Orientador: Prof. Dr. Fernado Costa Mattos / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, São Bernardo do Campo, 2018. / Nesta dissertação abordamos a concepção de universidade desenvolvida pelo filósofo Martin Heidegger. Embora jamais tenha sido objeto de reflexão sistemática é possível detectar em diferentes momentos de seus caminhos de pensamento, antes mesmo de assumir a reitoria da Universidade de Freiburg em plena ascensão do movimento nazista, uma preocupação constante relativo à essência do ensino superior alemão. A leitura do discurso A Autoafirmação da Universidade Alemã, proferido na ocasião, não foi suficientemente capaz de explicitar a sua compreensão filosófica sobre o assunto. Por esse motivo, nos debruçamos tanto suas preleções da década de 1920, a começar por uma esquecida lição ditada logo após o término da guerra (Kriegsnotsemester, 1919), como até mesmo nas correspondências pessoais trocadas com Elfride Petri, Rudolf Bultmann e Karl Jaspers a preexistência de uma preocupação que sempre lhe acompanhou desde a sua juventude. Apesar de ser uma questão ignorada pela maioria de seus comentadores, quando se lança um olhar retrospectivo sobre a história da universidade verifica-se o quanto esta se constitui um verdadeiro problema para toda filosofia alemã desde finais do século XVIII. Para Heidegger, a preocupação com o ensino superior alemão não se resumia a um simples ideal de formação (Bildung) dos estudantes ou a um mero compromisso administrativo com a instituição, mas, fundamentalmente, diziam respeito a uma situação ou contexto vital na qual se encontrava em jogo tanto o destino da cultura alemã (Kultur) como a história da própria noção de verdade Ocidental (Aletheia). / In this dissertation we discuss the conception of university developed by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Although it has never been the object of systematic reflection, it is possible to detect at different times of its ways of thinking, even before taking over the rectory of the University of Freiburg in the full rise of the Nazi movement, a constant concerning the essence of German higher education. The reading of the speech the autoaffirmation of the German university, given at the time, was not sufficiently able to clarify its philosophical understanding on the subject. For this reason, we looked at both its lectures of the 1920s, beginning with a forgotten lesson dictated shortly after the end of the War (Kriegsnotsemester, 1919), as even in the personal correspondence exchanged with Elfride Petri, Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Jaspers the preexistence of a concern that has always accompanied you since your youth. Although it is an issue ignored by most of its commentators, when a retrospective look at the history of the university is observed, it is a real problem for all German philosophy since the late 18th century. For Heidegger, the concern with German higher education was not a simple ideal of training (Bildung) of the students or a mere administrative commitment to the institution, but, fundamentally, they concerned a vital situation or context in the Which was at stake both the fate of the German culture (Kultur) and the history of the very notion of Western truth (Aletheia).

This paper aims to analyze the philosophical implications of the atomic bomb in the thinking of three German post-war philosophers: Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Jaspers. Although they differ greatly in interest and philosophical perspective, the atomic bomb can be discerned as a problem of humanity's technological, ethical, and political conditions in the intersection of their authorships. In the examination of their ideas, they are situated within a diachronic tradition of philosophy of technology. Their common entanglement with phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy is also considered, most notably in the form of the influence of Martin Heidegger. For Anders, the atomic bomb is the defining feature of the ethical and political conditions of post-war humanity, yet humans are unable to grasp its reality. In the thinking of Jaspers, the bomb necessitates a supra-political principle grounded in the faculty of reason. For him, politics in the nuclear age must rest upon the responsibility of the many individuals, in an ethical re-birth of humanity. Arendt primarily understands the bomb as a product of the increasing power of the thoughtless instrumentality of science. The destructive potential of atomic weapons solidifies to her a crisis in the meaning of politics, in which brute force has undermined political power. All three thinkers share the view that the atomic bomb must be understood in conjunction with a certain thought- and meaninglessness in the science and politics of their contemporary. The bomb also signifies to them a technological obscuring of human agency, the implications of which are exacerbated by the fact that it has also immensely improved the ability of one individual to commit heinous acts. In impairing the conditions for ethical action and meaningful politics for lasting peace, the bomb necessitates these very same principles. By threatening to make humanity as mortal as only individuals had been before, the bomb has made radical change in human thinking and activity urgent. However, to what extent sufficient adaptations are probable, or even possible, is a question in which the philosophers discussed in this paper diverge.

