Models of strategic behavior are usually too complex to conduct large scale analyses, and frequently rely on accurate descriptions of the strategic environment, or unrealistic assumptions which render empirical studies very sensitive to misspecification. This dissertation relates game-theoretic frameworks to models of causality inference and thus provides a reliable method to identify price leadership. Therefore, causal models can be used to study large sets of data without imposing strategic behavior a priori. A case study is provided by analyzing the supply chain relationship among Dominick's Finer Foods and its suppliers. Although our data required aggregation, this empirical analysis successfully determined causal patterns for 60 percent of our sample. Of these price leaderships, 70 percent elicit Manufacturer Stackelberg relationships which tend to be associated with manufacturers that hold big market shares, 25 percent elicit Retailer Stackelbergs which seem to be associated with the biggest retailer margin profits, and only 5 percent elicit a monopolistic retailer with vertical coordination. These results agree with observations made by other authors and the market structure of the 1990's. Moreover, the strategic relationship among the suppliers is also studied. Interestingly, the dominant firms tend to isolate themselves from the price leadership, whereas the second largest firms seem to become price leaders. Our studies agree with the market literature as well. In particular, we find price leadership in a firm which was identified as a low cost leader. Finally, we discovered that the private label does not lead any firm's price unless this firm is the provider of a generic brand.

After the global trend of telecommunication liberalization in the 90s, mobile service market in West Europe, North America, Japan and Korea are moving from a rapid-growing stage to a mature stage. With the fierce market competition, the ARPU¡]Average Revenue Per User¡^coming from the voice service of mobile communication is gradually declining, and the whole market is facing a dilemma of price wars. Meanwhile, with the development of communication technology, Mobile Data Services have been launched progressively around the world. To prevent from becoming the victims like those in the internet bubbles again, every mobile communication service operator uses the differential market strategies as counterplots. This research is based on the viewpoint of changing business game taken from the co-opetition theory that was proposed by Braudenburge and Nalebuff in 1996. This research intended to explore the current status and the trend of global mobile communication services, and the market co-opetition strategies of leading companies. Furthermore, this research compares the global status with the related domestic environment and proposes a model of market strategy in this industry for our country and some suggestions for future development to change the business game of the industry. The result of this research suggests that the pure competition between mobile service providers and Value-Net players shall no longer exist, and shall be replaced by another relationship of mutually compensate cooperation and simultaneously both competition and cooperation. If those domestic operators could follow the co-opetition model to change the element of business game properly and to shape correct market strategies, it will very possibly be positively beneficial to the development of our mobile communication industry in this country.

Over the past decade, new approaches to innovation management have become prime drivers of various industries. Considering product quality, product innovation and service innovation in the automotive industry, this study tries to adopt game theory and real option models to analyze competing and consuming behavior among high- quality firms, low-quality firms and rational consumers. With an argument that firms will undertake innovation activities if they produce high-quality products, this study wishes to demonstrate that high quality products will induce both product and service innovations simultaneously. To achieve the research objective, this study divides innovation into product and service innovations, and then, discusses quality¡¦s impacts on product and service innovations separately. Game theory models concerning quality and product innovation indicate that the fixed cost of innovation, the barrier to a firm¡¦s engaging in innovative activities, is overcome only if a firm produces high-quality products. Moreover, another dynamic game also shows the strong relationship between product quality and service innovation. Applying real options models to evaluate service innovations in the automotive industry, including half-price purchase warranty and extended test drive service, also verify that effective service innovations might increase consumer willing-to-buy and enlarge the sales and profits for the innovative firms. Besides quality, this study also reveals that consumer preference to new product or service is another key successful factor for business innovation management. Successful innovation management depends on continuously improving product and service, concerning the status of expected market, and understanding the needs of potential consumers. Even though a general consensus on product and service innovations among different industries remains lacking, this study strongly supports the argument that firms producing high-quality products will be active in innovations. From the broader perspective of process management, total quality management, which increases product quality, undoubtedly supports innovation management.

The acquisition and creation of technological knowledge could be treated as a means to strengthen the innovative capabilities of SMEs. Knowledge management, therefore, plays an important role in company¡¦s performance and innovation. But knowledge transfer and sharing are the most difficult issues when implementing knowledge management. Many companies often encounter setbacks due to neglecting human nature and knowledge trading mechanism within organizations while implementing knowledge sharing. This paper is aimed to propose an integrated knowledge sharing and transfer model by applying network embeddedness, game theory, co-opetition and agent contest to solve the employee¡¦s dilemma and free-rider behavioral problems. This paper exploits the knowledge network to transfer knowledge across organizations, and discusses game theory in depth for knowledge sharing within organization. Based on knowledge sharing mechanism, we categorize high-tech firms into four types of knowledge sharing such as job guarantee, individual performance, team performance, and team learning. Empirical results showed that the type of team learning firm with agent contest and reward systems designed for both team and individual could build a co-opetitive knowledge-sharing environment. Based on knowledge transfer mechanism, the results show that IT, organizational culture, reward system and governmental policies have positive effects on enhancing knowledge network linkages. Steady and robust network linkages can benefit knowledge transfer and learning. The major sources of obtaining external knowledge are frorm academic research and international knowledge network for Taiwanese SMES. This paper suggest that overemphasize on domestic network and ignore the academic research and international networks may impede SMEs to acquire heterogeneous knowledge and innovation. The reward system and governmental policies have positive effects on corporate innovation. High levels of knowledge sharing and knowledge transfer capabilities are the major factors of improving innovation and organizational performance.

No description available.

Abstract Information asymmetry in the financial market, especially in the financial organization, usually generates more serious consequences than those in the commodity market. How to reduce or remove the asymmetric information in a bank¡¦s credit rationing has been a challenge for a commercial bank. On the basis of the models developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Barro (1986), this study attempts to analyze the issues, faced by a typical commercial bank, of adverse selection, moral hazard, and agent¡¦s reputation, and to simulate the results of such issues in a game-theoretic approach. The study has reached the following conclusions: 1. With regard to the adverse selection issue, this study concludes that if a bank wants to solve the problem of adverse selection on debit and credit, the decision must be made upon the objective evaluation that considers not only the reality and rational assumption but also the external signaling and screening information to assess the enterprise and its investment plan. 2. Regarding the moral hazard issue, this study concludes that if a bank has an effective incentive, the enterprise will automatically select the most beneficial items to the bank on debit. This mechanism reduces the bank¡¦s risk. On the other hand, if a penalty is set forth, then it will be more likely to prevent the moral hazard problem to occur. 3. By the moral hazard model, this study concludes that if an enterprise needs to enter the market to collect funds, it would imply that the game will continue infinitely. Owing to the benefits from reputation is increasing as the number of stage of the game increases, an enterprise will have a strong incentive to build his non-cheating reputation based on a long term consideration. Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Reputation, Game Theory.

Thesis (B.S.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Mathematics, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-55). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.