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The main aim of this thesis is to examine, through an analysis of relevant case law, the way in which the courts interpret and apply primary legislation pursuant to the interpretative obligation contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the European Communities Act 1972 and section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, and to assess current judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty in the light of the judicial perception of the interpretative obligation in the above-mentioned provisions. As an essential prelude to the examination of the case law on the judicial treatment of the interpretative obligation in the 1972 and 1998 Acts, chapter 2 of the thesis discusses the traditional, Diceyan concept of parliamentary sovereignty. This is considered without the effects of the 1972 and 1998 Acts. This chapter demonstrates that the courts perceived it as their constitutional duty to obey and apply the latest will of Parliament without question. It is observed that no legal grounds could exist for challenging the validity or enforceability of primary legislation. Chapter 3 discusses conventional methods of statutory interpretation. It is observed that conventionally, the principal aim of statutory interpretation is the ascertainment of parliamentary intention in the statute under consideration. Where the intention of Parliament is clear and unambiguous and is not absurd in any way, the courts feel duty-bound to carry out the identified parliamentary intention in line with the rule, demanded by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, that courts obey without question the latest will of Parliament. The rest of the thesis is devoted to an examination of the way in which the courts use their interpretative powers under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act when interpreting and applying primary legislation coming within the purview of these enactments. It is argued that while the courts appear to continue to acknowledge the sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament, the case law reveals that in appropriate cases, section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act has enabled judges to interpret and apply primary legislation in a way that substantially challenges the traditional, Diceyan concept of parliamentary sovereignty. They feel able to ignore or otherwise modify the legal effects of unambiguous primary legislation in appropriate cases.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau, 1927. / Includes bibliographical references (p. vii-ix).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2007. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 276-365). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1967. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Law, morality and politics in bioethical law making in the Czech Republic The central theme of this master thesis is bioethical law making in the Czech Republic and the influence of morality and politics on this law making. The main aim of the thesis is to find out who and under what circumstances influences whether and how laws are made in eight bioethical topics: abortion, transplantation, embryonic stem cell research, living will, artificial reproduction, sex change, surrogate motherhood and euthanasia. In its first chapter the thesis discusses the interaction of two normative systems - morality and law; and in its second chapter it discusses the relationship between morality and politics and law and politics. The third and fourth chapters reflect lessons learned from the previous chapters and apply its hypotheses to the analysis of the above mentioned eight bioethical topics. The master thesis arrives at a conclusion that Czech bioethical law making is split between liberal and conservative approaches. Furthermore it concludes that the majority of the most prominent and difficult moral dilemmas in bioethical law making have been decided historically and are part of the country's historical moral heritage.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.