This research examines the recent global financial crisis’ (GFC) impact on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and analyses governments’ responses. According to most literature, SMEs already faced obstacles prior to the GFC, such as paying high taxes, overcoming low profitability, being affected by rising business costs, finding qualified labour, dealing with increasing competition, etc. The GFC has had serious repercussions for SMEs with respect to financing, markets, and liquidity. In order to explore in depth the governments’ responses, qualitative methods are employed to test the following three research questions: 1) To what extent did governments aim to assist SMEs to survive the GFC? What types of programs have been implemented to address new and existing obstacles? 2) Did governments apply appropriate strategic initiatives to realize their goals? If the initiatives could not achieve the governments’ original goals, what obstacles did they address? 3) Did governments tend to help SMEs more after the GFC? Did governments give up on disadvantaged firms or did they try to help them survive the crisis? Analysis revealed that, as a result of the GFC, governments developed programs aimed at new obstacles and at some of the existing ones. The aims did not differ materially for developed and less-developed economies. Financing and taxation programs tended to be designed to achieve their goals directly, where other programs tended to achieve them in a more indirect manner. Overall, government initiatives covered most of the serious obstacles faced by SMEs and government assistance programs aimed at SMEs tended to have been augmented in light of the GFC.

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This study examines the timeliness of write-downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The timeliness of write-downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write-down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that accounting write-downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write-downs, I document that higher corporate governance quality is positively related to timelier write-downs. Furthermore, I observe that regulatory investigations and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write-downs, whereas the write-downs by firms with more complex exposures, higher financial leverage, and tighter regulatory constraints are less timely. In addition, I control for numerous exposure-specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures, and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis, were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, this study finds that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write-downs.

This study examines the timeliness of write-downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The timeliness of write-downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write-down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that accounting write-downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write-downs, I document that higher corporate governance quality is positively related to timelier write-downs. Furthermore, I observe that regulatory investigations and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write-downs, whereas the write-downs by firms with more complex exposures, higher financial leverage, and tighter regulatory constraints are less timely. In addition, I control for numerous exposure-specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures, and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis, were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, this study finds that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write-downs.

Prior literature finds that firms incur a lower cost of debt capital when they voluntarily disclose information. However, the economic literature demonstrates that creditors' lending standards become more stringent (lax) when credit is rationed (abundant) suggesting that they value voluntary disclosure from borrowers differentially across credit market regimes. I draw upon the economic and finance literature on credit rationing to test whether the effects of voluntary disclosure on firms' cost of debt capital is greater during periods of credit rationing. I provide some evidence that confirms this prediction. Moreover, I provide some evidence that this relation is stronger for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing suggesting that creditors value voluntary disclosure more from firms that have fewer resources to cover the increased agency cost of lending during periods of credit rationing.

This research examines the recent global financial crisis’ (GFC) impact on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and analyses governments’ responses. According to most literature, SMEs already faced obstacles prior to the GFC, such as paying high taxes, overcoming low profitability, being affected by rising business costs, finding qualified labour, dealing with increasing competition, etc. The GFC has had serious repercussions for SMEs with respect to financing, markets, and liquidity. In order to explore in depth the governments’ responses, qualitative methods are employed to test the following three research questions: 1) To what extent did governments aim to assist SMEs to survive the GFC? What types of programs have been implemented to address new and existing obstacles? 2) Did governments apply appropriate strategic initiatives to realize their goals? If the initiatives could not achieve the governments’ original goals, what obstacles did they address? 3) Did governments tend to help SMEs more after the GFC? Did governments give up on disadvantaged firms or did they try to help them survive the crisis? Analysis revealed that, as a result of the GFC, governments developed programs aimed at new obstacles and at some of the existing ones. The aims did not differ materially for developed and less-developed economies. Financing and taxation programs tended to be designed to achieve their goals directly, where other programs tended to achieve them in a more indirect manner. Overall, government initiatives covered most of the serious obstacles faced by SMEs and government assistance programs aimed at SMEs tended to have been augmented in light of the GFC.

