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The institution of art as a problem in the poetry of William Carlos WilliamsBrennan, Paul Andrew January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
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O voo da coruja entre a luz e a sombra : acerca do saber absoluto e da possibilidade de uma nova figura do espíritoMiranda, Marloren Lopes January 2018 (has links)
A filosofia, para Hegel, é o saber conceitual que se pensa e pensa sua época, sendo esse saber resultado do processo de desenvolvimento histórico e cultural do mundo. Nesse sentido, a Fenomenologia do Espírito é a apresentação necessária do movimento de formação do saber que surgiu na época de Hegel, o qual ele denomina de saber absoluto. Esse é o resultado do percurso que culminou na Revolução Francesa, na religião protestante e na filosofia do idealismo transcendental, e a Fenomenologia apresenta esse encadeamento através de suas figuras, isto é, momentos da história, da cultura e da filosofia tomados a partir de sua perspectiva conceitual e conectados de forma a demonstrar as transformações do saber ele mesmo. A partir disso, Hegel denomina o saber absoluto como última figura do espírito, que, como ele aponta no final da obra, também é a nova figura, a filosofia como ciência, e se propõe a desenvolvê-la naquilo que ele chama de Ciência da Lógica. Desse modo, o objetivo desse ou, em outras palavras, se é possível, a partir do próprio sistema hegeliano, considerar o surgimento de novas figuras do espírito depois da figura do saber absoluto ou da filosofia do idealismo absoluto. Para isso, busca-se esclarecer a noção de figura na Fenomenologia, bem como suas condições de possibilidade e aquilo que Hegel utiliza como o seu método científico, a saber, o processo dialético, explicitado na noção de suprassunção (Aufhebung). A fim de esclarecer essas noções de modo mais preciso, recorre-se a noções da Ciência da Lógica e retorna-se à Fenomenologia a partir deles, de modo a compreendê-los de maneira concreta e de salientar os aspectos lógicos já presentes nessa obra. Para isso, procurase demonstrar aqui que a Lógica hegeliana não é apenas uma ciência formal, como a metafísica tradicional usualmente considera, mas também uma ontologia, um estudo de como o ser é. Para Hegel, o ser é o conceito e por isso se pode ter um saber conceitual, como o saber absoluto, acerca da realidade e ele ser um saber efetivo, isto é, um conhecimento das coisas como elas são nelas mesmas, e não apenas como elas aparecem para nós segundo nossas condições de possibilidade da experiência, como tenta mostrar o idealismo transcendental de Kant. Por isso, este trabalho defende que a ontologia hegeliana não é nem um retorno à metafísica tradicional, nem uma radicalização dessa, mas uma apropriação de seus conceitos revistos sob a óptica das novas lentes do saber absoluto, um saber qualitativamente diferente dos saberes anteriores e que, precisamente por isso, permitiria a continuação e atualização desse saber de acordo com novos momentos históricos e culturais. / For Hegel, philosophy is the conceptual knowing that is thought about and thinks about its time. This knowing derives from the process of historical and cultural development of the world. Thus, the Phenomenology of Spirit is the necessary presentation of the movement of knowledge acquisition that arose in Hegel's time, which he calls absolute knowing. This is the result of the path that climaxed in the French Revolution, in the Protestant religion and in the philosophy of transcendental idealism. The Phenomenology presents this chaining through its figures, that is, moments of history, of culture and of philosophy taken from their conceptual perspective and connected in order to demonstrate the transformations of knowing itself. Based on this, Hegel considers absolute knowing the last figure of spirit, which, as he points out at the end of the work, is also the new figure, philosophy as science, and proposes to develop it in what he calls the Science of Logic. Therefore, this study aims to investigate in what sense one can understand the determination of figure of or, in other words, if it is possible, based on the Hegelian system itself, to consider the emergence of new figures of spirit after the figure of absolute knowing or of the philosophy of absolute idealism. In order to do so, it seeks to clarify the notion of figure in the Phenomenology, as well as its conditions of possibility and what Hegel uses as his scientific method, namely, the dialectical process, explicit in the notion of sublation. In order to more precisely clarify these notions, notions from the Science of Logic are used and a return to the Phenomenology is made based on them, so as to understand them in a concrete way and to emphasize the logical aspects already present in this work. To this end, here we try to demonstrate that the Hegelian Logic is not only a formal science, as traditional metaphysics usually considers it to be, but also an ontology, a study of how the being is. For Hegel, the being is the concept and therefore it is possible to have a conceptual knowing, such as the absolute knowing, about reality, and it can be an actual knowing, that is, a knowledge of things as they are in themselves and not only as they appear to us according to our conditions of possibility of experience, as transcendental idealism attempts to show us. Therefore, this study argues that the Hegelian ontology is neither a return to traditional metaphysics nor a radicalization of this metaphysics, but an appropriation of its concepts revised under the new lenses of absolute knowing, a knowing that is qualitatively different from previous types of knowing and that, precisely for this reason, would allow the continuation and updating of this knowing according to new historical and cultural moments.
