Using the 2014 State of the Union Address as an example, I show that the public honoring of physically wounded veterans hides the emotional, psychological, social, and moral wounds of military service, creating a normative veteran identity based on mental toughness, and essentializes all veterans as honorable by default. Using Michel Foucault’s notion of Panopticism from <i>Discipline and Punish</i>, I argue that this unquestioned heroism of the veteran disciplines the nation, disengages the population from involvement, and enables unchecked, perpetual war. In response, I propose that we avoid thanking veterans publicly and abstractly, instead approaching each and every veteran personally in full recognition of their unique set of relations. This would improve veteran reintegration, politically engage the population in discourse regarding military conflict, and ultimately serve as a check on the use of state violence.

Trata-se de um estudo sobre a filosofia política de Aristóteles, sobretudo no que toca à divisão dos regimes políticos. Como se sabe, segundo Aristóteles seis são os regimes políticos, três justos (realeza, aristocracia e república) e três corruptos (tirania, oligarquia e democracia). O autor se propõe a demonstrar que a distinção entre essas seis formas de constituição, no pensamento político aristotélico, não é primeiramente pelo número dos que exercem o mando ou pela finalidade com que governam, mas resulta da aplicação de certos princípios à distribuição do poder pelas diversas partes da comunidade política. Assim, a distribuição do poder segundo o estado de liberdade constituiria a democracia; a distribuição segundo o critério da riqueza, a oligarquia; a distribuição segundo o critério da virtude, a aristocracia e a realeza; a exacerbação dos princípios da democracia e da oligarquia culminaria na tirania; e a república ou governo constitucional seria constituída pela combinação harmônica de instituições democráticas, oligárquicas e aristocráticas, resultando no regime mais apropriado à maioria das comunidades políticas. / The subject is a study of the political philosophy of Aristotle, particularly regarding the types of political regimes. According to Aristotle there are six political regimes three righteous (Kingship, Aristocracy and Republic) and three corrupt (Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy). The author intends to demonstrate that the distinction between these six forms of constitution in the Aristotelian political thinking is not defined primarily by the number of those who exer command or by the purpose to which they govern. It is, however, the result of how power is distributed by the political community. Thus, the distribution of power according to the state of liberty would constitute the democracy; the distribution according to the criteria of wealth, oligarchy; the distribution according to the criteria of virtue, aristocracy and kingship. The excess of the principles of democracy and the oligarchy would culminate in tyranny. The republic, or constitutional government, would be constituted by the harmonious combination of the democratic, oligarchic and aristocratic institutions, resulting in the most appropriate regime for most political communities.

When employees become dissatisfied at an organization, they may develop negative behaviors that can impede profits and productivity. The purpose of this single case study was to explore what strategies are essential for organizational leaders to improve workplace performance. Maslow's hierarchy of needs served as the conceptual framework for this study. Data collection involved face-to-face, semistructured interviews of 20 managers, floor employees, and clerical staff from a business organization in Southwest Georgia. Participant selection was based on employees' tenure of at least 1 year of experience within the organization. Interviews were transcribed and then coded for common patterns and themes. Five themes emerged: (a) workplace environment, focusing on the level of flexibility given to employees in the organization; (b) feedback sources in organizations, centering on measurable standards such as written evaluations and other resources provided to employees; (c) management relationships, focusing on managers' influence on the performance of employees; (d) barriers in the workplace, examining internal and external sources that impede performance; and (e) recruitment/promotion strategies, centering on the organization's compensation incentives. Study outcomes suggest that organizational leaders may increase employee work performance by enhancing strategies that provide a positive assortment of abilities, motivational tools, and opportunities. In addition, these findings suggest that collaborative decision making between management and employees has a positive relationship with work attitudes and the engagement of employees. Leaders in organizations may apply these findings to develop an enriched workplace environment, one that could improve employee retention rates and organizational commitment.

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The use of the term “sophist” in Plato’s Statesman has been understood to apply to all rulers who are not statesmen. They do not have the statesman’s expert knowledge but they all imitate the statesman. This seems to be consistent with the idea that a sophist is a false imitator. I argue against this interpretation and instead insist that only the tyrant in the Statesman is a sophist. I base this argument on the final definition of the sophist in Plato’s Sophist and the discussion of imitation in the Sophist. The tyrant is an important figure in the Statesman, even though he is only mentioned briefly. He is the ruler who pretends to be a statesman so that he can rule with the statesman’s power which is above the law. I use my narrower interpretation of the term “sophist” in the Statesman to argue that Plato’s purpose in the discussion of laws and regimes in the Statesman is to protect the city from the tyrant as a sophist. This requires that the people of the city recognize their own ignorance and completely forbid any type of political leadership that would make the city vulnerable to the false statesman. Instead, they imitate the statesman by their complete obedience to the law. The idea of complete obedience to the law, without any room for modification or change, is not politically appealing. However, it is important that part of Plato’s solution to the problem of tyranny is self-awareness of our lack of political knowledge. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / The use of the term “sophist” in Plato’s Statesman has been understood to apply to all rulers who are not statesmen. Instead, I argue that only the tyrant in the Statesman is a sophist. I base this argument on the final definition of the sophist in Plato’s Sophist and the discussion of imitation in the Sophist. I use my narrower interpretation of the term “sophist” in the Statesman to argue that Plato’s purpose in the discussion of laws and regimes in the Statesman is to protect the city from the tyrant as a sophist. This requires that the people of the city recognize their own ignorance and completely forbid any type of political leadership that would make the city vulnerable to a false statesman. This argument is important as it shows that part of Plato’s solution to the problem of tyranny is self-awareness of our lack of political knowledge.

