No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

The aim of this paper is to provide insights of market intelligence and answer to the question “What is market intelligence?” by reviewing existing literature of market intelligence. This study also aims to investigate the connection between market intelligence and Game theory, which is believed by the authors to create the foundation for market intelligence studies. The search of relevant material for this literature review was conducted by using the databases of Halmstad University and Google Scholar. Due to the lack of literature on market intelligence as an overall theory, also other literature, such as books, were utilized besides the articles. This study recognizes six theoretical connections based on the reviewed literature and Game theory. Also, a general definition of market intelligence was recognized as a result of the literature review.

Ma thèse étudie le mécanisme de l’acquisition et de l’approvisionnement des informations. Il est appliqué à trois situations. Le premier chapitre (travaillé avec Georgy Lukyanov) développe un modèle dans lequel l’émetteur communique stratégiquement avec un groupe de récepteurs. Les gains des récepteurs dépendent des informations de l’émetteur. Ceci indique que, en dépit de la bienveillance de l’émetteur, le conflit des intérêts entre l’émetteur et les récepteurs apparaît de façon endogène à la présence de friction de la coordination. Par conséquent, l’équilibre de communication est imparfait : les nouvelles extrêmes, bonnes ou mauvaises, sont relevées mais les nouvelles relativement neutres ne sont pas prises en compte. Donc, un biais exogène dans les préférences de l’émetteur peut améliorer la communication et augmenter le bien-être. Le second chapitre (travaillé avec Takuro Yamashita) parle du problème de la divulgation optimale des informations dans le mécanisme désigné où le principal peut s’engager dans sa divulgation et aussi dans son mécanisme. Au début, on offre un résultat caractéristique pour optimiser la politique de révélation complète. Pour appliquer le résultat, on montre que le principal (vendeur) préfère toujours révéler toutes les informations relatives aux récepteurs de la vente aux enchères générale. Dans le cas du commerce bilatéral où son but est le surplus avec une légère condition sur l’environnement, il ne trouve pas optimal de révéler toutes les informations. Pour une procédure de vote, les votants peuvent choisir entre le statu quo et la réforme. On démontre que le principal doit révéler toutes les informations sur le bénéfice global mais qu’il ne doit révéler aucune information sur le bénéfice individuel de chaque agent. Dans le troisième chapitre on montre que, contrairement à l’idée conventionnelle selon laquelle les agents qui ont des convictions hétérogènes vont s’entendre à long terme (suite aux nouvelles informations), leurs convictions peuvent diverger s’ils sont rationnellement inattentifs. Quand l’attention a un coût, le choix optimal des agents est d’accepter les nouvelles informations qui leur paraissent plus vraisemblables. Cela va conduire à un apprentissage conformiste. Ainsi, les agents qui ont des croyances éloignées de la vérité réagiront moins que les agents qui ont des croyances proches de la vérité. Ceci va mener à une divergence de leurs anticipations. Je caractérise la condition de la divergence de croyance et je montre que ça a plus de chance d’arriver quand la vérité est plus extrême et que le coût de l’attention est moins important. / My thesis studies the mechanism of endogenous information acquisition and provision, and applies it into three applications. The first chapter (joint with Georgy Lukyanov) develops a model in which the sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender’s information. It is shown that, in the presence of coordination frictions, conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers arises endogenously, in spite of the sender’s benevolence. As a result, equilibrium communication is imperfect: extremely good or bad news get disclosed, while relatively “neutral” information is withheld. Consequently, an exogenous bias in the sender’s preferences can improve communication and raise welfare. The second chapter (joint with Takuro Yamashita) considers the problem of optimal information disclosure in mechanism design where the principal can commit to his disclosure policy as well as to his mechanism. We first provide a characterization result for the optimality of the full disclosure policy. Applying this result, in a generalized auction setting we show that the principal (seller) always prefers to disclose all the relevant information to the agents. In a bilateral trade setting where his objective is surplus, under a mild condition on the environment, he does not find optimal to reveal all the information. In a voting application where voters choose between either the status quo or a reform, we show that the principal should reveal all information regarding to the aggregate benefit from the reform but reveal no information about individual benefit for each agent. The third chapter shows that, in contrast to conventional idea that agents with heterogenous beliefs will agree in the long-term as they learn from new information, their beliefs may diverge if agents’ learning is rationally inattentive. When attention is costly, agents optimally choose to acquire potentially new information which they believe most likely to come, leading to a conformism learning. Hence, agents whose initial beliefs are far from the truth will react less often compared to agents whose beliefs are closer to the truth, leading to a divergence in agents’ beliefs in expectation. I characterize the condition for belief divergence and show that it is more likely to happen when the truth is more extreme and the attention cost is moderate.

