Abstract This dissertation demonstrates that the ancient source traditions which furnish historians with information concerning Alexander the Great’s subjugation of India are deeply complex and often underappreciated as being such. This is done through a systematic analysis of the various extant and fragmentary traditions surrounding this period. Therefore, the evidence of the authors who wrote about Alexander’s Indian campaign directly after, or within a generation or so of it, are first discussed. This involves primarily a study of the extant fragments of many of the men who accompanied Alexander himself. This is followed by an investigation into the so-called ‘secondary authors’, or our extant histories of Alexander. The focus here is on evaluating the transmission of detail, bias, and distortion through the various aims, methods and prejudices of these later historians. Following this, there is a discussion of the numismatic evidence relating to the Indian campaign. This involves a study of Alexander’s ‘elephant medallions’ and various coins of the Diadochoi in which the intricacies of our documentary evidence is made evident. Finally, there is included in this dissertation a case study in which the problematic nature of the ancient evidence surrounding this period of the great conqueror’s life is shown. This is comprised of a detailed analysis of the evidence for the battle of the Hydaspes.

Abstract This dissertation demonstrates that the ancient source traditions which furnish historians with information concerning Alexander the Great’s subjugation of India are deeply complex and often underappreciated as being such. This is done through a systematic analysis of the various extant and fragmentary traditions surrounding this period. Therefore, the evidence of the authors who wrote about Alexander’s Indian campaign directly after, or within a generation or so of it, are first discussed. This involves primarily a study of the extant fragments of many of the men who accompanied Alexander himself. This is followed by an investigation into the so-called ‘secondary authors’, or our extant histories of Alexander. The focus here is on evaluating the transmission of detail, bias, and distortion through the various aims, methods and prejudices of these later historians. Following this, there is a discussion of the numismatic evidence relating to the Indian campaign. This involves a study of Alexander’s ‘elephant medallions’ and various coins of the Diadochoi in which the intricacies of our documentary evidence is made evident. Finally, there is included in this dissertation a case study in which the problematic nature of the ancient evidence surrounding this period of the great conqueror’s life is shown. This is comprised of a detailed analysis of the evidence for the battle of the Hydaspes.

Abstract This dissertation demonstrates that the ancient source traditions which furnish historians with information concerning Alexander the Great’s subjugation of India are deeply complex and often underappreciated as being such. This is done through a systematic analysis of the various extant and fragmentary traditions surrounding this period. Therefore, the evidence of the authors who wrote about Alexander’s Indian campaign directly after, or within a generation or so of it, are first discussed. This involves primarily a study of the extant fragments of many of the men who accompanied Alexander himself. This is followed by an investigation into the so-called ‘secondary authors’, or our extant histories of Alexander. The focus here is on evaluating the transmission of detail, bias, and distortion through the various aims, methods and prejudices of these later historians. Following this, there is a discussion of the numismatic evidence relating to the Indian campaign. This involves a study of Alexander’s ‘elephant medallions’ and various coins of the Diadochoi in which the intricacies of our documentary evidence is made evident. Finally, there is included in this dissertation a case study in which the problematic nature of the ancient evidence surrounding this period of the great conqueror’s life is shown. This is comprised of a detailed analysis of the evidence for the battle of the Hydaspes.

Abstract This dissertation demonstrates that the ancient source traditions which furnish historians with information concerning Alexander the Great’s subjugation of India are deeply complex and often underappreciated as being such. This is done through a systematic analysis of the various extant and fragmentary traditions surrounding this period. Therefore, the evidence of the authors who wrote about Alexander’s Indian campaign directly after, or within a generation or so of it, are first discussed. This involves primarily a study of the extant fragments of many of the men who accompanied Alexander himself. This is followed by an investigation into the so-called ‘secondary authors’, or our extant histories of Alexander. The focus here is on evaluating the transmission of detail, bias, and distortion through the various aims, methods and prejudices of these later historians. Following this, there is a discussion of the numismatic evidence relating to the Indian campaign. This involves a study of Alexander’s ‘elephant medallions’ and various coins of the Diadochoi in which the intricacies of our documentary evidence is made evident. Finally, there is included in this dissertation a case study in which the problematic nature of the ancient evidence surrounding this period of the great conqueror’s life is shown. This is comprised of a detailed analysis of the evidence for the battle of the Hydaspes.

This thesis examines the history of the University of Queensland Women Graduates’ Association (UQWGA) from 1920 to 1979. The association was established by a small group of women graduates in Brisbane in 1920, and from that time they maintained links with graduate women throughout Australia and internationally. These links were formalised in 1922 when the Australian Federation of University Women was formed and immediately affiliated with the International Federation of University Women. The UQWGA aimed to connect and support graduate women locally as well as promote the values of the IFUW which included international friendship and peace. The history of women’s organisations in Australia has attracted little scholarly attention. This thesis contributes to the growing body of research on the women’s movement from the end of World War I to the emergence of women’s liberation in the 1970s. The members of the UQWGA believed that through their university education they had developed the skills and knowledge to contribute to the betterment of society. University education had also instilled in them a sense of privileged that was a motivating factor in their mobilisation. The UQWGA provided a supportive and stimulating space for graduate women that encouraged their endeavours in professional and public life. The actions and approach of the UQWGA reflect those of other mainstream women’s organisation up to the mid-1960s. The organisation promoted its agenda through ‘polite lobbying,’ utilising methods that were respectful of established systems and processes. The UQWGA established and maintained supportive relationships with other organisations, both men’s and women’s, and with the University of Queensland. The association was primarily concerned with issues of the status and position of graduate women, but members felt that their contribution would also be valued in the wider community. This thesis aims to locate the work of the UQWGA in the context of the women’s movement in Australia, including how it reacted to the altering women’s movement of the 1970s when it changed its name to the Australian Federation of University Women – Queensland.

