Undergraduate honors paper--Mount Holyoke College, 2008. Dept of Philosophy. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-102).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Timothy Renick, committee chair; Kathryn McClymond, Timothy O'Keefe, committee members. Electronic text (48 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 24, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-48).

Not available / text

This thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove that relativism is false, and realism true.

In this dissertation, I propose a new method of dealing with moral relativism. This method, which I call the 'parallel arguments' approach, has the unusual feature that -- if successful -- it neutralizes the force of relativistic arguments in metaethics without making commitments to any particular (or even general) antirelativist position. While other writers have employed this approach in limited ways, I believe that this is the first self-conscious and systematic use of this approach in the particular area I deal with. The bulk of the dissertation is devoted to a demonstration of the 'parallel arguments' approach against the arguments for moral relativism advocated by one of its most famous contemporary proponents, Gilbert Harman.The aim of the introduction is to motivate the overall project by showing why a new approach seems to be desirable in dealing with moral relativism. In the introduction, I clarify and justify the 'parallel arguments' approach that will be employed in the chapters to come. The first chapter sets out the target of the dissertation: the relativistic arguments of Gilbert Harman. In order for the 'parallel arguments' approach to be applied to these arguments, they must first be clarified and cleansed of simpler oversights. For that reason, while the first chapter contains an attempt at an exegesis of all Harman's arguments for moral relativism, that exegesis is accompanied throughout with a critical philosophical gloss. In that gloss, I present and discuss a number of textual and argumentative difficulties in Harman's writings that seem to have been missed by previous critics. The second chapter is the beginning of the application of the 'parallel arguments' approach to Harman's case for relativism. The chapter is devoted to those relativistic arguments for which Harman is most famous: namely, arguments for moral relativism that stem from an analogy or disanalogy between morality and science. I deal with the first of these arguments quickly, and spend the bulk of the second chapter discussing Harman's most famous relativistic argument. This argument of Harman's is based on a disanalogy between the discovery that there is a proton in a cloud chamber and the discovery that the burning of a cat is immoral. After clarifying more clearly what is at issue in this argument, I present and discuss two distinct 'parallel arguments' responses to it. The third chapter deals with the other two arguments Harman presents for moral relativism: the argument from moral disagreement and what I call the 'argument from moral reasons'. I clarify both arguments and, again, present a 'parallel arguments' response to each. In the conclusion, I return to an issue that was raised in the introduction: might there not be ethicists of a particular philosophical temperament such that they could rightly reject the 'parallel arguments' approach as ineffective? I argue in response that, while this is possible, it does not seem to be a problem for my project. / Graduate

Assuming that moral discourse is prescriptive, what distinguishes it from other types of prescriptive discourse? To say, as Hare does, that it is its overridingness, is subject both to criticisms that assume that overridingness could, in principle, be used to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, and then show that it is doubtful that moral discourse is overriding, and to the criticisms that claim that it is in principle impossible to use overridingness to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, because all of them are bound to be on a par in respect of overridingness. / It is also impossible to distinguish moral discourse from other types of prescriptive discourse by saying that in it we use arguments based on imaginatively putting oneself in the shoes of others, because such arguments are used in prudential discourse as well. However, we can account for the distinction, if we realize that such arguments can be performed only on certain designated argument-places, and that in moral claims argument-places of two different types are designated for the purpose: those for moral agents and those for moral patients; while in prudential claims argument-places of only one type are designated: those for prudential agents. / If this account is accepted, this raises a number of further questions. Examination of these questions leads to a form of relativism about membership in the sets of moral agents and moral patients. This form of relativism, however, leaves considerable room for rational discussion of membership in these sets and is compatible with the rejection of relativism about the content of moral rules.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Thomas K. Seung. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove that relativism is false, and realism true. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of the studies was to test 1) the effectiveness of experimenter-directed principle testing discussions in moving subjects from an ethical relativist position to a more universalist position on all cultural practices which are unethical 2) whether subjects at higher levels of moral development rejected ethical relativism to a significantly greater degree than subjects at lower levels of moral development 3) whether subjects at higher levels of moral development were more willing to accept non-ethical cultural practices than were subjects at lower levels of moral development-. These questions were generated from Bernard Gert's rationale for the existence and validity of universal moral principles and from Lawrence Kohlberg's claim that persons at higher levels of moral development are more likely to be universalists. The subjects for the first study were 44 grade eleven students drawn from two classes in a Vancouver-high school. The subjects for the second study were 32 fifth year university students in the Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia. In both cases, the main reason for selection was the cooperation of the teachers, The level of moral development for each subject was measured by using Rest's Defining Issues Test. Movement from an ethical relativist position to an ethical universalist position was measured by using Kehoe's Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. In study one, all subjects were pre-tested with the Defining Issues Test and then randomly divided into a treatment group and a control group. All subjects were post-tested with the Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. In study two, all subjects were pretested with the Defining Issues Test and Form A of the Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. All subjects were administered the treatment and then post-tested with Form B of the Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. The treatment in both studies attempted to determine if subjects would demonstrate a greater willingness to 1) accept non-ethical cultural practices 2) reject the ethical relativist position 3) accept the ethical universalist position. Analyses of the data in study one suggested that the treatment had no significant effect. Analyses of the data in study two suggested that the treatment did have a significant effect on the subjects' willingness to accept non-ethical cultural practices. The treatment, however, also had a significant effect on the subjects' willingness to accept unethical cultural practices. These results suggest that the treatment caused disequilibrium within the subjects' values system whereby they could not distinguish cultural practices with ethical implications from those without. In future studies, this distinct-ion must be clarified. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate