This paper investigates the determinants of sovereign debt crises by using cross-country data from 1977 to 2010. In particular, I focus on the structure of sovereign debt by analysing the debt composition (domestic versus external), maturity structure (short-term versus long-term), composition type (bank loans versus bond) and currency denomination (domestic currency versus foreign currency) of debts. I also assess whether the previous history of banking and currency crises affect the likelihood of a sovereign debt crisis. The results suggest that both the structures of debt and the past history of other financial crises are important determinants of debt crises. The results are robust when using alternative measures to understand the risks of sovereign debt. I also investigate the impacts of debt structure and past financial crises history on the levels and changes of foreign and local currency long-term debt credit ratings.

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This study investigates the theology of wealth, with reference to the parables of Jesus, in dialogue with recent Irish economic history. Poverty is commonly seen as a societal problem, but in the teaching of Jesus, especially in his parables, the status of the wealthy is called into question. This thesis explores what it means to be followers of Jesus in societies where historically high levels of wealth and comfort are widespread. It begins by considering that societal context, naming neoliberalism as the complex of economic, political, and cultural factors that combine to generate wealth. The parables of Jesus are introduced as a collection of narratives which puncture the philosophical assumptions at work in neoliberalism. Reading them after the twentieth century Swiss theologian Karl Barth, the parables are found to be apocalyptic interruptions which reorientate the reader towards the reign of God. With these two strands – neoliberalism and the parables – in play, the thesis reconsiders Ireland's recent economic history. It is argued that the ethical significance of the “Celtic Tiger” boom and the subsequent 2008 crash is best accessed not via the language of economics but through narratives. The re-telling of the events of the crash and its aftermath through parables exposes how markets are embedded in thick cultural, historical, and political settings and how simple and settled statistical accounts can miss much of ethical significance. The decisive chapter takes up the constructive task. Building on this re-described account of a wealthy society, it proposes that the appropriate response for Christians to the problem of wealth is to turn to worship as a reparative therapy that forms congregations in practices and ways-of-seeing that run counter to the normative perceptions of neoliberalism. This is achieved by means of a robust engagement with the work of the contemporary moral theologian, William Cavanaugh. A final chapter underlines the original contribution of the project, sketches some future areas of research, and proposes that lament is the initial stance that results from this study.

The market consensus during the financial crisis was that financial sector CEOs were engaged in excessive risk taking induced by compensation practices. Thus, the primary focus of this paper is to determine whether empirical evidence supports this assertion. As such, I examine bank CEO compensation, bank risks, and the relation between bank CEO risk taking incentives and bank risks and the effect of the 2007/9 financial crisis on this relation. I find that banks on average reduced their exposure to credit, capital, total, and unsystematic risks, and increased their exposure to liquidity, portfolio, off-balance sheet and (accounting) foreign exchange risks, from 2003 to 2006. These trends largely reversed during 2007 to 2009. During the 2007/9 financial crisis, banks experienced significant structural shifts in all risk indicators (except for capital and foreign exchange risks) which increased significantly consequent on the economic downturn. I also find that banks remained highly sensitive to changes in short- and long-term interest rates and foreign exchanges rates throughout the period. My findings also support a bank size effect. I observe consistent real growth in CEO base salary annually, from 2003 to 2009, which suggests that there is resilience in this form of compensation to the financial crisis. However, only small banks paid significantly higher base salary during the financial crisis to offset the similar decline in annual bonus payments caused by deteriorating financial and market performances during that time. I find that CEO portfolio option values were more responsive to changes in total risk during the pre-financial crisis period (2003 to 2006) than during the financial crisis (2007 to 2009). Also, I find evidence of banks size effects in compensation components, compensation structure and compensation sensitivity. My results are robust to other sample formations and statistical indicators. After adjusting for the simultaneity bias between bank CEOs' risk taking incentives (measured by the sensitivity of CEO option portfolio and pay for performance sensitivity) and bank risks (using accounting and market based measures), my findings reveal significant shifts in the relation between compensation and bank risks during the financial crisis. Specifically, during the financial crisis, CEOs with more sensitive pay for performance were related to banks with greater capital risk, and banks with higher portfolio risk had CEOs with more sensitive pay for performance. Also, banks with greater total and unsystematic risks during the financial crisis had CEOs with less risk taking incentives. Other indicators during the financial crisis show that less stable banks had CEOs with less risk taking incentives, while banks with greater asset return risk had CEOs with less sensitive option portfolios. Overall, these results do not support the risk inducing incentives of bank CEO compensation especially during the financial crisis.

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This paper applies a cross-sectional regression analysis of 83 countries over the period 2009-11 in order to examine the role played by the exchange-rate regime in explaining how countries fared in terms of economic growth recovery following the recent financial crisis. After controlling for income categorization, regime classification, using alternative regime definitions, and accounting for various other determinants, the paper finds a significant relationship between the regime choice and the recovery performance, where those countries with more flexible arrangements fared better. These results were conditional on the regime classification scheme and the income level, implying an asymmetric effect of the regime during the recovery period between high and low income countries. The paper also finds that proxies for initial conditions as well as trade and financial channels were highly significant determinants of the growth performance during the recovery period.