This thesis examines the history of the University of Queensland Women Graduates’ Association (UQWGA) from 1920 to 1979. The association was established by a small group of women graduates in Brisbane in 1920, and from that time they maintained links with graduate women throughout Australia and internationally. These links were formalised in 1922 when the Australian Federation of University Women was formed and immediately affiliated with the International Federation of University Women. The UQWGA aimed to connect and support graduate women locally as well as promote the values of the IFUW which included international friendship and peace. The history of women’s organisations in Australia has attracted little scholarly attention. This thesis contributes to the growing body of research on the women’s movement from the end of World War I to the emergence of women’s liberation in the 1970s. The members of the UQWGA believed that through their university education they had developed the skills and knowledge to contribute to the betterment of society. University education had also instilled in them a sense of privileged that was a motivating factor in their mobilisation. The UQWGA provided a supportive and stimulating space for graduate women that encouraged their endeavours in professional and public life. The actions and approach of the UQWGA reflect those of other mainstream women’s organisation up to the mid-1960s. The organisation promoted its agenda through ‘polite lobbying,’ utilising methods that were respectful of established systems and processes. The UQWGA established and maintained supportive relationships with other organisations, both men’s and women’s, and with the University of Queensland. The association was primarily concerned with issues of the status and position of graduate women, but members felt that their contribution would also be valued in the wider community. This thesis aims to locate the work of the UQWGA in the context of the women’s movement in Australia, including how it reacted to the altering women’s movement of the 1970s when it changed its name to the Australian Federation of University Women – Queensland.

ABSTRACT Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States of America [US] saw the problem of nuclear proliferation as one of its own creation and therefore theirs to rectify. Perhaps motivated by a form of nuclear imperialism, the US held the majority of the aspiration and ability to solve the international problem of nuclear proliferation. In hindsight there is perhaps very little that successive presidential administrations could have done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons during this period without significantly affecting their own international ambitions. However, the possibility that the US could have obtained the signatures of the nuclear non-signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) [NPT] became more remote due to the determination of those states to act independently and demonstrate their authority over their own nuclear matters in the shadow of both the superpowers during the Cold War. Furthermore, the American failure to obtain early agreement on the nuclear issue meant that the long-term nuclear ambitions of these nations could not be reversed. Exploiting an array of archival sources, Bring the Bombs out of the Basement analyses the process by which the US sought to bring these non-compliant states into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also discusses the significance of the failure of the US to bring the nuclear non-signatories into the fold. Studying the problem under the framework of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation system, it focuses on the period between 1961 and 1974 – from the intensification of NPT negotiations under President John F. Kennedy, to the year in which India detonated its first nuclear device. By analysing the diplomatic interactions between the US and India, Pakistan and Israel, this thesis examines why the US was unable to politically tame one of the most significant scientific research achievements of all time and wield influence in the nuclear arena commensurate to its superpower status. In terms of uniqueness, this is the first study to have comprehensively examined and compared US nuclear policy towards only the nuclear non-signatories.

ABSTRACT Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States of America [US] saw the problem of nuclear proliferation as one of its own creation and therefore theirs to rectify. Perhaps motivated by a form of nuclear imperialism, the US held the majority of the aspiration and ability to solve the international problem of nuclear proliferation. In hindsight there is perhaps very little that successive presidential administrations could have done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons during this period without significantly affecting their own international ambitions. However, the possibility that the US could have obtained the signatures of the nuclear non-signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) [NPT] became more remote due to the determination of those states to act independently and demonstrate their authority over their own nuclear matters in the shadow of both the superpowers during the Cold War. Furthermore, the American failure to obtain early agreement on the nuclear issue meant that the long-term nuclear ambitions of these nations could not be reversed. Exploiting an array of archival sources, Bring the Bombs out of the Basement analyses the process by which the US sought to bring these non-compliant states into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also discusses the significance of the failure of the US to bring the nuclear non-signatories into the fold. Studying the problem under the framework of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation system, it focuses on the period between 1961 and 1974 – from the intensification of NPT negotiations under President John F. Kennedy, to the year in which India detonated its first nuclear device. By analysing the diplomatic interactions between the US and India, Pakistan and Israel, this thesis examines why the US was unable to politically tame one of the most significant scientific research achievements of all time and wield influence in the nuclear arena commensurate to its superpower status. In terms of uniqueness, this is the first study to have comprehensively examined and compared US nuclear policy towards only the nuclear non-signatories.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.