[pt] O presente texto propõe verificar o sublime e a música em Adorno. Para tanto, três objetivos centrais serão seguidos. O primeiro visa verificar o surgimento do sublime. De objeto de investigação filosófica do tratado Do Sublime atribuído à Longinus e a posterior tradução, por Boileau, avançaremos para a sua recepção e repercussão na Inglaterra oitocentista, especificamente, Burke. Em seguida, analisaremos o sublime em Kant, visando dialogar com as considerações adornianas a cerca do sublime, configurado pelo filósofo como enigma, e as obras de vanguardas artísticas, a Nova Música. O segundo objetivo debruça-se sobre a Nova Música, verificando sua contribuição para o entendimento do sublime em Adorno. Para tanto, analisaremos as possíveis ligações e desdobramentos presentes nesta nova proposta radical musical, denominada por Adorno, de esfera despadronizada, quando, comparadas à esfera de obras musicais, ditas, padronizadas. Formularemos a hipótese de que a Nova Música esteja imbricada, tanto com o sublime em Burke, notadamente, via expressionismo musical, bem como, com o sublime matemático kantiano, dada à incomensurabilidade de suas possibilidades composicionais advindas do dodecafonismo schonberguiano, para finalmente receber, em Adorno, o tratamento de enigma. O terceiro e último objetivo foca no fetichismo musical e o seu desdobramento em regressão auditiva, decorrência principal, nas artes musicais, da Indústria Cultural. Mediante tal análise, aventaremos a hipótese, de que a regressão auditiva, paradoxalmente aos sombrios prognósticos adornianos, descortinou também, os novos rumos para a música ocidental. Através da liberação das dissonâncias e do uso da série, advindas da mesma Segunda Escola de Viena, surgiram os movimentos de música concreta, eletrônica e eletroacústica, permitindo-se um novo tratamento musical para o ruído, transformando-o assim, no mais novo elemento composicional. As conclusões centralizam-se na questão principal da categoria estética artística musical, o sublime. Por meio de sua análise, interpretação e entendimento, permite-se uma aproximação ao tratamento dado por Adorno a certas obras musicais, sinalizadas pelo filósofo, como pertencentes ao âmbito do sublime musical. Esperamos contribuir, com esta pesquisa, para uma maior aproximação com o sublime e a crítica musical em Adorno. / [en] This dissertation focuses on Adorno s treatment of the music phenomenon under aesthetic s category of the sublime. To do so, we will follow three main goals. The first one deals with the debate of the sublime in Philosophy. Its beginning as an object of philosophical enquiry since Do Sublime Treaty, attributed to Longinus, appeared for the first time in history. It s enduring echos in France through its French translation by Boileau, as well its reception and repercussions in the eighteenthcentury England with Burke s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beuatiful. Kant s sublime will be analyzed shortly afterwards, in order to deal with Adorno s considerations on the sublime and the avantgard movements. Our attention will be focused on the enigmatic element which was analyzed by Adorno in some artworks, especially those of the New Music stream. Our second goal is about the discussion of the Adornian concepts of New Music.Our aim here is to decide whether these concepts as presented by Adorno, can still be of any use to understand as well as to call music sublime. At the same time it will be analyzed the strong bounds and developments that can t be avoid to be grasped between this new kind of radical musical proposal so called by him as, the sphere of non standardized music, thus drawing a parallel with the standardized music sphere. This will lead us to hypothesize that New Music, as observed by Adorno, is deeply bound up with the Burke s ideas about the sublime, notably seen by means of the music compositions on the expressionism period, as well to Kant s mathematically sublime through the immeasurable possibilities of music compositions brought by the dodecaphonic and serial techniques. As a result, it will be seen by Adorno as a great enigma, a riddle, a puzzle, due to its mystery nature which never allows to be entirely signified. On our final goal we intend to examine the regression of listening as the main after effect of the Culture Industry on music by means of the Fetish-Character, which is directly responsible for a turnaround of artworks into commodities whose only fate will be to serve as goods, thus being consumed by the majority. Paradoxically Adorno s voice of doom about the regression of listening in our modern society can be hypothesized today as a new path for western music. The full usage of the noise which was the one of the mainly results of the dissonance s freedom promoted by the same Second Viennese School which Adorno was a zealous believer, a new tool for the contemporary music composition was devised. By turning the noises into a new compositional tool through the serialism technique, the post modern music has arrived. Our conclusions attempts to centralize around the main question of the aesthetic s category of the sublime in music. By its analysis, as well as its interpretation and its knowledgement, it can lead us the way to approach and elucidate Adorno s treatment of certain music artworks as belonging to the sublime realm. We truly hope to have provided with this research a reliable contribution to music critique not only those belonging to the realm of New Music but, to all the new music artworks, that follow its streams throughtout the XX century and beyond.

