Thesis advisor: Hideo Konishi / Online auctions have many different formats. Each of these affect the ways in which users bid strategically. One example of this is the end-time format. Some sites, like eBay, use a hard close, under which there is a strict end-time and the highest bidder at that time wins. Others, like Amazon, have an extended end-time format. It has been shown that these differences do, in fact, appear to change how bidders behave. This paper uses data obtained from Yahoo! Auctions, where both formats are used, to examine the impact these differences have on the final price of an auction. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2005. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program.

Game theory is a common tool in modeling human decisions and strategies under various decision environments, with the foundation being the fact that a joint decision from all the individuals (we shall adhere to the term players hereafter) will impact on each other's well being. In this thesis, we shall study how the behaviors of the players affect the performance of the whole system, and shall introduce some measurements to quantify the influence on the system performance. / In the second part, we turn to the consequence of greediness of the players. In a dynamic decision-making process, system inefficiency may be caused by the unwise use of the resources due to the myopia of the decision makers. The loss of efficiency is measured by a ratio termed the Price of Myopia: the value at the greedy solution divided by the optimal value. A specific setting is studied to illustrate the point. Furthermore, we consider the combined effect of selfishness and myopia under a game framework and introduce a new notion, the Price of Isolation to quantify the matter. Some bounds for the price of isolation are established in a dynamic setting of the previous two models. / In the third part, we investigate the influence of cooperation and altruistic behavior of players. The incentive of the players to cooperate, and the impact of cooperation on the members of the coalition and on the whole system are analyzed. We consider a model of resource competition game and find that the system will benefit from the cooperation of players at the expense of some individual members in the coalition. A measurement termed the Price of Socialism is introduced to characterize how much any individual will need to sacrifice for the social optimum. We obtain a tight bound for the price of socialism for our particular model. / The first part is devoted to the study of the loss of system efficiency caused by selfish behavior of the players. We use the notion of the Price of Anarchy and consider two different but intrinsically related game settings to address the issue. One is to consider the cost incurred to the players due to the usage of some shared resources, modeled as the links of a network. Suppose that there are K players and each of them must achieve a given throughput. Furthermore, the unit cost on each link is affine linear in the total flow. Then the price of anarchy for the game can be upper bounded by (3K + 1)/(2 K + 2). The second model is a generalization of Cournot oligopolistic competition, in which the players utilize some shared resources to produce some commodities to sell. Again, suppose there are K players, and the unit costs of the shared resources and the selling prices of the products are all affine linear functions in the amount of demand and supply respectively. Then the price of anarchy is shown to be lower bounded by 1/K. / Wang, Xiaoguo. / Adviser: Shuzhong Zhang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-06, Section: B, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-108). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Le sujet général de cette thèse est la modélisation mathématique des systèmes biologiques. Le principal modèle étudié est le réseau métabolique: une collection d'objets - métabolites, réactions biochimiques, enzymes et gènes - et les relations entre eux, généralement organisées sous forme de graphe.Trois sujets distincts sont couverts. Dans le premier chapitre principal, un algorithme appelé MOOMIN pour «Mathematical explOration of Omics data on a MetabolIc Network» est présenté. C'est un outil informatique permettant d'interpréter les résultats d'une analyse d'expression différentielle à l'aide d'un réseau métabolique. Le résultat de l'algorithme est un changement métabolique, exprimé en termes de réactions supposées avoir subi un changement d'activité, qui correspond le mieux aux données d'expression génique. Le deuxième chapitre principal traite de l'intersection de la théorie des jeux et de l'étude du métabolisme cellulaire. Un nouveau type de modèle est proposé, combinant les principes de la théorie des jeux évolutive à la modélisation par contraintes pour prédire le comportement métabolique. Dans le troisième et dernier chapitre principal, un modèle épidémiologique de l'agent pathogène de la vigne Xylella fastidiosa est présenté et analysé. À l'aide d'une analyse de sensibilité, l'importance relative des paramètres du modèle est évaluée et les résultats sont discutés du point de vue de la lutte contre la maladie / The overall subject of this thesis is mathematical modelling of biological systems. The main model under study is the metabolic network: a collection of objects — metabolites, biochemical reactions, enzymes, and genes — and the relations amongst them, usually organised to form a