This article describes the method of Mobile Process Landscaping by example of a project in which the service processes of a company from the housing industry were analyzed regarding their mobile potential. This analysis was conducted with the aim to organize these processes more efficiently in order to realize cost savings. Therefore, the method of Mobile Process Landscaping, which is introduced in this article, was used. The method refers to the stage of requirements engineering in the software process. It is shown how the initial situation of the company was analyzed, which alternative process models on the basis of mobility supporting technology were developed and how these alternatives were economically evaluated. Furthermore, it is shown how first restrictions for the software and system design were made on the basis of one process model. Finally, it is shown how the Mobile Process Landscaping method can be used to verify whether the adoption of mobility supporting technology is suitable to obtain a defined goal and which requirements such a solution needs to fulfill.

[pt] As doenças do rim e trato urinário contribuem com cerca de 850 mil mortes a cada ano, sendo a décima segunda causa de morte do mundo. No Brasil, a diálise ainda é o procedimento mais utilizado, apesar de o transplante ser a modalidade mais recomendada, por oferecer melhor qualidade de vida ao paciente, uma possível redução do risco de mortalidade e menor custo que a diálise. Uma vez na fila, o paciente ainda se depara um conjunto de ineficiências do Sistema Nacional de Transplante. A presente pesquisa identifica que uma delas é o desalinhamento entre os atores do transplante (doador, receptor e unidade transplantadora) e que há um gap no que tange às atividades do ator unidades transplantadoras. Dessa forma, o objetivo da presente pesquisa é investigar, à luz da gestão de operações, o modelo de uma unidade transplantadora de referência, inserida na rede de transplante renal do estado do Rio de Janeiro. A partir do levantamento da literatura e de campo, são realizadas modelagens do processo de transplante renal, descrição e diagnóstico do modelo de operação da unidade transplantadora e proposições acerca do projeto de operação da unidade estudada / [en] Diseases of the kidney and urinary tract contribute about 850,000 deaths each year, being the 12th leading cause of death in the world. In Brazil, dialysis is still the most used procedure, although transplantation is the most recommended modality, because it offers a better quality of life for the patient, a possible reduction of mortality risk and lower cost than dialysis. Once in the queue, the patient still faces a set of inefficiencies of the National Transplant System. The present research identifies that one of them is the misalignment between the actors of the transplant (donor, receiver and transplantation unit) and that there is a gap with respect to the activities of the transplantation unit actors. Thus, the objective of this research is to investigate, in the light of operations management, the model of a reference transplantation unit, inserted in the kidney transplant network of the state of Rio de Janeiro. From the literature and field survey, modeling of the renal transplantation process, description and diagnosis of the operation model of the transplantation unit and propositions about the operation project of the studied unit are performed.

The Electrical Power Systems (EPS) are indispensable for a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The EPS are essential for plant start-up, normal operation, and emergency conditions. Electrical power systems are necessary not only for power generation, transmission, and distribution but also to supply reliable power for plant operation and control system during safe operation, Design Basis Conditions (DBC) and Design Extension Conditions (DEC). According to IAEA Specific Safety Guide SSG-34, EPS are essentially the support systems of many plant equipment. Electrical system, which supply power to plant systems important to nuclear safety, are essential to the safety of an NPP. In recent years, due to the digitization of Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems, along with their enhanced accuracy, ease of implementing complex functions and flexibility, have been also exposed to sophisticated cyber threats. Despite physical separation and redundant electrical power supply sources, malicious cyber-attacks performed by insiders or outsiders might disrupt the power flow and result in an interruption in the normal operation of an NPP. Therefore, for the uninterrupted operation of a plant, it is crucial to contemplate cybersecurity