The need for programme management to align, coordinate and manage a portfolio of construction projects to deliver benefits that would not be achievable if the projects were managed independently in a turbulent economic environment, limitations of project management, and increasing stakeholder expectations cannot be over emphasised. In the construction industry, the implementation of programme management has been bedevilled with major challenges of which the North West Department of Public Works (DPW) CAPEX programme is no exception. The CAPEX programme has been noted for delivering fewer infrastructure projects as planned in terms of budget, time, and other expectations. The research documented in this treatise thus examined the existing programme management approach of the North West DPW CAPEX programme with respect to generally accepted standards and practices. A mixed research approach was used to identify problems such as delays in payment of works, poor reporting standards, improper planning of works, procurement difficulties, and inadequate management structures. The results point to excessive bureaucratic processes, improper information management systems and lack of commitment and ownership towards government works as the major underlying causes of the programme predicaments. Dogmatic implementation of government’s black economic empowerment policies and inadequate in-house capacity were also contributing factors. The research findings imply that effective processes should be laid for prompt payment of works certificates and invoices. Improved reporting standards and proper planning of the programme as a whole and its constituent projects is necessary for the attainment of stipulated goals. In particular, it is crucial to ensure that adequate management considerations in terms of capacity, infrastructure, structures and expertise are put in place while the procurement processes should be continually reviewed for programme success purposes.

My dissertation is a study of the conditions under which state-owned enterprises improve infrastructure services--transport, energy, and water--particularly in developing countries. This research is relevant because, despite successful privatization of infrastructure that yielded over trillion and a half dollars in investments since 1990, infrastructure provision remains dominated by state-owned enterprises (Estache & Fay, 2007; Gomez-Ibanez, 2003). The OECD estimates that over the next two decades, US $35 to 40 trillion will be required to meet the global infrastructure deficit. At least half of this investment will be made by governments, particularly in, but not limited to, developing countries (OECD, 2007). In contrast to conventional wisdom, my research identifies mechanisms for reforming public infrastructure utilities through a new recipe for an inclusive reform framework that, unlike the textbook approach, jointly optimizes equity and efficiency without privatization. This dissertation contrasts the world's largest public utility, the Indian Railways, with the ideal-type textbook privatization, illustrated with the case of the British Railways' privatization. I focus on the Indian Railways as a paradigmatic example of how to reform infrastructure-providing state-owned enterprises while balancing equity with efficiency concerns. I analyze primary data gathered through 100 in-depth interviews and on-site observations. The fieldwork was conducted over a period of two years, including half a year at the Office of the Minister for Indian Railways. In addition, I utilize secondary data through archival review of policy documents and analyze fifty years of the Railways' statistics. My dissertation shows how the Indian Railways was transformed, between 2005-2008, counter intuitively, without privatization, retrenchment, or fare-hikes for poor passengers, under the leadership of a populist politician, the then Minister of Railways. I explain how the Railways' was rescued from near bankruptcy in 2001 to realize US $6 billion annual surplus in 2008. An essential element of the Indian Railway's complex strategy was to leverage existing assets by operating faster, longer, and heavier trains on the supply-side, as opposed to investing in asset accumulation. On the demand-side, the Railways shed a monopoly mind-set in favor of customer centric, dynamic, and differential pricing and service provision. Based on the positive case of Indian Railways, I derive an equitable alternative to infrastructure reform: A tripartite inclusive reform framework--diagnostic, invention, and agency. First, crafting space for reform by diagnosis and navigation of conflicting and competing interest groups to isolate apolitical variables that jointly increase efficiency and equity outcomes. Second, reinventing reforms by focusing on all manipulable variables for supply optimization and demand responsiveness, because profit in public utilities is a function of several manipulable variables, not only fares and wages. Third, agency, through radical incrementalism, an approach to minimize the risk of catastrophic errors, and yet yield rapid transformations.

Zugl.: Göttingen, Univ., Diss., 2005. / In: Springer-Online.

Diss. Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2008. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).

Diss. Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2008. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).

Diss. Universität Chemnitz, 2008. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).

Diss. Universität Chemnitz, 2008. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).

Diss. Universität Bremen, 2008. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).

Diss. Universität Bremen, 2008. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).

Dissertation, Universität zu Köln, 2009. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).