graph.Three distinct topics are covered. In the first main chapter, an algorithm called MOOMIN for “Mathematical explOration of Omics data on a MetabolIc Network” is presented. It is a computational tool to interpret the results of a differential expression analysis with the help of a metabolic network. The output of the algorithm is a metabolic shift, expressed in terms of reactions that were inferred to have undergone a change in activity, that best aligns with the gene expression data. In the second main chapter, the intersection of game theory and the study of cellular metabolism is discussed. A new type of model is proposed, one that combines the principles behind evolutionary game theory with constraint-based modelling to predict metabolic behaviour. In the third and last main chapter, an epidemiological model of the Xylella fastidiosa grapevine pathogen is presented and analysed. Using sensitivity analysis, the relative importance of the model parameters is evaluated, and the results discussed from the point of view of disease control

This thesis studies three game theoretic models of pricing, in which a seller is interested in optimally pricing and allocating her product or service to a market of agents, in order to maximize her revenue. These markets feature a large number of self-interested agents, who are generally heterogeneous with respect to some payoff relevant feature, e.g., willingness to pay when agents are consumers or private cost when agents are firms. Agents strategically interact with one another, and their actions affect other agents' payoffs, either directly through social influence or competition, or indirectly through a review system. The seller has demand uncertainty and strives to optimize expected discounted revenues. I use either a mean-field approximation or a continuum of agents assumption to reduce the complexity of the problems and provide crisp characterizations of system aggregates and equilibrium policies. Chapter 2 considers the problem of an information provider who sells information products, such as demand forecasts, to a market of firms that compete with one another in a downstream market. We propose a general model that subsumes both price and quantity competition as special cases. We characterize the optimal selling strategy and find that it depends on both mode and intensity of competition. Several important extensions to heterogeneous production costs, information quality discrimination, and information leakage through aggregate actions are studied. Chapter 3 considers the problem of optimally extracting a stream of revenues from a sequence of consumers, who have heterogeneous willingness to pay and uncertainty about the quality of the product being sold. Using an intuitive maximum likelihood procedure, we characterize the solution of consumers' quality estimation problem. Then, we use a mean-field approximation to characterize the transient dynamics of quality estimates and demand. These allow us to simplify and solve the monopolist's problem, and ultimately provide a characterization of her optimal pricing policy. Chapter 4 considers the problem of a seller who is interested in dynamically pricing her product when consumers' utility is influenced by the mass of consumers that have purchased in the past. Two scenarios are studied, one in which the monopolist has commitment power and one in which she does not. We characterize the optimal selling strategy under both scenarios and derive comparisons on equilibrium prices and demands. Our main result is a characterization of the value of price commitment as a function of the social influence level in the market.

At individual level, we adopted the well-known ultimatum game experiment with asymmetric information. By allowing individuals to view historical market information, we study how individuals utilize the market transaction information to help them make decisions under the asymmetric information condition. We testified the History-Consistent Rationality Model, and illustrated that the model is sufficient to yield accurate point predictions that are on average within 5% absolute deviation of the total pie size for every subject behavior in 20 rounds. / At market level, we studied how people evaluate the value of information, and what kind of information revelation mechanism would collectively maximize market efficiency. We examined the prevailing market mechanism and found that there are unavoidable deadweight losses, so we proposed a new model that could eliminate deadweight losses under many market conditions, and designed and conducted experiments to testify our claims. / In this dissertation, we relaxed the perfect information assumption in the marketplace, and studied the reality with asymmetric information from a market scope, and then drill down to decision making model at individual level. / Stiglitz (2009) reviewed the cause of the recent financial tsunami, and claimed that Adam Smith's invisible hand is invisible because it is not actually there: market equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient whenever there are information imperfection or asymmetric information, which is always the case in reality. People have conflicts of interests and incentives to provide distorted information, which could be difficult to verify by the other parties, so even if individuals are acting in a perfectly rational way, the outcome is not systemically rational. He concluded that "we need to do a better job of managing our economy, but this will require better research that is less framed by the flawed models of the past, less driven by simplistic ideas, and more attuned to the realities of today." / Lau, Ka William. / Adviser: Ching Chyi Lee. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-127). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Both of the two major components of Game Theory, e.g., the non-cooperative game theory and the cooperative game theory, are becoming more and more closely related to the field of optimization, as the needs to study the analytical properties of games start to rise. The results presented in this thesis illustrate several connections between Optimization and Game Theory, and attempts are made to build a bridge between the cooperative game theory and the non-cooperative game theory, to characterize the co-existence of competition and cooperation in practice. We start by applying the properties of Polymatroid Optimization to the cooperative game theory, and show that both of the joint replenish game and the one warehouse multi retailer game are submodular games. In the next part, we show that the strategies promoting learning from history are convergent under certain conditions. This result can also be viewed as an efficient algorithm to compute the Nash Equilibrium of the game. Because the competitive routing game satisfies the condition, we know that if every user adapts with good enough memory, then asymptotically the system converges to Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, if the decision of cooperation is difficult to reverse, then it can be justified for the farsighted players to use the cost structure in the Nash Equilibrium point to decide if they should cooperate or not, instead of reacting to the immediate consequences as a basis to make decisions. With the optimization tools applied, we are able to show that in parallel network, the social cost and the cost of other players tend to decrease if two players cooperate. Also, the price of anarchy is higher when the flow demand of players are more evenly distributed. Using that structural result, we derive the exact upper bound of the price of anarchy for a given parallel network with fixed number of players. The exact upper bound of the price of anarchy for arbitrary parallel network with given number of players, which is independent to the network structure and parameters, can be derived consequently. / Simai He. / Adviser: Shuzhong Zhang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-11, Section: B, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-103). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

In order to solve the NBM Nash formulates an optimization problem. The unique solution of this problem is the famous Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). We revise this optimization problem and supplement some new selection criteria of profit allocation to develop some bargaining mechanisms appropriate for the two situations of our model respectively. Each bargaining mechanism offers the alliance one, two, or several reasonable profit distribution(s) which can be selected by these two parties. Subsequently for any situation we propose some novel dynamic programming algorithms with respect to several specific utility function structures involving job schedules respectively to implement those relevant mechanisms in pseudo-polynomial time. / In this dissertation we investigate a new cooperative game model, where two parties comprise an alliance to process a number of jobs offered by a customer and bargain about a reasonable processing profit distribution determined by a two-partition of these jobs. / In this model the non-negative integer-valued parameters of each job, which are the basic assumptions in traditional discrete scheduling models, are still adopted. We also assume each job is non-preemptive. Any party's utility function of the two-partition of these jobs does not possess any elegant continuous or concave property which is critical for the original Nash Bargaining Model (NBM), and furthermore we are only concerned with the integer-valued utility function. Consequently these assumptions result in a new discrete variation of the NBM. In this dissertation we highlight an important special case of our model, where after a two-partition of these jobs is given, each party's utility of processing the jobs assigned to him is related with an optimal schedule of these jobs which minimizes a cost (penalty) function. / This new model is motivated at least by the following real world phenomenon: after two manufacturers have jointly contracted with a customer for processing a number of jobs owing to their insufficient operation facilities, these two par ties need to negotiate a two-partition of these jobs to obtain a profit distribution acceptable for each one. In this dissertation we consider two situations of this model. In the first situation these two parties basically possess the same bargaining power. In the second situation one party possesses the greater bargaining power and can design some bargaining mechanisms more beneficial for himself attributed to his more operation techniques or facilities than the other's. / Chen, Quanle. / "November 2006." / Adviser: Xiaogiang Cai. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-08, Section: B, page: 5489. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 150-153). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

