informs the view of the monetary authority on the current state of the economy. Under this framework, firms use interest rate to support their pricing decisions, influencing inflation dynamics. We also obtain the optimal parameters of the policy instrument (regarding three different efficiency criteria), considering that the central bank knows that firms take information from its actions.

[pt] Esta tese consiste em três ensaios teóricos sobre tópicos relativos à fixação de preços sob informação incompleta. Duas características são comuns aos três ensaios: (i) informação heterogênea sobre condições econômicas agregadas e (ii) um grau moderado de complementaridade estratégica nas decisões de preços. No Capítulo 1, estuda-se a transmissão de informação em um modelo com estágios de produção e informação dispersa. Firmas observam sinais sobre os preços dos insumos que endogenizam a precisão da informação que é pública dentro de um estágio, mas não entre os estágios. Em contraste com o caso com sinal público exógeno, as firmas decidem otimamente atribuir menos peso a informação pública ao longo da cadeia. Uma implicação é que a precisão da informação, que ficaria inalterada com sinais públicos exógenos, decresce ao longo da cadeia com sinais semi-públicos endógenos. No Capítulo 2, examinase o processo de repasse cambial (ERPT) para os preços em um modelo de informação dispersa onde a taxa de câmbio nominal fornece informação sobre os fundamentos de forma imperfeita. Quando a informação é completa, ERPT também é completa. Sob informação dispersa, o modelo apresenta três propriedades consistentes com os fatos estilizados de ERPT. Primeiro, ERPT está entre 0 e 1. Segundo, ERPT é normalmente maior para produtos importados do que para produtos ao consumidor. Terceiro, ERPT é maior para economias emergente e diminuiu ao longo do tempo tanto para economias industrializadas quanto emergentes. Finalmente, no Capítulo 3, estuda-se a interação entre rigidez e dispersão de informação através da introdução de sinais com ruído em um modelo padrão de curva de Phillips com rigidez de informação. O modelo de informação rígida e dispersa (SDI) resultante apresenta como casos particulares os modelos de informação completa, dispersa e rígida. Estuda-se a relevância individual dos principais parâmetros do modelo em várias direções. Primeiro, analisa-se o impacto dos valores corrente e passados da inflação com informação completa na inflação corrente. Segundo, consideram-se as respostas da inflação a choques monetários. Finalmente, compara-se a variância da inflação SDI com as variâncias da inflação quando a informação é completa, dispersa ou rígida. / [en] This thesis consists of three theoretical essays on topics in price setting under imperfect information. Unifying the essays are two features: (i) heterogeneous information about aggregate economic conditions and (ii) a moderate degree of complementarity in pricing decisions. In Chapter 1, the transmission of information is studied in a model with a vertical input-output structure and dispersed information. Firms observe input prices with noise that endogenize the precision of information that is public within a stage but not across stages. In contrast to the case with an exogenous and overall public signal, firms find it optimal to rely less on public information along the chain. A direct implication is that, while information precision remains unchanged with exogenous public signals, it decreases along the chain when semi-public signals are endogenous. In Chapter 2, exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT) to prices is examined in a model of dispersed information where the nominal exchange rate imperfectly conveys information about the underlying fundamentals. If the information is complete, ERPT is also complete. Under dispersed information, the model displays three properties that are consistent with the stylized facts of passthrough. First, ERPT lies between 0 and 1. Second, ERPT is usually higher for imported goods prices than for consumer prices. Third, ERPT is higher for emerging market countries and declines over time for both industrial and emerging market economies. Finally, in Chapter 3, the interaction between information stickiness and dispersion is studied by introducing noisy signals in an otherwise standard sticky-information Phillips curve. The model of stickydispersed information (SDI) nests as special cases the complete information, the dispersed information and the sticky information models. The individual relevance of each of the main parameters of the model is studied in several directions. First, the impact of current and past complete-information inflation rates on current inflation is analyzed. Second, the inflation response to monetary shocks is considered. Finally, the variance of SDI inflation is compared with the variances of complete, dispersed, or sticky-information inflations.