in the EPS design and implementation. Considering multiple cyber threats, the main objectives of this research work are finding out security vulnerabilities in electrical power systems, simulating potential cyber-attacks and analyzing the impacts of these attacks on the electrical components to protect the electrical systems against these cyber-attacks. An EPS testbed at a small scale was set up, which included commercial I&C and electrical equipment significant for the cybersecurity analysis. The testbed equipment comprises of electrical protection relay (IEC 60255), controller, operating panel, engineering workstation computer, simulation model, etc. to monitor and control the power supply of one or more electrical equipment responsible for a regular operation in an NPP. Simulated cybersecurity attacks were performed using this testbed and the outcomes were examined in multiple iterations, after adding or changing security controls (cybersecurity countermeasures). Analyzing the cybersecurity and performing cyber-attacks on these systems are very advantageous for a real power plant to prepare and protect the plant equipment before any malicious attack happens. This research work conclusively presents cybersecurity analysis, including basic and sophisticated cyber-attack scenarios to understand and improve the cybersecurity posture of EPS in an NPP. The approach was completed by considering the process engineering systems (e.g. reactor core cooling systems) as attack targets and investigating the EPS specific security Defense-in-Depth (DiD) design together with the Nuclear Safety DiD concepts.:CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Motivation 1.2 Technical Background 1.3 Objectives of the Ph.D. Project 1.4 State of the Art in Science and Technology CHAPTER 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF CYBERSECURITY AND ELECTRICAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION CONCEPTS 2.1 Electrical Power System 2.2 Electrical Protection System 2.3 Cyber-Physical System 2.4 Industrial Control System 2.5 Safety I&C and Operational I&C Systems 2.6 Safety Objective Oriented Top-Down Approach 2.7 Cybersecurity Concept 2.8 Threat Identification and Characterization in NPP 2.8.1 Design Basis Threat 2.8.2 Attacker Profile 2.8.1 Reported Real-Life NPP Cyber-Attack Examples 2.9 Security Levels 2.10 Summary CHAPTER 3 CYBER-PHYSICAL PROCESS MODELING 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Single Line Diagrams of Different Operational Modes 3.3 Design 3.4 Block Diagram of Simulink Model 3.5 Implementation of Simulink Blocks 3.5.1 Power Generation 3.5.2 Grid Feed 3.5.3 House Load (Feed Water Pump) 3.6 OPC UA Communication 3.7 Summary CHAPTER 4 CYBER THREAT SCENARIOS FOR EPS 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Cyber-Physical System for EPS 4.3 Cyber Threats and Threat Sources 4.3.1 Cyber Threats 4.3.2 Threat Sources 4.4 Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 4.4.1 Vulnerabilities in EPS 4.4.2 Vulnerabilities in ICS 4.5 Attacker Modeling 4.6 Basic Cyber Threat Scenarios for EPS 4.6.1 Scenario-1: Physical Access to Electrical Cabinets 4.6.2 Scenario-2: Modification of Digital Protection Devices 4.7 Potential Advanced Cyber Threat Scenarios for EPS 4.7.1 Scenario-1: Alteration of a Set-point of the Protection Relay 4.7.2 Scenario-2: Injection of Malicious Packets 4.7.3 Scenario-3: False Trip Command 4.7.4 Scenario-4: Availability Attack on Protection Relay or SCADA System 4.7.5 Scenario-5: Permanent Damage to Physical Component 4.7.6 Scenario-6: Protocol-wise Attack on Operator Panel 4.8 Threat Scenario for Simulink model 4.9 Summary CHAPTER 5 EPS TESTBED DESCRIPTION 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Basic Industrial Automation Architecture 5.3 Need for Testbeds 5.4 Proposed EPS Testbed 5.4.1 Testbed Architecture 5.4.2 Testbed Implementation 5.5 EPS Physical Testbed Applications 5.5.1 Modeling and Simulation of Power System Faults 5.5.2 Modeling of Cyber-Attacks 5.6 Summary CHAPTER 6 EXPERIMENTAL AND IMPACT ANALYSIS OF CYBER THREAT SCENARIOS 6.1 Outline 6.2 Normal Operation and Control 6.3 Possibilities to Cause Failure in the Primary or Secondary Cooling Systems 6.4 Implementation of Cybersecurity Threat Scenarios 6.4.1 Alteration of a Relay Set-Point during Plant Start-Up Phase 6.4.2 Alteration of a Controller Set-Point during Normal Operation Phase 6.4.3 Availability Attack on Control and Protection System 6.4.4 Severe Damage to a Physical Component due to Overcurrent 6.5 Experimentally Assessed Cyber-attacks 6.6 Summary CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK REFERENCES SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS GLOSSARY