Although financial innovations and deregulations are often argued to be one of the main causes of the current global financial crises, there are only a few cross-country empirical evidences. Using several proxy variables for different types of innovations and regulations of a total of 132 countries, this thesis analyzes the effects of various types of financial innovations and regulations on several types of financial crisis such as currency crisis and banking crisis, for countries with different income levels. The thesis shows that financial innovation in the form of securitization has a negative effect on a country’s financial stability, while stronger regulations in the form of restrictions on bank activities and entry requirements are positively associated with the financial stability. However, judicious implementation of financial regulations is required to cope with the financial crisis because some types of regulations, if implemented simultaneously, have countervailing effects and may exacerbate the financial crisis.

Abstract In the recent years, there has been a wave of financial globalization and it caused the rapid expansion of financial markets, financial markets become more open, capital flows speeded greatly, and new financial product published in the market, increased the degree of mutual influence. In the 2007, the subprime mortgage of America caused the global financial crisis. Most invest banks such as Lehman Brother and brokers and lots of investors were hurt deeply by the financial crisis and the assets reduced rapidly as well. Due to the collapse of the financial system, lots of banks need to issue new financial product like Dual Currency Deposit (DCD) to customers instead of structure note. However, the new financial products have sold very well, it caused great concern to the government to restrict strictly to financial consultants and establish the classification for investors. The thesis use survey research and collect relevant reference to discuss the change of the investors¡¦ investment behavior and risk preference of the new financial products after the financial crisis. The questionnaire can be divided into four parts which are personal data¡Binvestor¡¦s risk attributes¡Bthe risk of new financial products and investment related information. In conclusion, we found the level of personal risk and commodity risk inconsistently. For the reason, the investment risk does affect the confidence of investors after the financial crisis. Furthermore, the financial institutions can target the groups of 40-49 year old ages as the future marketing. Most respondents believed that the investment environment between Taiwan and Hong Kong are different in financial policies¡Bfinancial officers knowledge. Consequently, we wish can provide Taiwan financial institutions for further reference for professional investors with specialized service and qualified financial consultants. Keyword: financial crisis, structured product, risk, investment behavior, survey research

This study aimed to explore the business strategies of large financial groups and risk management, analysis of its implementation in practice strategy and decision-making process, and the development of this policy consideration. Understanding of how large financial holding group do its own resources and risk management controls in the financial turmoil of can be maintained after the high-performance business performance and strategy differences before and after the financial crisis This study using case study research made exploratory study foundings that with framework of the theory, according to the theory of the systematic collection, induction and data analysis. Research framework is divided into six items: 1.Analysis of the financial industry environment: 2.Before the financial crisis management strategy of the case company's direction. 3. after the financial crisis management strategy of the case company's direction. 4. Response strategy in the future. On selection of Fubon Financial and Cathay Financial Holding and Citigroup Bank of Taiwan.The research findings before and after the strategy differences between the financial financial crisis are listed as below: 1. The strategy differences for Cathay Financial Holding (1)Reorientation recruitment of manpower; (2).More attention to personnel training function; (3).More and more extensive range of professional services; (4). Information technology continue to improve; (5). Risk management control situations contractor for the previous high-risk business 2. The strategy differences for Fubon Financial Holding (1).To attracts more international and the recognition concept of talents; (2). From quantity to quality education and training aspects of the improvement; (3). Actively seeking to expand overseas business base; (4). Emphasis on providing clients with timely and consistent with the needs of the product; (5). Information processing and improve the marketing and organizational effectiveness; (6). On the action more attention to risk management and implementation. 3. The strategy differences for Citigroup Bank of Taiwan (1). More attention to human quality of staff; (2). Employees to obtain relevant training and professional certifications pay more attention to; (3). After the branch has continued to expand product reach economies of scale advantages; (4). Development of the past, Taiwan has not been exposed to products and services; (5). Information technology upgrading hardware and software facilities; (6). into Citigroup's risk control mechanisms.

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 was a serious economic downturn which affected economies around the world. Like many other areas of investment, pension funds were heavily affected by this crisis. Prior to the GFC, a combination of financial innovation, demand for higher returns, overdependence on ratings agencies and investor complacency increased the severity of the crisis on investors, including those in pensions. As a result of the crisis, we can conclude that there have been changes in the attitudes towards asset management for pension funds. Investors have generally become more conservative when investing, and are placing a greater emphasis on the risk/return profile of investments. In addition, investors have learned that liquidity risk is an important consideration when investing, and that they should always consider the fundamentals of investing when they are making investment decisions. Finally, those investing in pensions should remember that pension investment is a long-term strategy and should not be overly alarmed by an economic downturn such as that of the GFC.