One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists propose that moralizers come to understand their moral beliefs as fictive precommitments that are instrumentally valuable. In this essay, I argue that this type of instrumentalist justification does not allow moralizers to have genuinely moral reasons for acting in accordance with their precommitments. The legislative function of morality and the concept of moral personhood cannot be supported by metaethical theories that only provide instrumental reasons for adopting moral discourse. Ironically, this implies that an instrumentalist moral society would not be able to preserve as many useful moral concepts as would a non-instrumentalist moral society. Since the fictionalists’ own criterion demands that they endorse the most instrumentally valuable metaethical theory, they cannot persuasively argue that their own metaethical alternative is viable. Fictionalists should, I argue, prefer a non-instrumentalist theory that preserves more of the functions of moral discourse, such as quasi-realism. The argumentative strategy employed by fictionalists is therefore self-undermining.

One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists propose that moralizers come to understand their moral beliefs as fictive precommitments that are instrumentally valuable. In this essay, I argue that this type of instrumentalist justification does not allow moralizers to have genuinely moral reasons for acting in accordance with their precommitments. The legislative function of morality and the concept of moral personhood cannot be supported by metaethical theories that only provide instrumental reasons for adopting moral discourse. Ironically, this implies that an instrumentalist moral society would not be able to preserve as many useful moral concepts as would a non-instrumentalist moral society. Since the fictionalists’ own criterion demands that they endorse the most instrumentally valuable metaethical theory, they cannot persuasively argue that their own metaethical alternative is viable. Fictionalists should, I argue, prefer a non-instrumentalist theory that preserves more of the functions of moral discourse, such as quasi-realism. The argumentative strategy employed by fictionalists is therefore self-undermining.

The interpretation of analytical claims about music presents a dilemma between positivism and fictionalism: is it that the structures imputed by the analysis are part of the reality of "the music itself" or are the structures merely a shorthand? Although there is growing agreement that we lack direct epistemological access to the music itself, the dilemma does not disappear, in large part because we feel an ethical obligation to respect the music. We intend to "get it right" by hearing how we believe the music itself demands to be heard. This thesis adapts Simon Blackburn's quasi-realist program in meta-ethics to the ontological interpretation of music analysis. Quasi-realism allows scholars to hold that although analytical choices boil down to values, this does not prevent the expression of realist-sounding ontological claims implied by their work. The analogy with quasi-realism provides an additional motivation for further work in the ethics of music analysis. / 2016-09-29

[pt] O objetivo geral deste trabalho é propor uma interpretação das teorias causal e dos valores (moral e estético) de David Hume, que designo por quasi-realismo cético. Neste sentido, procuro justificar um confronto das análises elaboradas na literatura secundário sobre o filósofo – que têm estado sistemática e declaradamente apartadas. Para cumprir este objetivo, começo por apresentar de forma introdutória algumas pressuposições importantes para este trabalho (capítulo 1). Depois, procuro destacar e desenvolver algumas componentes das teorias causal e dos valores (moral e estético) de Hume que são determinantes para a discussão, subdividindo-as em componentes que designo por metafísica, epistémica e semântica (capítulos 2 e 3). Por último, procuro justificar a posição que assumo em relação a cada um destes aspetos considerados, compondo, assim, o conjunto de componentes do designado quasi-realismo cético – essencialmente inspirado na contribuição de Angela Coventry (por sua vez, inspirada no quasirealismo de Simon Blackburn), ao mesmo tempo que lhe acrescenta um elemento cético (capítulo 4). / [en] The general aim of this work is to propose an interpretation of David Hume s theories of causality and values (moral and aesthetic), which I call sceptical quasi-realism. In this respect, I try to confront several analysis developed in secondary litterature about the philosopher – which have been sistematically and openly separated. To achieve this aim, I begin by introducing some presuppositions which are important for the purposes of this work (chapter 1). Then, I try to identify and develop some determinant features of Hume s theory of causality and values (moral and aesthetic) for the discussion, subdivided in features which I call metaphysic, epistemic and semantic (chapters 2 and 3). Finally, I attempt to justify the interpretation regarding each of this considered features, composing the set of features of what I call sceptical quasi-realism – mainly inspired in Angela Coventrys contributions (which, in turn, is inspired in Simon Blackburns quasi-realism), adding a sceptical element to it (chapter 4).