This thesis is about (a) money supply being determined by banking behaviour, or by the behaviour of central banks and (b) the influence of money supply on bank stock returns. That money is endogenously determined is a proposition of post-Keynesian (PK) economists suggesting that money supply is determined by the behaviour of commercial banks as banks adjust money creation in response to credit demands by the public. This theory challenges the monetarist view of exogenous money supply, where the central bank is said to control money supply. This thesis examines how, under the credit-creation behaviour of banks, the money supply affects bank stock returns in a multi-equation model.

Following the Basel Committee’s advocacy of value-at-risk (VaR) disclosure in external reports of financial institutions, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued Financial Reporting Release No. 48 to permit VaR disclosure as one of the most important disclosure approaches for market-risk quantitative information in 1997. This study is the first to empirically examine both economic determinants and consequences of VaR disclosure informativeness in the banking industry. First, this study finds that more informative VaR disclosure is associated with more effective corporate governance characteristics, including better shareholder protection, a larger and more independent board, the presence of a separate risk committee under the board of directors, a more independent risk committee, higher institutional ownership and a better overall governance environment. These results suggest that corporate governance mechanisms are important determinants of the informativeness of VaR disclosure. Second, the evidence shows that the cost of equity capital is negatively associated with the informativeness of VaR disclosure, consistent with informative VaR disclosure effectively communicating private information to investors about a bank’s market risk exposure and its risk management system. Additional evidence during the recent crisis further suggests the importance of VaR disclosure informativeness to the capital market as a strong signal reflecting the efficacy of risk management practices and the quality of risk governance mechanisms. However, I still find that a large proportion of the sample banks choose not to disclose information with respect to some important disclosure items (e.g., quantitative stress-test results, and non-trading portfolio VaR). It is necessary for government regulators to re-consider the current regulation on VaR disclosure in the external reports of the banking industry.

This study examines the timeliness of write-downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The timeliness of write-downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write-down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that accounting write-downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write-downs, I document that higher corporate governance quality is positively related to timelier write-downs. Furthermore, I observe that regulatory investigations and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write-downs, whereas the write-downs by firms with more complex exposures, higher financial leverage, and tighter regulatory constraints are less timely. In addition, I control for numerous exposure-specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures, and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis, were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, this study finds that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write-downs.

Following the Basel Committee’s advocacy of value-at-risk (VaR) disclosure in external reports of financial institutions, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued Financial Reporting Release No. 48 to permit VaR disclosure as one of the most important disclosure approaches for market-risk quantitative information in 1997. This study is the first to empirically examine both economic determinants and consequences of VaR disclosure informativeness in the banking industry. First, this study finds that more informative VaR disclosure is associated with more effective corporate governance characteristics, including better shareholder protection, a larger and more independent board, the presence of a separate risk committee under the board of directors, a more independent risk committee, higher institutional ownership and a better overall governance environment. These results suggest that corporate governance mechanisms are important determinants of the informativeness of VaR disclosure. Second, the evidence shows that the cost of equity capital is negatively associated with the informativeness of VaR disclosure, consistent with informative VaR disclosure effectively communicating private information to investors about a bank’s market risk exposure and its risk management system. Additional evidence during the recent crisis further suggests the importance of VaR disclosure informativeness to the capital market as a strong signal reflecting the efficacy of risk management practices and the quality of risk governance mechanisms. However, I still find that a large proportion of the sample banks choose not to disclose information with respect to some important disclosure items (e.g., quantitative stress-test results, and non-trading portfolio VaR). It is necessary for government regulators to re-consider the current regulation on VaR disclosure in the external reports of the banking industry.

This study examines the timeliness of write-downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The timeliness of write-downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write-down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that accounting write-downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write-downs, I document that higher corporate governance quality is positively related to timelier write-downs. Furthermore, I observe that regulatory investigations and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write-downs, whereas the write-downs by firms with more complex exposures, higher financial leverage, and tighter regulatory constraints are less timely. In addition, I control for numerous exposure-specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures, and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis, were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, this study finds that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write-downs.

Master of Science / Department of Agricultural Economics / Christine Wilson / Allen Featherstone / The objectives of this thesis are to examine the banking strategy of Kansas farmers and to analyze the determinants of lender choice among Kansas farmers. To meet these objectives, econometric analysis was used to examine the financial characteristics of the farm that affect the number of banking relationships and the probability a farmer has a loan with a respective lender. The financial characteristics include variables representing the solvency, liquidity, and profitability of the farm. To analyze banking strategy, a poisson model was estimated to determine how the financial characteristics of the farm affect the number of banking relationships used by the farmer. The solvency, liquidity, and profitability of a farmer was analyzed to examine how these measures affect how many banking relationships the respective farmer has. Additionally, a panel data fixed effects model was used to analyze how the number of banking relationships affects the net farm income of the farm. To analyze the determinants of lender choice for Kansas farmers, six probit models were used to determine how farm and financial characteristics, including dollar amount of inventory for certain assets and dollar amount of loans, affect the probabililty the farmer has a loan with the respective lender. A Heckman selection model was used to further analyze the dollar amount of loans a farmer has with a respective lender using information from the probit models. Results of the study show that the higher the debt to asset ratio the farmer has, the more banking relationships the respective farmer has. It was also found that the amount of inventory for certain asset classifications, dollar amount loans, and the financial characteristics affect the lender the farmer chooses to use.

Master of Agribusiness / Department of Agricultural Economics / Bryan Schurle / Quantifying the impact of various economic events is essential for risk management in community banks. Interest rate shocks of either rapidly increasing or decreasing rates, in magnitudes of at least 200 basis points, is one of the more common risks modeled. Liquidity crises that impact deposits or loan demand can arise from either local or national economic events is another risk factor that regulators are requiring banks to quantify and plan for. Excel spreadsheets can be used to develop models to measure and quantify these risks. Simulation tools and what-if analysis using data table and scenario manager identify possible outcomes for differing interest rate scenarios, interest rate shocks and liquidity stresses. Data table was used for simulation of a stochastic model to produce a cumulative distribution function of two hundred results each on three different interest rate environments. Scenario manager was used to narrow the simulation to a certain set of expectations affecting the balance sheet of the bank and another set of expectations from an interest rate shock. Changes in the bank’s balance sheet resulting from three different commodity price expectations were modeled. An interest rate shock of four hundred basis points over a two year period was also modeled. These models are simple and cost effective. Once data are captured, the time required to develop and generate scenarios is manageable. The model can be used for a wide range of what-if alternatives as an individual bank may see fit. These models are adequate to meet present regulatory requirements for a community bank of smaller size that is not complex and does not possess a high risk profile.