Most studies that have examined parties that challenge the political establishment have focused their attention on certain types of 'anti-political-establishment parties' (a-pe parties), such as left-libertarian parties or right-wing populist parties. It is argued here that before moving on to an exploration of the reasons behind the electoral success or failure of specific a-p-e parties, one should take a closer look at the preconditions for the success of a-p-e parties in general. This makes it necessary to avoid any 'time-specific' or 'ideology-specific' explanations. Consequently, only those explanatory variables that could be tested at any point in time and for any a-p-e party regardless of its position on the left-right political scale were included in this study. Six hypotheses that fulfilled these criteria were selected to be tested using data from nineteen advanced industrial democracies covering the entire 1945 to 1999 time period. These hypotheses stress the importance of the electoral system, political traditions, the economic conditions of a country, the colluding behaviour of the establishment parties, certain party system features and the 'availability' of voters. In contrast to prior research which has often emphasized the importance of socioeconomic and institutional factors, the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses suggest that political variables explain much of the variance in the level of electoral support for a-p-e parties in different democracies, at different points in time. Thus, the economic situation of a country as well as the electoral system do not appear to have a significant impact on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. On the other hand, anti- political-establishment parties thrive in an environment where and when the establishment parties are fairly close to each other ideologically and where and when weak partisan attachments make voters available to their appeals. In addition, the behaviour of the establishment parties, especially the mode of interaction between them and the main opposition is very important. That is, a-p-e parties profit from collusion between the main establishment parties, especially in an environment that is characterized by mutual distrust between the governing party(ies) and an opposition that is excluded and sometimes even ostracized.

For more than two thousand years, "democracy" had referred to chaos, violence, irrationality and the tyranny of the mob. Almost all the principal founders of what we now call the "democratic" systems of the United States and France openly and proudly proclaimed their opposition to "democracy." "Democracy" was a term which, for them, had a disparaging connotation. Thus, the term "democracy" was an effective weapon for undermining the legitimacy of a political actor, faction or platform. Despite this inauspicious beginning, political leaders gradually became defenders and promoters of "democracy" (around 1830-40). The shift may be explained by the birth of the official parties in the United States and by the introduction of Universal suffrage (for adult males) in France. The word "democracy" was consciously employed to induce the people into believing that the politicians cared about representing their wishes and interests. In both cases—the United States and France—political factions competed for control of the term "democracy" and even openly acknowledged the existence of this semantic competition. It may be said, therefore, that it is mainly due to successful propaganda that we use the label "democracy" today to characterize the American and the French regimes.

Šiame magistro darbe atskleidžiama diskutuotina ir nemažai problemų kelianti politinių partijų finansavimo teisinio reglamentavimo pusė bei tiriamas tokio reguliavimo efektyvumas. Magistro darbo tikslas pateikti objektyvią politinių partijų finansavimo Lietuvoje analizę, kas galbūt pasitarnautų kuriant ir priimant naujus teisės aktus politinio finansavimo srityje. Autorė, aptardama Lietuvoje ir užsienio šalyse susiklosčiusią praktiką, pateikia konkrečių aplinkybių, susijusių su politiniu finansavimu, analizę ir siūlymus. Šiame magistro darbe ieškoma atsakymų į klausimus, iškilusius analizuojant tokias pagrindines sritis: kaip užtikrinti skaidrumą politinių partijų finansinėje veikloje? Kokios reikalingos prielaidos, kad teisinis reguliavimas būtų efektyvus? Kokio lygmens valstybinis finansavimas užtikrintų paramą politinėms partijoms? Kadangi yra studijuojami teisės aktai, reglamentuojantys politinių partijų finansavimą, šiame magistro darbe siekiama išsiaiškinti politinių partijų svarbą demokratinėje valstybėje bei pagrįsti tokių partijų finansinės veiklos teisinio reglamentavimo tikslingumą. Tai leidžia suprasti teisės aktų, reguliuojančių politinį finansavimą Lietuvoje, siekius bei išsiaiškinti, kokios problemos kliudo pasiekti šiuos tikslus. Pagrindinės problemos Lietuvoje, visų pirma, apima politinių partijų finansinės kontrolės ir finansavimo skaidrumo trūkumus, antra, politinių partijų nesąžiningą konkurenciją ir finansinius barjerus, trukdančius tokiam sąžiningumui... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / This master‘s paper uses controversial issue of party financing as an example to explore the effectiveness of a particular regulation. The aim of the paper is to give an objective overview of the issue of political party financing in Lithuania that may be worth while elaborating and before adopting new regulations in this sphere. Author discusses the situation in Lithuania and other countries thus giving the analysis and recommendations for particular circumstances of party finance in country. In this master’s paper main further-used concepts are analysed, looking for answers to questions like: how to ensure the transparency of the funding of political parties? What are the preconditions for regulation to be effective? How far should public funding be used to support political parties? As legislation on financing of political parties is studied, the master’s paper searches for main ideas about political parties and the notion what is the aim of financing regulation. Consequently, the answer allows formulating the aim and objectives of party finance regulations introduced in Lithuania, and seeing the main problems obstructing the reaching of the aim. The present problems in Lithuania include, first, lack of control and transparency, second, unfairness in political struggle, and financial barriers to enter it, third, threat of corruption and illegal influences of sponsors, fourth, violation of limitations and restrictions, and finally, fall-off in public trust of political... [to full text]