by Jan, Ting-Wai and Ng, To-Tung. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-67). / ABSTRACT --- p.i / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.ii / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / CHAPTER / Chapter I --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Objective --- p.1 / The Industrial Gases Industry --- p.1 / The Products --- p.2 / Competition within an Industrial Park --- p.3 / A SCENARIO IN THE INDUSTRY --- p.3 / Chapter II --- DESIGN OF THE GAME --- p.4 / The Environment --- p.4 / The Time Line --- p.5 / The Game in Extensive Form --- p.7 / Chapter III --- EVALUATION OF THE EXPECTED PAYOFFS --- p.10 / Payoff criterion: Net Present Value Vs Internal Rate of Return --- p.10 / Calculation of Payoffs at End Nodes --- p.12 / Cash Flow Assumptions --- p.13 / The Product Selling Price --- p.13 / Utilities Consumption in Relation to Plant Utilization --- p.14 / Chapter IV --- ANALYSIS OF THE GAME --- p.16 / The First Iteration --- p.16 / The Right Side of the Tree --- p.17 / The Left Side of the Tree --- p.18 / Payoffs of Portion A (Investment Options) --- p.19 / If Firm F2 sells at Year -1 --- p.20 / Is It a Fair Deal for Firm F1 at Node 4? --- p.21 / Can Firm F2 Increase Its Payoff at Year -1 ? --- p.22 / Determine a New Product Selling Price Between Firms F1 and F2 --- p.24 / Revised Expected Payoffs for Nodes 6 to 9 at Year-1 --- p.25 / The second Iteration (Final Outcome) --- p.27 / Risk if Firms Make Irrational Decisions --- p.27 / Chapter V --- INDUSTRY PRACTICE IN LONG TERM CAPACITY PLANNING --- p.29 / The Decision Tree of Firm F1 --- p.29 / The Decision Tree of Firm F2 --- p.30 / The Implications of Making Decisions Based on Individual Decision Trees --- p.31 / By Firm F1 and F2 --- p.31 / Chapter VI --- CONCLUSION --- p.33 / APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS IN CASH FLOW --- p.34 / APPENDIX B SUMMARY OF CASH FLOW FOR VARIOUS PAYOFFS AT FIRST ITERATION --- p.35 / APPENDIX C SUMMARY OF CASH FLOW FOR VARIOUS PAYOFFS FOR FINAL OUTCOME --- p.55 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.66

Submitted by Erika Demachki (erikademachki@gmail.com) on 2014-08-28T20:37:21Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) TCC - Carlos.pdf: 1307050 bytes, checksum: e3104a4272da62c638840e38dced1527 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-28T20:37:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) TCC - Carlos.pdf: 1307050 bytes, checksum: e3104a4272da62c638840e38dced1527 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-11 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / In this work we have exposure to some elements of game theory and certain resolution procedures games using matrices, probability and especially optimization, ie, we optimize the moves with mathematical background. For this we will use a Theorem, two Propositions and discuss several examples to game theory, applying what we are working and show how one can proceed in several games so that the reader can understand and use such a theory. The objective is to disseminate the ideas of game theory, which has applications in several areas, including economy and military art. / Neste trabalho teremos a exposição de alguns elementos da Teoria dos Jogos e certos procedimentos de resolução de jogos usando matrizes, probabilidade e principalmente otimização, ou seja, vamos otimizar as jogadas com embasamento matemático. Para tal usaremos um Teorema, duas Proposi ções e vários exemplos para discorrer sobre a Teoria dos Jogos, aplicando o que estamos trabalhando e mostrar como se pode proceder em vários jogos para que o leitor possa compreender e usar tal teoria. O objetivo deste trabalho é divulgar as ideias da Teoria dos Jogos, as quais tem aplicação em várias áreas, entre elas economia e arte militar.

Chan, Chun Him = 論競爭環境中出現的協作現象 / 陳俊謙. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-141). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chan, Chun Him = Lun jing zheng huan jing zhong chu xian de xie zuo xian xiang / Chen Junqian. / Title / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.v / Table of Contents --- p.vii / Chapter 1 --- Prologue --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Prisoners' Dilemma and Snowdrift Game --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Formulation --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Prisoners，Dilemma (PD) --- p.8 / Chapter 2.4 --- The Snowdrift Game (SG) --- p.9 / Chapter 2.5 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in PD --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- The Temptation Reward Punishment Sucker System (TRPS system) --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- "Our Expanded 2-parameter System (r, s system)" --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- The Benefit and Cost System (BC system) --- p.11 / Chapter 2.6 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in SG --- p.12 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- A Common 1-parameter System (rh system) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Tragedy of One-shot PD Game --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- The First Cooperation --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Repeated PD Game --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Axelrod´ةs Tournament and Strategy “Tit-for-Tat´ح (TFT) --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Second Cooperation --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Nowak and Sigmund Evolutionary Experiment --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Stochastic Reactive Strategies (SRSs) and Evolutionary Infinite IPD --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Experimental Setup --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Experimental Results --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Conclusion: TFT as a Pivot for Cooperation --- p.22 / Chapter 4 --- Evolutionary IPD with Strategy Lattices --- p.23 / Chapter 4.1 --- Sensitivity to Initial Conditions and Numerical Accuracy in IPD --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Simulation Results --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Strategy Frequencies Xi(t) versus Time --- p.27 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- "Mean Final State in the Whole r, s Space" --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Time Evolution of (p) and (q) --- p.38 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Mean Final State of a Strategy Lattice with Inclined Frequencies --- p.42 / Chapter 4.3.5 --- Conclusion --- p.50 / Chapter 5 --- Egoistic Exploiters Induced Global Generosity in Evolutionary IPD --- p.52 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.52 / Chapter 5.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.52 / Chapter 5.3 --- "The Three Initial Conditions: Cases TO, T1 and T2" --- p.53 / Chapter 5.4 --- Simulation Results --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Distribution of the Final Dominant Strategies --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Case TO (100 Random Strategies) --- p.56 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Case T1 (99 Random Strategies and a TFT-like Strategy) --- p.58 / Chapter 5.4.4 --- Case T2 (98 Random Strategies and both a TFT-like and an AllD-like Strategies) --- p.58 / Chapter 5.4.5 --- Comparing the Three Cases --- p.61 / Chapter 5.4.6 --- Discussion --- p.64 / Chapter 5.5 --- Analytic Manipulations for Small r Region --- p.65 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Values of (pmps) and (qmps) for Case T2 --- p.65 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Values of {pmps) and {qmps) for Case TO and T1 --- p.68 / Chapter 5.6 --- Conclusion --- p.71 / Chapter 6 --- The Basics of Networks --- p.72 / Chapter 6.1 --- Fully-connected Networks and Well-mixed Networks --- p.72 / Chapter 6.2 --- Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.73 / Chapter 6.3 --- Barabasi-Albert (BA) Scale-free Growing Networks --- p.74 / Chapter 7 --- Proposing the N-person Snowdrift Game (NSG) --- p.76 / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2 --- Limitations of 2-person Games on Networks --- p.76 / Chapter 7.3 --- The Existing N-person Games --- p.77 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Public Good Game (PGG) --- p.78 / Chapter 7.3.2 --- The N-person Battle of Sexes Games (NBOS) --- p.78 / Chapter 7.4 --- The NSG Scenario and Payoffs --- p.79 / Chapter 7.5 --- Everyday Examples of NSG --- p.80 / Chapter 7.6 --- Preview of Studies in Evolutionary NSG --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Evolutionary NSG in Well-mixed Populations --- p.84 / Chapter 8.1 --- The Method of Replicator Dynamics --- p.84 / Chapter 8.2 --- The Simulation Algorithm --- p.90 / Chapter 8.3 --- The Simulated Equilibrium Contributor Fraction x*(r) --- p.91 / Chapter 8.4 --- Analytic Manipulations on the Algorithm --- p.92 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Conversion Probabilities and Equilibrium Conditions --- p.92 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- Discussions --- p.94 / Chapter 8.5 --- Analytic Treatments on the Time Evolution of the Contribution Level x(t) --- p.96 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- Discrete Time Equation --- p.97 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- Continuous Approximations --- p.97 / Chapter 8.5.3 --- Analytical Solutions of N=2 and N=S --- p.98 / Chapter 8.6 --- Conclusion --- p.100 / Chapter 9 --- Evolutionary NSG in Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.101 / Chapter 9.1 --- Comparison between Well-mixed and Lattice Populations --- p.101 / Chapter 9.2 --- Simulation Parameters --- p.103 / Chapter 9.3 --- Simulation Results for ID Lattices --- p.103 / Chapter 9.4 --- Analytic Theory for ID Lattices by Analyzing on the Local Configurations --- p.105 / Chapter 9.4.1 --- The Absence of Connected Contributors --- p.105 / Chapter 9.4.2 --- Theory for ID k=2 Chain Lattice --- p.106 / Chapter 9.4.3 --- Theory for ID k=4 Chain Lattice --- p.109 / Chapter 9.5 --- Simulation Results for 2D Lattices --- p.112 / Chapter 9.6 --- Analytic Theory for 2D k=4 Square Lattice --- p.115 / Chapter 9.7 --- Simulation Results for 3D Cubic Lattice --- p.120 / Chapter 9.8 --- Conjectures for Approximate Solutions in High-Dimensional Hy- percubic Lattices --- p.120 / Chapter 9.9 --- Extracting the Relation Neff=2k+1 --- p.122 / Chapter 9.10 --- Conclusion --- p.123 / Chapter A --- Evolutionary NSG in Barabasi-Albert Networks --- p.125 / Chapter A.l --- The New Elements in BA Networks --- p.126 / Chapter A.2 --- The Two Implementations - Model A and Model B --- p.126 / Chapter A.3 --- Results in Model A (Varying-N) --- p.127 / Chapter A.4 --- Results in Model B (Fixed-N) --- p.133 / Chapter A.5 --- Conclusion --- p.135 / Chapter B --- Supplementary Equations for Chapter 9 --- p.136 / Chapter B.l --- Equations for ID k=4 Lattice --- p.136 / Chapter B.2 --- Equations for 2D k=4 Lattice --- p.137 / Bibliography --- p.139