Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 165-181).

Thesis (M.L.S.)--University of Texas.

Thesis--Tekniska Högskolan, Stockholm. / At head of title: Library and Institute of Ibero-American studies, Stockholm. Extra t.p., with thesis statement, inserted. Bibliography: p. 229-241.

Thesis (M.L.S.)--University of Texas.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universidad de Sevilla. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 273-283).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Purdue University, 1990. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 310-329).

Thesis- Tekniska Högskolan, Stockholm / At head of title: Library and Institute of Ibero-American studies, Stockholm. Extra t.p., with thesis statement, inserted. Bibliography: p. 229-241.

Boston University. University Professors Program Senior theses. / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-02

This study is primarily concerned with making an assessment of the social and economic policies pursued by the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada between 1979 to 1983. It is the first sociological study of the Grenadian revolution, and is longer and more detailed than any other study that has been written on the subject. The thesis mainly examines developments inside Grenada. It therefore breaks entirely new ground since most of the existing literature views the revolution from the perspective of international relations. The principal methods of investigation used were library research in London and the Caribbean; and six months of field work in Grenada, Barbados and Jamaica, where I attended important political events and conducted interviews with politicians, businessmen, government officials and representatives' of international agencies. The thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter one sets the scene for the study by providing information on the culture, geography, history, sociology and economy of Grenada, and traces the events that led to the revolutionary seizure of power in 1979. Chapter two discusses the main theoretical issues raised by the revolution, and chapter three analyses the institutions of popular power established by the PRG. Chapters four to eight examine the principal features of the economic strategy of the revolutionary government, and chapter nine seeks to explain the factors that led to the downfall of the revolution. The concluding chapter contains a very brief summary of the main findings of the study. The central argument put forward in the thesis is that the. revolutionary ideology which guided the PRG was highly authoritarian in character, and led to the implementation of policies that were not suited to Grenadian society. The ultimate downfall of the revolution was caused by the authoritarian practices of the PRG which resulted in a vicious power struggle in which the Prime Minister and over 100 of his supporters lost their lives. This implosion of the post-revolutionary regime gave the United States' government an adequate pretext to invade Grenada and dismantle the institutions of the revolution.

This thesis studies Spain’s failure to halt the revolution which led to Colombia’s independence in 1822. After Napoleon’s occupation of the Spanish peninsula in 1808, most of Spain’s South American colonies removed themselves from European control and functioned as sovereign states. The thesis explores, first, the activities of royalists in the Viceroyalty of New Granada during this period. It then turns to events after 1815. In that year, following the defeat of Napoleon, Spain’s restored monarchy despatched a substantial army to Venezuela and New Granada, in an effort to return the viceroyalty to Spanish control. This expedition, while initially successful, failed ignominiously in its task. The thesis examines the reasons for Spain’s defeat, which was more the result of Spanish error than Colombian patriotism. To begin with, Spain’s policies for solving the American problem suffered from several fundamental defects. All attempts at ending the American insurgencies were based on an inadequate understanding of American realities. Moreover, the only policy to which Spain committed itself wholeheartedly, namely military reconquest, was seen by many as merely exacerbating the problem, and was further restricted by financial considerations. Spain thus lacked a coherent policy for counter-revolution, and failed to carry through those plans it succeeded in putting into operation. New Granada saw the effects of this non-policy. Colonial officials there, like officials in Spain, disagreed profoundly in their proposed cures for the insurgency. Furthermore, mutual distrust between members of the civil administration and the royalist army at times overshadowed efforts to defeat the insurgents. Disagreement over policy was but one strand of the royalist crisis in New Granada. Equally serious was the chronic shortage of money suffered by both the army and the civilian administration. Their continual demands for food, funding and supplies wore away Neogranadans’ initial support for Spain’s reconquest, as did the arrogant and offensive behaviour of royalist troops. Perennially short of cash, the army and the administration relied on forced loans and confiscation to keep afloat. These proved an unstable base for a re­imposition of Spanish control. The effect was that the inhabitants of New Granada, most of whom had welcomed the royalist army in 1816, by 1819 gave enthusiastic support to Simón Bolivar’s campaign against Spain’s General Morillo. The thesis examines these issues, setting them in the context of Spain’s effort to restore its authority in New Granada. It then charts the consequent collapse of royal government from 1819 to 1822. It concludes with an assessment of the Spanish response to the loss of the American colonies.