This paper will examine John Rawls’s views regarding the make up of society and, in particular, it will investigate the question of whether or not Rawls’s theory of justice is dependent upon accepting and endorsing the view that society is, or, at least, resembles an association. The aim of the paper will be to defend the position that Rawls’s theory of justice is in fact dependent upon an associational conception of society, and that it, therefore, relies upon the idea that the individuals in a society share a common interest or purpose. Thus, far from providing a liberal conception of society, this paper will attempt to illustrate that Rawls actually presents a more communitarian outlook of society than many might expect from a purportedly liberal thinker. In order to best prove the essential link to an associational conception of society, I discuss three principles that provided Rawls with reasons for preferring the difference principle to other modes of justice, and suggest that these founding principles provide sufficient evidence for connecting Rawls’s theory of justice to an associational conception of society. By advocating such a vision of society, Rawls betrays a fundamental premise of his own political liberalism, namely, the idea that individuals do not necessarily share a common interest or purpose with one another. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-25 19:19:43.637

Distributive equality can be valued in different ways, which can be rendered as definitions of ways to value distributive equality. Those definitions can be used to investigate the value, if any, that distributive equality is held to have by particular principles which regulate distributive shares. Distributive equality can be valued as a matter of justice in two different ways; it can be an intended consequence of a principle of justice and it can be among the grounds for a principle of justice. The definitions of those two ways of valuing distributive equality can be used to investigate the value, if any, that distributive equality is held to have by Rawls’s interpretation of the second principle of justice. Distributive equality can be valued for reasons relating to social relations rather than justice. When distributive equality is valued for reasons relating to social relations, a definition of that way of valuing distributive equality can be specified by reference to the reasons provided. When distributive equality is valued for reasons relating to social relations, the relevance and implications of that way of valuing distributive equality with regard to the prior question of how society should be organized can be investigated by reference to the reasons provided. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2008-09-26 17:06:38.455

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Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1990. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 175-183).

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1991.

Zugl. Teildr. von: Konstanz, Univ., Magisterarbeit, 2007

Zugl.: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 2006

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2005.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1990. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 175-183).

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2006.