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Thesis--Freie Universität Berlin. / Bibliography: p. 185-192.

Thesis--Freie Universität Berlin. / Bibliography: p. 185-192.

Halle, Phil. Diss. v. 10. Jan. 1935. / Vollst. in: Hegel bei d. Slaven. (Veröff. d. Slavist. Arbeitsgemeinschaft an d. Dt. Univ. in Prag. 1, 9.).

Friedrich Nietzsche thought that philosophers were deeply mistaken about the nature and sources of philosophical activity. Where others took themselves to be motivated by a desire to know the truth, Nietzsche charged that his fellow philosophers, motivated by a pathological set of psychological and physiological characteristics, did little more than sublimate and rationalize their own prejudices. In this thesis, I sketch out in further detail and defend the plausibility and significance of this Nietzschean diagnosis of philosophers. I argue that since Nietzsche’s view of philosophers both offers a compelling explanation of some phenomena in contemporary philosophical practice and, were it true, would have significant upshot for how and even whether philosophy should be practiced, we philosophers ought to begin taking it seriously.

Friedrich Nietzsche, 100 years after his death, remains a controversial figure in philosophy. Much of this controversy stems from Nietzsche's view of truth, which seems superficially hopelessly contradictory, vacillating between relativism and denial of truth on the one hand, and praise for science and hard truths on the other. Thus, any person wanting to defend Nietzsche's positive philosophy must first make sense of his epistemology. The solution to this puzzle regarding Nietzsche's theory of truth is the realization that Nietzsche changes his view on truth. Much like Wittgenstien, Nietzsche had an early and a late period in his epistemic views, and a middle period where he is struggling with two very different, incompatible views. The late view of truth is surprisingly straightforward: Nietzsche can be seen as an early pragmatist. Once we have a coherent truth theory, we can then start to conclude some of the more contentious arguments in Nietzsche's philosophy, such as: what is the Will to Power, and how does Nietzsche's view of truth interact with his criticism of morality? This thesis will trace the development of the former and endeavor to answer some of the latter.

Friedrich Nietzsche, 100 years after his death, remains a controversial figure in philosophy. Much of this controversy stems from Nietzsche's view of truth, which seems superficially hopelessly contradictory, vacillating between relativism and denial of truth on the one hand, and praise for science and hard truths on the other. Thus, any person wanting to defend Nietzsche's positive philosophy must first make sense of his epistemology. The solution to this puzzle regarding Nietzsche's theory of truth is the realization that Nietzsche changes his view on truth. Much like Wittgenstien, Nietzsche had an early and a late period in his epistemic views, and a middle period where he is struggling with two very different, incompatible views. The late view of truth is surprisingly straightforward: Nietzsche can be seen as an early pragmatist. Once we have a coherent truth theory, we can then start to conclude some of the more contentious arguments in Nietzsche's philosophy, such as: what is the Will to Power, and how does Nietzsche's view of truth interact with his criticism of morality? This thesis will trace the development of the former and endeavor to answer some of the latter.

The author's Habilitationsschrift--Universität Innsbruck, 1983. / Includes indexes. Bibliography: p. 393-410.