Purpose – The purpose of this research project is to explore the research question – how does the pursuit of agenda of regulatory reforms, post the crisis, influence governance arrangements at banks and assist them in maintaining resilience during subsequent episodes of crises?Research methodology – The project adopts a comparative case study approach involving a mixture of review of secondary resources and fieldwork interviews across East Asian nations. Findings – The project applied the Minskian Financial Instability Hypothesis to the 1997 East Asian crisis. It explored the macro-economic and policy environment during 1990s for highlighting institutional failures at the heart of the crisis. The interview findings offered contextual setting and diverse perspectives for regulatory reforms aimed at improving bank governance, post the crisis. The experience of case study banks outlined the impact of regulatory reforms on banking business models, post the crisis. The role of post-1997-crisis regulatory reforms in bringing about East Asian resilience, during the 2007 crisis, is thus analysed in the research project. Practical implications – The research project provides emerging economy perspective to regulatory reforms and offers policy-level recommendations for banks, regulatory authorities, corporate borrowers, and statutory auditors in maintaining governance standards conductive to financial stability in the long run. Originality – The project claims originality of application, interpretation and evaluation (which are considered as building blocks for “academic contribution”) of an important academic theory in the context of financial crises – Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. It integrates the aspects of financial instability, regulatory reforms and bank governance in the context of East Asian financial crisis by introducing the concept of “economic responsibilities” of market participants from emerging economies.

Magistro baigiamajame darbe atliktas finansinių krizių prognozavimo galimybių tyrimas. Pirmojoje darbo dalyje yra vertinama ir analizuojama finansinės krizės samprata, apibrėžiamas finansinės krizės gyvavimo ciklas ir nustatomi finansinės krizės pradžią identifikuojantys rodikliai. Antroje darbo dalyje yra vertinama finansinių krizių prognozavimo metodologija, kuri yra naudojama kitų autorių tyrimuose. Antroje dalyje taip pat vertinamas pasirinktų finansinių krizių pradžios momentą apibrėžiančių kintamųjų tinkamumas, pasirenkami nepriklausomieji kintamieji bei apibrėžiama tyrimo metodologija. Trečioji darbo dalis yra skirta pagrindiniam tyrimui, kurio metu tiesinės regresijos metodu yra tikrinama galimybė prognozuoti finansines krizės pradžią pasitelkus pasirinktus nepriklausomus kintamuosius. Atlikus tyrimą pateikiamos išvados ir rekomendacijos tolimesniems moksliniams tyrimams bei valdžios institucijoms, atsakingoms už finansų sistemų priežiūrą. / The main task of the Master‘s degree final work is to implement the research of financial crises’ prediction possibility. Financial crisis, financial crisis cycle and the initial stage of financial crisis are identified in the first part of the work. The second part of the work consists of the analysis of financial crises’ prediction methodologies, which were implemented by other scientists, evaluation of selected dependent variables for the identification of financial crises starting point, selection of independent variables for the prediction of financial crises and the methodology of the main research. The results of the main research and calculations of correlations and linear regressions are presented in the third part of the work. The research ends with conclusions and recommendations for government institutions and further studies of financial crises’ predictability.

Economic resilience has recently enjoyed increased popularity in academic discourse, especially after the 2008 Global Crisis played havoc across the globe, but is as of now still in its infancy: A commonly agreed upon definition is yet to be found, and papers devoted to this concept are still rather scarce. It is commonly known that the manufacturing industries in European economies have generally been in decline for decades, and that they have primarily been replaced by the services sector. It has however been argued in the past that due to relatively high sunk costs, there is increased incentive for investors to keep manufacturing enterprises afloat during difficult times as long as possible, making them less likely to go out of business compared to others, thereby minimizing the initial blow of an economic shock to the respective economy and subsequently foster recovery. These assumptions are being examined in this paper by analysing data from the EU-28 starting at the outbreak of the 2008 crisis until 2015, followed by an investigation of individual economies in greater detail. The results show that more industrialised economies tend to have fared better during the crisis years and also managed to recover sooner.

This thesis studies the relationships between systematic risk, financial indicators and the financial crisis from the perspective of international airlines. The thesis uses the CAPM beta of airline stock as the proxy for airline systematic risk and explores its relationships with six financial indicators and the financial crisis which broke out in the second half of 2008. The findings of 28 international airlines over the period of 1997 to 2002 and 2007 to 2012 indicate that (1) airline systematic risk is negatively related to profitability and positively related to size, and these relationships hold over time periods, (2) the negative relationship between airline systematic risk and operational efficiency exists while it changes the sign over recent time periods, (3) airline systematic risk positively responds to financial leverage while its significance is influenced by samples used, (4) the positive relationship between airline systematic risk and liquidity is only significant over the first period, (5) no findings suggest airline systematic risk is related to growth. Moreover, the relationship between airline systematic risk and the financial crisis is not straight-forward because of lacking clear-cut judgment of the financial crisis year for airlines. Moreover, this thesis also tries panel data methods and finds both the same and different results compared with the model without panel data methods.