Emerging work in moral psychology challenges our confidence in our moral judgment. Our moral intuitions have been attributed to automatic, emotionally laden processes and are alleged to be accordingly deficient. Intuitive moral judgments apparently neglect some of the most basic concerns of moral decision-making; for example, they purportedly disregard relevant information, fail to balance competing considerations, and ignore social costs and benefits. Some moral psychologists propose an evolutionary explanation, suggesting that our moral sensibilities track matters of adaptive, rather than moral, significance.These findings are disconcerting and might naturally be taken to unsettle our philosophical practice. An empirically-informed moral psychology seems to discredit moral common sense as well as prevailing accounts of method and justification in moral and political philosophy. In turn, it threatens to undermine substantive conceptions of matters such as virtue, rights, and distributive justice.I argue that contemporary moral psychology does not, as is often supposed, necessitate radical revisions to our conception of morality. Recent research does oblige us to reevaluate many of our views in moral and political philosophy; however, I argue that it also gives us the opportunity to supply these views with new and stronger support.

<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to rebut some skeptical arguments in moral epistemology by appealing to philosophical resources from the history of European philosophy. The skeptical arguments I will be countering are grounded in the perspective of contemporary biology. Put quickly, our evolutionary history is said to undermine our claims to moral knowledge because the process by which our capacity for such knowledge developed was determined by adaptive and reproductive fitness. The determinations of fitness, it is said, cannot be expected to align with standards of objective moral value. In the first chapter, I spell out the importance of evaluative perception. The need for a capacity to perceive value raises the concern that moral psychology is something mysterious. In the second chapter, I consider some skeptical arguments in moral epistemology that conclude we have no good reason to believe we are wired to be receptive to objective moral truth. While some of these arguments purport to undermine our access toobjective moral truths, I conclude that they do not. The remainder of the dissertation considers the work of Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel in light of the concerns raised in part one. Despite initial appearances, these authors understand the relation of conscience and human nature in a way that points toward a defensible view, even in light of the challenges raised by contemporary biology. The resulting view is an account of the moral conscience that emphasizes autonomy and rational agency and recognizes their value in virtue of their concrete expression in a social context.<br></p>

<p>This dissertation identifies 5 mayor demands regarding the role of the emotions in Aristotelian virtue theories and examines how well some contemporary psychological views of the emotions deal with these issues. The discussion of the role of emotion in Aristotelian virtue theory draws on Aristotle's texts and the works of Terence Irwin, Nancy Sherman, Martha Nussbaum, John Cooper, Rosalind Hursthouse and Arash Abizadeh. The discussion of the contemporary psychological views of the emotions is based on the work of Paul Griffiths in What Emotions Really Are, and focuses on his division of the study of emotion into affect programs and higher cognitive emotions. </p><p>The dissertation is divided in three chapters. The first chapter discusses Aristotelian definitions of emotion and outlines the following demands that psychological theories of emotion should be able to explain: (1) plausibility, (2) psychological harmony, (3) motivational support, (4) perception of moral salience and (5) training. The second chapter explains the psychological views that Griffiths focuses on, the affect program theory and the higher cognitive view, and highlights the areas relevant to the Aristotelian demands. The third chapter compares the contemporary theories of emotion discussed with Aristotelian views of emotion by taking the Aristotelian demands outlined in the first chapter and examining how the contemporary theories handle these issues. I conclude that the contemporary views do not adequately meet the Aristotelian demands and need to pay more attention to the Aristotelian view of emotion to achieve a more complete view. I argue that how a theory distinguishes between basic and higher cognitive emotions impacts the compatibility with Aristotelian notions of emotion and how it can meet its demands.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis offers an analysis of the vice tradition of the fourth-century monk Evagrius Ponticus. While Evagrius, like others before him, understands that virtue and vice have an affective component, and that these affections are reactions to mental images, for Evagrius these images are veridically thinner than what we find in earlier discussions of passion in ancient philosophy. As a result, vice is less a matter of false reasoning and false perception than it is a matter of the excessive dwelling on representations connected with events of one’s personal history, to the point that the passions aroused at the time of those events become globalized dispositions. Evagrius’s concern with how memories lead us to dwell on these “bad thoughts” proves to be point of contact with psychoanaly which many modern authors, including Michel Foucault, have detected; yet a close analysis of what Evagrius takes to be involved in self-examination reveals that Foucault’s account of the “technologies of the self” fails to take into account Evagrius’s interest in the distinction between the endowed self, that self which is examined, and the ideal self, the goal of the ascetic activity.

This thesis offers an analysis of the vice tradition of the fourth-century monk Evagrius Ponticus. While Evagrius, like others before him, understands that virtue and vice have an affective component, and that these affections are reactions to mental images, for Evagrius these images are veridically thinner than what we find in earlier discussions of passion in ancient philosophy. As a result, vice is less a matter of false reasoning and false perception than it is a matter of the excessive dwelling on representations connected with events of one’s personal history, to the point that the passions aroused at the time of those events become globalized dispositions. Evagrius’s concern with how memories lead us to dwell on these “bad thoughts” proves to be point of contact with psychoanaly which many modern authors, including Michel Foucault, have detected; yet a close analysis of what Evagrius takes to be involved in self-examination reveals that Foucault’s account of the “technologies of the self” fails to take into account Evagrius’s interest in the distinction between the endowed self, that self which is examined, and the ideal self, the goal of the ascetic activity.