En analysant les processus dialectiques par lesquels l’art repense le passé, Between Truth and Trauma : The Work of Art and Memory work in Adorno traite du concept adornien de la mémoire. Je postule que l’œuvre d’art chez Adorno incarne un Zeitkern (noyau temporel). Je démontrerai que l’immanence réciproque de l’histoire dans l’œuvre d’art et l’immanence de l’œuvre d’art dans l’histoire permettent de repenser le passé. Le premier chapitre examine la manière par laquelle le passé est préservé et nié par l’œuvre d’art. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment, à l’aide du processus interprétatif, le passé est transcendé à travers l’œuvre d’art. Le dernier chapitre évoque la lecture adornienne d’écrits de Brecht et de Beckett dans le but d’illustrer la capacité de l’œuvre d’art à naviguer entre la vérité et le trauma. / Analyzing the dialectical processes through which art works through the past, Between Truth and Trauma: The Work of Art and Memory in Adorno examines Adorno’s concept of memory. I argue that, for Adorno, the work of art both has and is a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus). I demonstrate that the reciprocal immanence of history in the work and immanence of the work in history allows for the past to be worked through. The first chapter examines how the past is preserved and negated by the work of art. The second chapter examines how the past is transcended through the work of art via the interpretive process. The final chapter looks at Adorno’s reading of work by Beckett and Brecht in order to illustrate the ability of the work of art to navigate between truth and trauma.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-10-06T12:49:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Arlindo Antonio Araújo Barbosa.pdf: 1236498 bytes, checksum: afcdae872d4f0ca03c9f9fb2d91256a0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-06T12:49:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arlindo Antonio Araújo Barbosa.pdf: 1236498 bytes, checksum: afcdae872d4f0ca03c9f9fb2d91256a0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation intends to delineate the task that Nietzsche gave himself and made the primary goal of presenting the “name” of Nietzsche. His act of rendering the project of transvaluation of all values effective, understood by the philosopher as the greatest demand yet made of humanity, considering that it provoked a deep cut in the history of Western man, was closely related to this approximation with the “name” of Nietzsche. Hence, the need for the philosopher to: make himself known. Still, how the author of Ecce homo “reveals” himself to humanity, fully distinguishing himself, is the way philosophers have presented themselves traditionally, in a type of presentation that distances itself from the idea of an autobiography. Thus, the author of Ecce homo presents himself through masks like the historian, the doctor and the psychologist, Nietzschean disguises that resonate with each other and are imbricated in the project of transvaluation of values. The thesis will demonstrate how some of the main aspects of his philosophy, such as forgetfulness, resentment, conscience, and values will be treated with these images, or by these masks put on by the philosopher / Nossa dissertação pretende esboçar a tarefa que Nietzsche atribuiu a si mesmo, a qual tinha como meta principal apresentar o “nome” Nietzsche. A efetivação do projeto de transvaloração de todos os valores, entendida pelo filósofo como a mais alta exigência já feita à humanidade, visto que provocava uma cesura na história do homem ocidental, perpassava por essa aproximação com o “nome” Nietzsche, daí, então, a necessidade do filósofo em: dar-se a conhecer. Todavia, o modo como o autor de Ecce homo se “revela” à humanidade, distingue-se, por completo, da forma como os filósofos se apresentavam tradicionalmente, isto é, trata-se de um tipo de apresentação que se aparta da ideia de uma autobiografia. Destarte, é a partir de máscaras como o historiador, o médico e o psicólogo, disfarces nietzschianos que ressoam entre si, e que estão imbricados ao projeto de transvaloração dos valores, que o autor de Ecce homo se apresenta. Tentaremos mostrar, ao longo do texto, como alguns dos aspectos principais de sua filosofia, como, por exemplo, o esquecimento, o ressentimento, a consciência, os valores, etc, serão tratados por essas imagens, ou por essas máscaras assumidas pelo filósofo

La critique feuerbachienne de la philosophie idéaliste de Hegel a beaucoup influencé ses contemporains et les matérialistes et humanistes du 19eme siècle. Cependant, les études françaises ne rendent pas compte de sa contribution à l'histoire de la philosophie autant qu'elles le devraient. Le but de ce travail est de présenter l'évolution de la pensée de Feuerbach de sa jeunesse hégélienne jusqu'à son matérialisme anthropologique et humaniste. Cette évolution est le résultat de la remise en cause progressive puis du renversement de la philosophie spéculative. Sa critique de la religion diffère profondément de celle des Lumières françaises dans le sens où loin de ne voir dans la religion qu'erreur, tromperie et fanatisme, il reconnaît que le religion exprime un trait anthropologique essentiel: l'essence de l'homme. La pensée de Feuerbach réside essentiellement alors dans une nouvelle interprétation du phénomène religieux en lui donnant une explication anthropologique. L'être humain est un mélange de rationalité et de sensibilité, d'affectivité et de passivité, qui doit être considéré en même temps en tant qu'individu et qu'être