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Moral Friction, Moral Phenomenology, and the ImproviserYoung, Benjamin Scott 01 January 2012 (has links)
This dissertation offers a phenomenology of that mode of self-interpretation in which it becomes possible for an interpreter to intentionally participate in the production of moral norms to which the interpreter himself or herself feels bound. Part One draws on Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" in order to thematize the phenomenon I call "moral friction"; a condition in which an interpreter becomes explicitly aware of the historical and cultural contingencies of their own moral vocabularies, practices, and concerns and as a result find themselves incapable of feeling the normative weight implicit in these. Part Two draws on Heidegger's existential analytic of human being, Gadamer's development of Hermeneutic Phenomenology, and Hegel's notion of "sublation" in order to map how novel interpretations can irreversibly displace the coherence of older interpretations. I call this form of interpretation "moral phenomenology." Finally, in Part Three, I utilize a selective phenomenology of musical improvisation to plot the unique temporal orientation of self-interpretation that results from intentionally deploying this irreversible displacement of older interpretations that involve normative moral implications. I call the form of life that is marked by this hermeneutic mode the "improviser." The result is a description of a form of life in which it becomes possible to explicitly participate in the production of moral norms within a historical and culturally contingent context that nevertheless preserves standards of rational justification for normative moral judgment without the need for atemporal first principles. The availability of this mode of self-interpretation displaces the sharp distinction between non-normative descriptive phenomenology and normative moral reasoning by placing the latter within a non-teleological historical practice that engages in the production of interpretations which irreversibly displace older interpretations--a practice that is governed by the critical cultivation of contingent moral norms within the open investigation into the good life for human being.
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Between truth and traume : the work of art and memory in AdornoDolgoy, Rebecca C. 09 1900 (has links)
En analysant les processus dialectiques par lesquels l’art repense le passé, Between Truth and Trauma : The Work of Art and Memory work in Adorno traite du concept adornien de la mémoire. Je postule que l’œuvre d’art chez Adorno incarne un Zeitkern (noyau temporel). Je démontrerai que l’immanence réciproque de l’histoire dans l’œuvre d’art et l’immanence de l’œuvre d’art dans l’histoire permettent de repenser le passé. Le premier chapitre examine la manière par laquelle le passé est préservé et nié par l’œuvre d’art. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment, à l’aide du processus interprétatif, le passé est transcendé à travers l’œuvre d’art. Le dernier chapitre évoque la lecture adornienne d’écrits de Brecht et de Beckett dans le but d’illustrer la capacité de l’œuvre d’art à naviguer entre la vérité et le trauma. / Analyzing the dialectical processes through which art works through the past, Between Truth and Trauma: The Work of Art and Memory in Adorno examines Adorno’s concept of memory. I argue that, for Adorno, the work of art both has and is a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus). I demonstrate that the reciprocal immanence of history in the work and immanence of the work in history allows for the past to be worked through. The first chapter examines how the past is preserved and negated by the work of art. The second chapter examines how the past is transcended through the work of art via the interpretive process. The final chapter looks at Adorno’s reading of work by Beckett and Brecht in order to illustrate the ability of the work of art to navigate between truth and trauma.