Philip Pettit argues that freedom is best defined as non-domination, where domination is understood as subjection to uncontrolled interference. Pettit further argues that government is legitimate when it succeeds in preventing citizens from dominating each other without dominating them in the process, as this allows citizens to enjoy the protection of government without surrendering their freedom. Since Pettit argues that democratic (popular) control over government prevents government from dominating its citizens, Pettit argues that a legitimate, non-dominating state is possible. In this paper I argue that popular control cannot prevent government domination unless one accepts controversial, substantive value judgments about freedom and equality that Pettit claims his theory avoids. / Master of Arts / Philip Pettit argues that freedom is best understood as non-domination. By this, Pettit means that we are free when we have a strong degree of control over our choices and actions. He uses this definition to argue that democracy maintains the freedom of citizens because it means that the actions of government are under the control of citizens. This paper argues, contra Pettit, that citizens lack sufficient individual control over the actions of the government to maintain freedom as Pettit understands it. It further argues that one can only accept that government interference is not freedom reducing if one accepts certain substantive claims about freedom and equality.

In Martha Nussbaum’s book Frontiers of Global Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, she presents the capabilities approach, a new theoretical framework that in her view better responds to the urgent problems of social inequality than existing theories of social justice. This thesis evaluates her descriptive claim by applying the capabilities approach to the French burqa ban and assessing whether the ban is unjust, and if so, what forms of intervention are most appropriate. In doing this, I will argue that Nussbaum’s theory is unsatisfactory unless she extends it to include the obligation to criticize in cases where we are certain that an injustice is being committed.

In this thesis, F.A. Hayek's argument is against social justice is given context, discussed, and evaluated. Hayek was one of the leading voices of libertarian ideology in the Twentieth Century. While Road to Serfdom is his most popular work, Hayek's philosophy is most fully expressed in his three volume set, Law, Legislation and Liberty. His thoughts against social justice are found the in the second volume, entitled The Mirage of Social Justice. It is the conclusion of the author that Hayek's argument against social justice, in the form of redistribution, falls short as it depends on a presupposition that an evolutionary moral and legal process will necessarily end in securing a libertarian style of government. The only possible means of salvaging the argument would to accept inherent and inviolable human rights, which Hayek fundamentally rejects as he claims the Kantian tradition.

I argue against the claim that normative political theory is 'autonomous' with respect to moral philosophy. I take the simple view that political theory is a form of moral philosophy, and is differentiated by pragmatic rather than theoretically significant criteria. I defend this view by criticizing arguments for the autonomy thesis. In the first three chapters I introduce and analyse the autonomy thesis and provide a framework for understanding the various claims that are made in the literature. In Chapters 4 to 8 I proceed to criticize a series of arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 4 I explain why Kant's division of morality into ethics and right is not as useful as it may seem to those who wish to defend the autonomy thesis, and argues that Arthur Ripstein gives no reason to think that political philosophy is autonomous that can be endorsed independently of commitment to a Kantian normative theory. In Chapter 5 I examine the political liberal argument for the autonomy thesis, concluding that even if a freestanding political conception of justice can be regarded as autonomous, it does not follow that political philosophy can also. Chapters 6 to 8 tackle various political realist arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 6 I argue that political theory is not required to deal with empirical facts in any way that distinguishes it from moral philosophy, and any argument for its autonomy that is based on a prior claim about the purpose of political theorizing would be question-begging. In Chapters 7 and 8 I provide various arguments against the idea that there is a distinctively political form of normativity, and diagnose some of the mistaken assumptions about morality that I take to lie at the heart of the realist case. In Chapter 9 I conclude.

<p>Recent discussions on global climate change have brought to our attention the largely disruptive influence of human activity on the planet and its inhabitants. Moral philosophers have added to the discourse their concerns about the unprecedented environmental problem of global climate change which threatens, and increasingly so, human welfare and the stability of the planet. The circumstances should be of concern to all, including philosophers who beyond their own endeavours will be affected by climate change. There are good reasons to think that the circumstances surrounding global climate change are morally repugnant and that serious action is required to avert global catastrophe and widespread suffering.</p> <p>Our discussion will draw attention to the ethical dimensions of climate change given present knowledge about the state of the global environment and human welfare across the planet, now and into foreseeable future. My aims in this paper are twofold. First, I will provide a survey of various arguments that fit under the umbrella of climate change ethics as a way to gauge their suitability to address the wider issues that should be of concern to us. Second, by seeking to refute these arguments on a number of theoretical grounds, I will make the case that the climate change problem is best understood through a welfarist lens. Climate change is fundamentally a problem of distributive justice for present and future generations and, as such, it is of great urgency to protect human welfare over the long run.</p> <p>The main argument begins in the first chapter with an overview of climate change against the backdrop of existing realities. We will take a look at the economics and science of climate change to gain a better understanding of issue, namely its origins and implications for the planet across space and time. In subsequent chapters, we defer to a variety of principles of global and intergenerational justice which are thought to offer moral guidance for the successful resolution of the climate change problem. Having concluded in the third chapter that we must focus on considerations of distributive justice, indeed those that are ultimately but not only utilitarian, the final chapter explores the appropriateness of various mechanisms and systems which would constitute a fair global climate regime.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)