Thesis advisor: Richard J. Arnott / This dissertation comprises three papers that are concerned with the implications of strategic interactions between a finite set of agents in private goods economies. One form of strategic behavior I consider arises in a social network when the consumption decisions of agents are influenced by those around them. The other form of strategic behavior I consider arises when agents bargain with one another. The first paper focuses on undirected networks in which consumers care about the average of their neighbors' consumption. The main contribution is to show how social networks affect equilibrium prices. I show that if every consumer has the same number of neighbors, then each consumer's influence on the market is independent of the number of neighbors. Due to the tradeoff between more neighbors responding and less sensitive responses, greater network intensity may not result in greater average influence of all consumers. In addition, I show that a consumer who is central in the network may not have the highest influence on the market because of the need to consider not only the number of neighbors that he has or his distances to other consumers, but also the number of neighbors that his neighbors have. The second paper examines strategic consumption in a directed network. The main contribution is to show how directed networks affect equilibrium outcomes. I show how the critical and promising links, and the key players in a social network can be identified. In doing so, I introduce the impact centrality and reaction centrality measures, and show how these measures are used to determine the effects on aggregate centrality of removing any agent from the network, and of removing or adding any directed link. The third paper considers bargaining under two-sided incomplete information in a market with multiple buyers and sellers, each with either high or low independent private values. I show that there exists a mechanism that guarantees efficient trading outcomes even when gains from trade are uncertain. The main contribution of this paper to show that a large number of traders is not necessary to guarantee efficient trading if there are at least as many sellers as there are buyers, and there is at least one low valuation buyer. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Chan King Pak Keven = 競爭性系統個體模型中的策略動態、決策及整體表現 / 陳景柏. / Thesis submitted in: August 2005. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves vii-viii (4th gp.)). / Text in English; abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chan King Pak Keven = Jing zheng xing xi tong ge ti mo xing zhong de ce lüe dong tai, jue ce ji zheng ti biao xian / Chen Jingbo. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Review on the Minority Game --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Background --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Model of MG --- p.6 / Chapter 2.3 --- Features --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Phase Transition --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Inefficient and Efficient Phase --- p.8 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Anti-persistence --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Data Collapse --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Existing Theories --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Reduced Strategy Space --- p.11 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- The Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.12 / Chapter 2.5 --- Summary --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Introduction to Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Strategy Ranking Theory for Mean Success Rate --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Time evolution of Virtual Point Ranking --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Winning Probability for m = 1 --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2 --- Calculation of Mean Success Rate --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3 --- "Size Dependence of weυen(K) (""Market Impact"" Effect)" --- p.23 / Chapter 3.4 --- Size Dependence of wodd、K) (Uneven Distribution of Agents into Split Ranks) --- p.25 / Chapter 4 --- Implementation of Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1 --- Feature of wodd(k) for higher m --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2 --- Derivation of wodd(k) from Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3 --- Proof of Eq. (4.14) --- p.36 / Chapter 4.4 --- Discussion on wodd(k) --- p.41 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Asymptotic Behavior of wodd(k) --- p.42 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Finite size correction of wodd(k) --- p.43 / Chapter 5 --- Applications of Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.46 / Chapter 5.1 --- Probability Density Function of Agents Making a Particular Choice --- p.46 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Odd time steps： k = 1 --- p.47 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Odd time steps： k = 2 --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- "Rodd,K" --- p.49 / Chapter 5.1.4 --- Even time steps --- p.51 / Chapter 5.1.5 --- Overall Attendance Distribution --- p.51 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Variance of the Attendance --- p.52 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Asymptotic behavior of the variance --- p.54 / Chapter 5.3 --- Anti-persistent Nature of Efficient Phase of MG --- p.55 / Chapter 5.4 --- Summary --- p.58 / Chapter 6 --- Strategy Ranking Theory and Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.60 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.61 / Chapter 6.2 --- Crowd-Anticrowd Theory with Ranking Patterns Characterized by k --- p.63 / Chapter 6.3 --- Variance: Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.65 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- m = 1 --- p.65 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- m = 2 --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4 --- Variance： Modified Crowd-Anticrowd Theory for m̐ơح 1 --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- k = 0 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- k = 1 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- k = 2 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Sum over all k --- p.68 / Chapter 6.5 --- Variance: Modified Crowd-Ant icrowd Theory for m=2 --- p.68 / Chapter 6.5.1 --- k = 3 --- p.69 / Chapter 6.5.2 --- k = 4 --- p.70 / Chapter 6.5.3 --- Sum over all k --- p.71 / Chapter 6.6 --- "Strategy Ranking Theory Expressed in (Nkl-Nk,(l)" --- p.71 / Chapter 6.7 --- Summary --- p.73 / Chapter 7 --- Variance of the Attendance in MG: Data Collapse --- p.75 / Chapter 7.1 --- Previous Studies --- p.75 / Chapter 7.2 --- Attempt 1 --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- Understanding from the Existing Theories --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Numerical Results --- p.79 / Chapter 7.3 --- Attempt 2 --- p.80 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- Modification Based on αc ß 1/2 --- p.81 / Chapter 7.3.2 --- Numerical Results --- p.81 / Chapter 7.4 --- Summary --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Minority Game in Networked Population --- p.83 / Chapter 8.1 --- Introduction --- p.83 / Chapter 8.2 --- Model --- p.84 / Chapter 8.3 --- Numerical Results --- p.85 / Chapter 8.4 --- Classification of Predictors --- p.86 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Major Classification of Predictors - Hamming Distance D --- p.87 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- "Minor Classification of Predictors - Dynamical Ranking (k,1)" --- p.88 / Chapter 8.4.3 --- "Using the Classification (k,l, D)" --- p.89 / Chapter 8.5 --- "Winning Probability of a Predictor (wk,l,d)" --- p.89 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- "Odd Steps, k = 1" --- p.90 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- "Odd Steps, k = 2" --- p.91 / Chapter 8.6 --- Number of Predictors --- p.93 / Chapter 8.7 --- Mean Success Rate of Non-networked MG： m = 1 --- p.93 / Chapter 8.8 --- "Cluster Size of a Predictor (sk,l,D)" --- p.95 / Chapter 8.9 --- Mean Success Rate of Networked MG --- p.97 / Chapter 8.9.1 --- With wK(even)=0.5 --- p.97 / Chapter 8.9.2 --- "Modification of wK(even) Using skl,D" --- p.98 / Chapter 8.9.3 --- Modification of Using Modified wK(even) --- p.100 / Chapter 8.10 --- Variance of the Attendance in Networked MG --- p.101 / Chapter 8.11 --- Attendance Distribution --- p.103 / Chapter 8.12 --- A Network-type Independent Approach --- p.104 / Chapter 8.12.1 --- Degree Depending Success Rate --- p.104 / Chapter 8.12.2 --- Evaluating w(k) --- p.107 / Chapter 8.12.3 --- Application on Random Graph as Underlying Network --- p.108 / Chapter 8.13 --- The Position of the Minimum Variance --- p.108 / Chapter 8.14 --- Summary --- p.110 / Chapter 9 --- Conclusion --- p.111 / Bibliography --- p.115