Little is known about why elected officials choose to get involved in presidential nomination struggles. Recent research argues that elected officials have a collective incentive to nominate an electorally viable and ideologically unifying candidate. Yet, elected officials must balance these collective incentives with their own personal considerations (e.g., reelection motives, policy interests, ambition, ideology) that may either foster or inhibit their ability to act on their collective desire to nominate viable, ideologically unifying candidates. Further, this research then determines the extent to which elected officials are rewarded-or punished- for getting involved during the presidential nomination process. In particular, interparty differences between the Republican and Democratic coalitions predict that Republicans, but not Democrats, will be rewarded for attempting to lead intraparty nomination struggles. Finally, this research links the aggregate-level findings that endorsements from elected officials are important determinants of nomination outcomes to the individual level by arguing that elected officials' endorsements mobilize their constituents to get involved in politics. In particular, as the mobilization process targets those who are already likely to participate in the first place, endorsements during presidential primaries leads to differential participation in politics. In sum, this research provides individual level foundations for the causes and consequences of congressional endorsements in presidential nomination contests.

This Thesis examines the relationship between the organisational and ideological transformation of the Labour Party, and the decline of intra-party factionalism by the groups of the Labour Left during the period from 1979 to 1997. Two central questions are considered. First, whether the fragmentation and decline of the Left during this period can best be understood by examining the interplay between organisational and ideological factors at both the party and individual group levels. Second, whether 'New Labour' continues to exhibit some of the key traits of attitudinal dissent among its grassroots membership, despite the lack of an organisational apparatus within which sub-groups of activists could challenge the centralising tendencies of party leaders and influence the direction of party policy. Labour's ideological and organisational transformation had a number of important consequences for the prevalence of intra-party factionalism. The organisational reforms meant that Labour ceased to represent Duverger's 'branch-mass' type of party. Furthermore, party leaders regained centralised control over members and activists through the resurgence of Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy'. The depth of Labour's ideological transformation also reinforced the narrowing of the ideological gap between (radical) grassroots members and ordinary (moderate) voters, such that May's 'law of curvilinear disparity' appeared extinct inside Blair's New Labour. Labour's transformation had a remarkably fragmenting effect at the group-level. The Labour Left was a collection of various groupings, each of which displayed different structural properties and ideological characteristics. There was no single organisational form of Labour Left factionalism, nor was their any common sense of ideological purpose. The processes of party transformation would act only to further the Left's fragmentation and cement its decline. However, it would be premature to talk of New Labour as a party free from dissent. Despite the dissolution of the Labour Left, New Labour's grassroots membership has retained some of the principal features of factionalism. Using data from original survey research among party members, it is suggested that New Labour has encouraged new types of 'objective' and 'subjective' factionalism. The kind of factionalism typified by the Labour Left of the 1970s and 1980s may have disappeared, but we should not preclude the growth of new dimensions of conflict between party leaders and grassroots members.

Thesis (Doctoral) -- Zhongguo ren min da xue, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of History, 1980.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2005. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Includes bibliographical references (p. 320-349).

Thesis--Münster. / Bibliography: p. 349-361.

Zugl.: Chemnitz, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2005