social. En opposition à l'interprétation de Marx, j'étudie plus particulièrement dans cette thèse, le rôle de la praxis sociale dans l'anthropologie feuerbachienne. Enfin, méthodologiquement, en plus d'une lecture attentive de l'ensemble du corpus feuerbachien, je re-contextualise sa pensée au sein du mouvement jeune-hégélien, et après la révolution de 1848. / Feuerbach's anthropological critique of Hegel's idealism has strongly influenced German materialists and humanists in the nineteenth-century as well as the following generations of thinkers. Even so particularly French scholars may still not recognize his contribution as central in the history of thought. The aim of my work is to present the development of Feuerbach's thought in particular how Feuerbach's early Hegelianism evolved into professing an empirical realism and materialist humanism, resulting in what was considered by Feuerbach himself as the negation of speculative German idealism. His critique of religion is fundamentally different from that of the French Enlightenment since according to him religion is not only fraudulent and deceptive, but also an essential anthropological feature. Essentially the thought of Feuerbach consists in a new interpretation of religion's phenomena, giving an anthropological explanation. For Feuerbach, the human subject was a complex weave of rationality and sensuality, affectivity and passivity, sociality and individualism. Contrasting with Marx's interpretation of Feuerbach, in this work 1 will study the role of the social praxis in Feuerbach's anthropology. Besides including a thorough reading of Feuerbach's work, my thesis will present a re-contextualisation of it in the Left Hegelian mouvement and after the March Revolution, as an additional rnaterial for my interpretation.

In the following study I reappraise the nineteenth century Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897). Burckhardt is traditionally known for having served as the elder colleague and one-time muse of Friedrich Nietzsche at the University of Basel and so his ideas are often considered, by comparison, outmoded or inapposite to contemporary currents of thought. My research explodes this conception by abandoning the presumption that Burckhardt was in some sense "out of touch" with modernity. By following and significantly expanding upon the ideas of historians such as Allan Megill, Lionel Gossman, Hayden White, Joseph Mali, John Hinde and Richard Sigurdson, among others, I am able to portray Burckhardt as conversely inaugurating a historiography laden with elements of insightful social criticism. Such criticisms are in fact bolstered by virtue of their counter-modern characteristic. Burckhardt reveals in this way a perspicacity that both anticipates Nietzsche's own critique of modernity and in large part moves well beyond him. Much of this analysis is devised through a genealogical approach to Burckhardt which places him squarely within a cohesive branch of post-Kantian thought that I have called heterodox post-Kantianism. My study revaluates Burckhardt through the alembic of a "discursive" post-Kantian turn which reinvests many of his outré ideas, including his radical appropriation of historical representation, his non-teleological historiography, his various pessimistic inclinations, and additionally, his non-empirical, "aesthetic" study of history, or "mythistory," with a newfound philosophical germaneness. While I survey the majority of Burckhardt's output in the course of my work, I invest a specific focus in his largely unappreciated Greek lectures (given in 1869 but only published in English in full at the end of the twentieth century). Burckhardt's "dark" portrayal of the Greeks serves to not only upset traditional conceptions of antiquity but also the manner in which self-conception is informed through historical inquiry. Burckhardt returns us then to an altogether repressed antiquity: to a hidden, yet internal "dream of a shadow." My analysis culminates with an attempt to reassess the place of Burckhardt's ideas for modernity and to correspondingly reexamine Nietzsche. In particular, I highlight the disparity between Nietzsche's and Burckhardt's reception of the "problem of power," including the latter's reluctance - which was attended by ominous and highly prescient predictions of future large-scale wars and the steady "massification" of western society - to accept Nietzsche's acclamation of a final "will to power." Burckhardt teaches us the value of history as an active counterforce to dominant modern reality-formations and in doing so, his work rehabilitates the relevance of history for a world which, as Burckhardt once noted, suffers today from a superfluity of present-mindedness.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'interroger la manière dont Hegel conçoit la fondation absolue de la philosophie, c'est-à-dire la manière dont la philosophie fournit, à l'intérieur d'elle-même, la justification intégrale de la vérité absolue de son discours, justification qui, d'après Hegel, la caractérise en propre. Pour ce faire, après avoir brièvement replacé, à titre introductif, cette tentative hégélienne dans le cadre de la problématique de la fondation de la philosophie propre à la philosophie post-kantienne, nous étudions d'abord la manière dont Hegel rend compte de la genèse historique de l'exigence d'une auto-fondation absolue de la philosophie dans ses Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie, qui s'avèrent un espace hybride de position des problèmes philosophiques, à la fois historiquement donnés et toujours