Multicast is a bandwidth efficient mechanism to provide wireless services for a group of nodes. Providing reliable wireless multicast is challenging due to channel fading. This thesis investigates cooperation among receiving nodes to enhance the reliability of wireless multicast. A time division based cooperative multicast strategy is proposed, and the optimal scheduling scheme is found to maximize the system throughput. It is shown that the optimal relay number is bounded by a threshold, and the optimal time allocation can be found using an efficient algorithm. Numerical results show that the proposed strategy can enhance network performance when the average channel condition between receiving nodes is better than that of the direct link. To provide incentive for cooperation, this thesis further studies the interactions among selfish nodes using game theoretic approaches. The cooperative multicast process is modeled as a repeated game and the desired cooperation state which satisfies the absolute fairness and the Pareto optimality criteria is found. A Worst Behavior Tit-for-Tat incentive strategy is designed to enforce cooperation and its effectiveness is studied under both the perfect and the imperfect monitoring scenarios. To address the issue of imperfect monitoring, an interval based estimation method is proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed strategy can enforce cooperation efficiently even the monitoring is imperfect. / Signal and Image Processing

Corruption is an important social and ethical problem / fight with it requires changes in values, norms and behavioral patterns of the society. This is usually a long and difficult process. Decades should pass to change deep values of a society. In the mean time, it is possible to combat corruption by changing incentive structures in the economy. If deep causes of the problem are analyzed carefully, a new system of governance can be established, such that, even most opportunist individuals do not find getting involved in corrupt practices profitable. Aim of this thesis is to examine characteristics of the system providing a fertile environment for corruption and to figure out factors stimulating corrupt transactions using game theoretical models. The first two models examine corruption as a kind of transaction between the briber and the bribee. In the models, it is shown that intermediaries sector occur from the profit maximization behavior of agents. This sector, by establishing long term, trust based relationships with bureaucrats, decreases risks occurring from the fact that the two parties involved in a corrupt transaction do not know each other perfectly. This sector, by reducing the likelihood of detection, serves corrupt transactions, and in return for the service it provided, takes commission, so gets benefit. Third model examines a strange type of corruption, a case of (spurious) middlemen obtaining bribe from the public service bureaucrats give, by pretending that he has influence on the acceptance or speed of it. The model tries to detect the characteristics of the environment making such a deception process persistent.