Moral philosophers like Martha Nussbaum, Philippa Foot, and Michael Weber argue for what I call the “Neo-Stoic Reading” of Nietzsche, which includes two claims: first, Nietzsche allegedly recommends the relentless pursuit of self-interest at the expense of other persons; second, he denies empathy any major role in the ethical life. I will argue that the Neo-Stoic view misses an important unifying theme in Nietzsche’s ethics and his criticism of morality—his investment in the value of honor—and that Nietzsche’s ethical recommendations involving empathy and even altruism can be better understood by situating them within an historical tradition of honor-based ethics.

Nathan Phillip Stout

The overall purpose of the dissertation is to make a contribution to a political theory of democratic transformations by drawing attention to one of the less theorised dimensions of a polity’s public culture: public affect. More precisely, I deal with the role that institutions in general and courts in particular can play in the education of public moral sentiments within transitional justice processes. A cognitive constructivist approach to emotions provides the background for my attempt to show, first, the legitimacy of negative public emotions of resentment and indignation in the aftermath of violence, and second, their positive potential for the reproductive efforts of the democratic community. These affects are barometers of injustice and can act as signals of alarm for institutions to intervene correctively. As such, they bear normative weight and should be a proper object of concern for any society attempting to make the transition to democracy; however, left unfiltered and unmediated institutionally, they can either degenerate into political cynicism and apathy, or be expressed in ways that are incompatible with the democratic value of equal concern and respect for all citizens. I argue that courts dealing with transitional justice issues can recognise, engage constructively, and fructify negative moral emotions for democracy. The exemplarity of judicial reflective judgment—both in the context of constitutional review of transitional justice bills and of criminal trials—can inspire citizens to reflect on what they want to do in the name of their violated sense of justice and encourage them to internalise democratic norms of social interaction. A series of case studies from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are used to illustrate how the judiciary has historically chosen to engage negative emotions in the aftermath of oppression and violence.

In this dissertation, I lay the foundations for the development of a unique ethical theory, titled “Ethical Harmonism,” on the basis of the early Confucian Xunzi’s thought. First, I attempt to understand Xunzi’s fundamental ethical position centered on his thought of the ideal state for humans. Second, I explore the nature of two attitudes that one should develop in order to create and maintain the ideal state for humans. Xunzi’s ethical position is characterized primarily in terms of “the final good” that it requires one to seek to attain. For Xunzi, the final good is a certain holistic state that every human has reason to create and maintain cooperatively, namely what I call “harmony.” Harmony is the ideal state in which all humans form a well-unified whole in such a way that they interact with one another by properly recognizing various kinds of persons and by appropriately responding to each kind. I also provide a preliminary reconstruction of Xunzi’s view by raising questions concerning whether his holistic view can reasonably accommodate part of contemporary individualistic ethical sentiments, especially, that associated with such a notion as human rights. This reconstruction is intended to serve to develop “Ethical Harmonism,” which is a working-label for the most defensible Xunzian position that is currently in the development stage. For Xunzi, the creation and maintenance of harmony depend on all humans’ proper development of two attitudes, qin (love) and zun (respect). For Xunzi, all humans should control their naturally unlimited desire by cultivating love and respect; and, by adopting these two attitudes in interaction with one another, they can jointly bring about harmony in society. I develop theories of these two attitudes especially by clarifying how each of the two attitudes is understood as a distinctive way of responding to certain kinds of person. I further explain how these two attitudes work cooperatively in ways that promote harmony. My study will provide a new systematic interpretation of two central concepts in Confucian ethics that are grounded in love and respect, namely ren (widely translated as humanness) and yi (widely translated as righteousness).

The overall purpose of the dissertation is to make a contribution to a political theory of democratic transformations by drawing attention to one of the less theorised dimensions of a polity’s public culture: public affect. More precisely, I deal with the role that institutions in general and courts in particular can play in the education of public moral sentiments within transitional justice processes. A cognitive constructivist approach to emotions provides the background for my attempt to show, first, the legitimacy of negative public emotions of resentment and indignation in the aftermath of violence, and second, their positive potential for the reproductive efforts of the democratic community. These affects are barometers of injustice and can act as signals of alarm for institutions to intervene correctively. As such, they bear normative weight and should be a proper object of concern for any society attempting to make the transition to democracy; however, left unfiltered and unmediated institutionally, they can either degenerate into political cynicism and apathy, or be expressed in ways that are incompatible with the democratic value of equal concern and respect for all citizens. I argue that courts dealing with transitional justice issues can recognise, engage constructively, and fructify negative moral emotions for democracy. The exemplarity of judicial reflective judgment—both in the context of constitutional review of transitional justice bills and of criminal trials—can inspire citizens to reflect on what they want to do in the name of their violated sense of justice and encourage them to internalise democratic norms of social interaction. A series of case studies from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are used to illustrate how the judiciary has historically chosen to engage negative emotions in the aftermath of oppression and violence.