déjà philosophiquement construits. Nous interrogeons ensuite, à partir de la Doctrine de l'essence, le concept logique de fondement (Grund) dans ses tensions propres, pour montrer qu'il dégage l'espace des problèmes posés par la notion de fondation sans pouvoir leur apporter par lui-même une solution définitive : cette dernière nous paraît bien plutôt énoncée dans la Doctrine du concept, dont le mouvement d'ensemble (concept subjectif, objectivité, idée) fait l'objet d'une lecture permettant d'y faire ressortir à la fois l'Aufhebung interne du fondement et l'émergence de la notion d'auto-fondation, qui apparaît in fine dans la définition de l'idée comme processus de « développement progressif » et « fondation régressive » de soi. La fondation est alors définie comme un processus consistant à rendre raison de soi dans ses manifestations, ce que nous interprétons comme rupture avec le concept de fondement hérité de la métaphysique d'entendement, dont la logique hégélienne produit l'Aufhebung. L'idée ayant été ainsi définie, de manière formelle, comme processus de rendre raison de soi, nous étudions, dans une troisième partie, la manière dont la philosophie de la nature et la philosophie de l'esprit concourent au processus d'auto-fondation réelle de l'idée, c'est-à-dire, en dernière instance, à son effectuation comme esprit absolu ; à cette occasion, nous étudions plusieurs occurrences significatives de la notion de fondement dans la Realphilosophie, ainsi que le rapport du discours philosophique aux réalités dont il traite (rapport que Hegel nous semble prendre soin de distinguer d'une justification extérieure). Une quatrième partie vient alors étudier la manière dont la philosophie se pense elle-même comme fondation systématique de sa propre vérité : on soulève la question de savoir si le système a besoin d'un fondement externe pour garantir sa vérité (fondement que certains interprètes ont pu trouver dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit ou dans l'histoire de la philosophie), et on étudie les syllogismes finaux de l'Encyclopédie pour y lire une réflexion de la philosophie sur sa propre fondation systématique. La thèse que nous soutenons au terme de ce parcours est que le profond remaniement spéculatif du concept de fondement qui aboutit à l'idée d'une autofondation au sens de « rendre raison de soi » (en rupture donc avec tout principe ou fondement réel ou formel tel qu'on en rencontre dans l'histoire de la philosophie), converge avec une redéfinition de la philosophie comme savoir rendant absolument raison de sa propre vérité, et même, au sens strict, ne fondant que sa propre vérité comme système, ce qui lui permet en même temps de libérer le sens vrai des objets qu'il parcourt et ordonne dans son déploiement systématique. / This thesis aims at questioning the way Hegel conceives the absolute foundation of philosophy, that is to say the way philosophy provides, within itself, the integral justification of its discourse's absolute truth, which, according to Hegel, characterizes it in specific. To do so, after sketching the historical frame of Post-Kantian debates about the foundation of philosophy, we first study the way Hegel relates, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the historical genesis of the requirement of an absolute self-foundation of philosophy. We then question the logical concept of Grund within the Doctrine of Essence in order to show, that neither it or its subsequent specifications (e.g. cause) suffice to give an account of the process of foundation, whose truth we take to be stated instead in the Doctrine of the Concept ; we study Begriffslogik's overall movement (subjective concept, objectivity, idea) in order to bring out the notion of self-foundation (Selbstbegründung), which appears in fine in the definition of Idea as a process of “progressive development” and “regressive foundation” of itself. Foundation is thus defined as a process consisting in the justification of itself in its own moments, which we take to be a split from metaphysics' concept of foundation, of which the Hegelian Logic carries out the Aufhebung. In a third part, we try to study the way philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit contribute to the process of a real self-foundation of the Idea, that is to say its realization as Absolute Spirit ; on that occasion, we study multiple occurrences of “foundation” in the Realphilosophie, and also the connection between philosophical discourse and the realities it deals with, which Hegel seems to distinguish from an external justification. The fourth part then studies the way philosophy thinks itself as systematical foundation of its own truth : we raise the question of knowing if the system needs an external foundation to guarantee its truth (which could be provided by the Phenomenology of Spirit or the history of philosophy), and we read the “syllogisms of philosophy” as philosophy looking back at its own foundation. The thesis we support at the end of this demonstration is that the profound speculative reshuffle of the concept of foundation that leads to the idea of a self-foundation within the meaning of “justifying itself” (breaking thus with every real or formal principle or foundation as we know them in the history of philosophy), converges with a redefinition of philosophy as knowledge justifying its own truth in an absolute manner, and even, in a precise meaning, founding only its own truth as a system, which allows it meanwhile to free the true meaning of the objects that it browses and orders in its systematical deployment.

