This study investigated the relationship between the character typology proposed by C. G. Jung, and the stages of cognitive-moral development described by Lawrence Kohlberg. It was hypothesized that certain character types, particularly those preferring introversion and intuition, would display the higher levels of moral development. A total of 120 male and female introductory psychology students at the University of Arizona were administered the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) to assess character type, the Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM) to identify stage of moral development, and the Shipley-Hartford Institute of Living Scale as a brief estimate of IQ. The only significant differences in moral development as a function of character type were between the judging and perceiving types, with perceiving types displaying the higher mean SROM score (p .02). This finding suggests that open-mindedness is more conducive to moral development than the tendency to jump to immediate conclusions.

The body of work presented in this thesis results from an in depth investigation of the moral reasoning of male offending and male and female non-offending adolescents in the UK using the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992). In Chapter I a review of the research relevant to field of study was presented. In Chapter 2 findings from initial investigations into the patterns of moral reasoning of male offending and male and female non-offending adolescents were presented. Key aims of the studies presented in Chapter 2 were to replicate previous findings using the measure amongst offenders and non-offenders, in particular to test claims that offenders were morally immature in relation to non-offending peers, and to investigate gender differences on the measure. In line with predictions, the measure discriminated between offenders and non-offenders, with offenders having significantly lower mean scores than non-offenders. No gender differences were observed in the overall sample. However, some difficulties were found in discriminating between younger male offenders and male non-offenders. Tests of the internal characteristics of the scale were also performed. In Chapter 3, subsequent analyses of data were performed using "categorical" methods. This represented a novel means of tackling the data. A key aim was to test the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis that females and males differ in use of Stage 3 "mutual and prosocial" and Stage 4 "systemic and standard" reasoning. Results of the "categorical" analyses apparently corresponded to the Gilligan hypothesis. Patterns of intra-individual variability in moral stage use were also investigated to test claims regarding structural consistency in moral reasoning. It was found that participants were demonstrating intra-individual variability in their patterns of moral reasoning, this presented a challenge to certain aspects of the moral reasoning model. The final chapter summarised key findings to emerge from the thesis, and discussed these in theoretical context.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Simon Fraser University, 2006. / Theses (Faculty of Education) / Simon Fraser University. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Lehigh University, 2003. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-165).

No description available.

In examining children's moral orientations, the study draws on the work of Carol Gilligan (1982) and Lawerence Kohlberg (1969) focusing on age and gender differences in moral development. This study sought to examine children's moral reasoning about situations involving conflicts and how they can resolve them. The present study is carried out in order to ascertain whether children's choice of moral orientations varies across individual factors such as age and gender. The study was conducted at a primary school in a working class suburb in Pietermaritzburg, province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The participants in the study were a group of 72 grade one and two learners. The participants were randomly selected from an alphabetical class list stratified by age (6, 7 and 8 year olds) and gender in that 12 boys and 12 girls were selected in each age group. The pupils were required to respond to three scenarios depicting real life dilemmas. The scenarios were used for obtaining data on the children's moral reasoning. Results have shown that children across gender and age made more care than justice orientation compared to 30% that reflected a justice orientation. An interesting finding was that across age boys' responses reflected a more care orientation (68%) than a justice orientation (32%) which is contrary to Kohlberg's view. However, across age girls' responses reflected a greater care orientation (72%) than a justice orientation (28%), as suggested by Gilligan. Both boys and girls showed a preference for the care orientation because they appear to understand the importance of solving problems in a way that considers the needs and concerns of all individuals. To understand the logic behind the learners determination of who is right and wrong and why, it was necessary to locate and follow the moral language, since the language gives meaning to the learners underlying belief system (Ward, 1988). This study also examined the responses in terms of moral operant concepts, which is defined as the ideas, beliefs, or principles that were used to organize a moral orientation. / Thesis (M.Ed.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2006.

Assuming that moral discourse is prescriptive, what distinguishes it from other types of prescriptive discourse? To say, as Hare does, that it is its overridingness, is subject both to criticisms that assume that overridingness could, in principle, be used to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, and then show that it is doubtful that moral discourse is overriding, and to the criticisms that claim that it is in principle impossible to use overridingness to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, because all of them are bound to be on a par in respect of overridingness. / It is also impossible to distinguish moral discourse from other types of prescriptive discourse by saying that in it we use arguments based on imaginatively putting oneself in the shoes of others, because such arguments are used in prudential discourse as well. However, we can account for the distinction, if we realize that such arguments can be performed only on certain designated argument-places, and that in moral claims argument-places of two different types are designated for the purpose: those for moral agents and those for moral patients; while in prudential claims argument-places of only one type are designated: those for prudential agents. / If this account is accepted, this raises a number of further questions. Examination of these questions leads to a form of relativism about membership in the sets of moral agents and moral patients. This form of relativism, however, leaves considerable room for rational discussion of membership in these sets and is compatible with the rejection of relativism about the content of moral rules.

Thesis (B.A. Hons. 1977) from the Department of Psychology, University of Adelaide.

Thesis (M.T.S.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 1993. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [101]-103).

Thesis (M.A.)--St. John's Seminary, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-63).