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Between truth and traume : the work of art and memory in AdornoDolgoy, Rebecca C. 09 1900 (has links)
En analysant les processus dialectiques par lesquels l’art repense le passé, Between Truth and Trauma : The Work of Art and Memory work in Adorno traite du concept adornien de la mémoire. Je postule que l’œuvre d’art chez Adorno incarne un Zeitkern (noyau temporel). Je démontrerai que l’immanence réciproque de l’histoire dans l’œuvre d’art et l’immanence de l’œuvre d’art dans l’histoire permettent de repenser le passé. Le premier chapitre examine la manière par laquelle le passé est préservé et nié par l’œuvre d’art. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment, à l’aide du processus interprétatif, le passé est transcendé à travers l’œuvre d’art. Le dernier chapitre évoque la lecture adornienne d’écrits de Brecht et de Beckett dans le but d’illustrer la capacité de l’œuvre d’art à naviguer entre la vérité et le trauma. / Analyzing the dialectical processes through which art works through the past, Between Truth and Trauma: The Work of Art and Memory in Adorno examines Adorno’s concept of memory. I argue that, for Adorno, the work of art both has and is a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus). I demonstrate that the reciprocal immanence of history in the work and immanence of the work in history allows for the past to be worked through. The first chapter examines how the past is preserved and negated by the work of art. The second chapter examines how the past is transcended through the work of art via the interpretive process. The final chapter looks at Adorno’s reading of work by Beckett and Brecht in order to illustrate the ability of the work of art to navigate between truth and trauma.
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The sublated style of a cinema in transition: Grigori Kozintsev, Leonid Trauberg, and Oleksandr Dovzhenko from the 1920s - 1930sBancroft, Alan 06 July 2021 (has links)
This Master’s thesis examines the period of transition (1928-1935) in Soviet cinema when the avant-garde directors Grigori Kozintsev, Leonid Trauberg, and Oleksandr Dovzhenko, among others, began to make films under the strictures of a new state-mandated socialist realist aesthetic. It argues, despite the prominence of literature which maintains that socialist realism precipitated a conceptual break that effectively ended avant-garde filmmaking practice, that socialist realism simultaneously preserved, developed, and negated elements of the avant-garde cinema. Using Katerina Clark’s The Soviet Novel and Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” this thesis first illustrates the programmatic, narrative, and ideological continuities between the aesthetics in Kozintsev and Trauberg’s The New Babylon (1929), Alone (1931), and The Youth of Maxim (1935). These films exemplify how socialist realism perpetuated the modified bildungsroman plot pre-figured by the avant-garde, further transformed Leninism’s spontaneity/consciousness dialectic which ideologically interpellates individuals via social being, and began to utilise continuity editing in place of montage to construct overtonal ideological impressions. Next it explores continuities of visual stylistics in five films by Oleksandr Dovzhenko, Zvenigora (1928), Arsenal (1929), Earth (1930), Ivan (1932), and Aerograd (1935). Here the concepts of the “transitional film” and the “reduced form of stylistics” are introduced. The claim is made that the films made after the introduction of sound technology and before the official codification of socialist realism in 1934 represent a distinct hybrid of the avant-garde and socialist realist aesthetics and that a particular mediation of avant-garde stylistics through the new strictures was practiced. In the films of Dovzhenko, the continuing employment of three devices is identified to support the concept of the reduced form of stylistics: the use of the monocle (single element) lens, the poeticization of death, and stylised figure movement. In identifying the trajectories of plot structure, ideology, and stylistic devices in the transition from the avant-garde to socialist realism, this thesis elucidates significant continuities between the two aesthetics that embody a conceptual development, or sublation, in place of a conceptual break, or pure negation. / Graduate / 2022-06-09
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