En analysant les processus dialectiques par lesquels l’art repense le passé, Between Truth and Trauma : The Work of Art and Memory work in Adorno traite du concept adornien de la mémoire. Je postule que l’œuvre d’art chez Adorno incarne un Zeitkern (noyau temporel). Je démontrerai que l’immanence réciproque de l’histoire dans l’œuvre d’art et l’immanence de l’œuvre d’art dans l’histoire permettent de repenser le passé. Le premier chapitre examine la manière par laquelle le passé est préservé et nié par l’œuvre d’art. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment, à l’aide du processus interprétatif, le passé est transcendé à travers l’œuvre d’art. Le dernier chapitre évoque la lecture adornienne d’écrits de Brecht et de Beckett dans le but d’illustrer la capacité de l’œuvre d’art à naviguer entre la vérité et le trauma. / Analyzing the dialectical processes through which art works through the past, Between Truth and Trauma: The Work of Art and Memory in Adorno examines Adorno’s concept of memory. I argue that, for Adorno, the work of art both has and is a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus). I demonstrate that the reciprocal immanence of history in the work and immanence of the work in history allows for the past to be worked through. The first chapter examines how the past is preserved and negated by the work of art. The second chapter examines how the past is transcended through the work of art via the interpretive process. The final chapter looks at Adorno’s reading of work by Beckett and Brecht in order to illustrate the ability of the work of art to navigate between truth and trauma.

Can Hegel's Philosophy of Right do without the Science of Logic?”. The question posed by this paper’s title refers to the attempts of some contemporary authors, amongst them Axel Honneth, to update the central theses of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, though precisely (and deliberately) doing so without its alleged dependence on the Science of Logic. On account of several methodological and hermeneutical reasons, it is not easy to answer this question. It is well known that Hegel emphatically asserts that both works and philosophical projects depend on each other, but there is no consensus amongst specialists on how much the Logic actually influences the Philosophy of Right and in what way it does so. On the other hand, clearly any social philosophy needs a logical theory in a broad sense, whether it may be Hegelian or not. This is even more so if the aim is to update the Hegelian construction implicit in the notion of freedom. In any case, the discussion seems to bring forth the paradox of asserting both the current relevance and the obsolescence of the Hegelian notion of freedom. / La pregunta planteada en el título de esta contribución alude a los intentos de algunos autores contemporáneos, entre ellos el de Axel Honneth, por reactualizar los planteamientos centrales de la Filosofía del Derecho de Hegel, pero prescindiendo precisamente (y deliberadamente) de su supuesta dependencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica. Responder a esa pregunta no es fácil por diversas razones, metodológicas y hermenéuticas. Es sabido por cierto que Hegel sostiene enfáticamente la dependencia entre ambas obras y empresas filosóficas, pero no hay consenso entre los especialistas sobre qué peso real y de qué tipo posee la Lógica sobre la Filosofía del Derecho. De otro lado, es evidente que cualquier filosofía social requiere de una concepción lógica en sentido amplio, sea esta hegeliana o de otro tipo, más aun si lo que se pretende es actualizar la construcción hegeliana implícita en el concepto de libertad. En cualquier caso, la discusión parece mostrar un hecho paradójico que consiste en afirmar simultáneamente la actualidad y la obsolescencia de la concepción hegeliana de la libertad.