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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Relating to Reasons

LANGLOIS, CHRISTOPHER 08 September 2010 (has links)
While each of us has an intuitive sense of what a reason is, when considered more carefully the concept is not so clear. There are a number of questions to which any successful account of reasons will provide some answer. For example, on some accounts reasons may appear to be metaphysically odd entities, unlike other sorts of facts in our world. From here there are very serious questions which spring up regarding the motivational efficacy of reasons: given the nature of reasons, as respective accounts describe them, how is it that reasons get a grip in an agent? Further, whatever reasons are, and in whichever relation agents stand to reasons, how is it that agents get in touch with truths about reasons? How in theory – and importantly, in practice – do agents figure out which reasons apply to them? I will be defending a view of reasons in which reasons are primitive. This is what T.M. Scanlon calls 'Reasons Fundamentalism'. In particular, I will defend this view against charges which claim that an account of reasons as primitive or fundamental fails us in the following three respects: 1) it cannot provide us with an adequate account of what sorts of facts reasons are, and how they intermingle with other sorts of facts; 2) it cannot provide us with adequate account of how a consideration can count as a reason for an agent even if that agent fails to be gripped by the consideration, and; 3) it cannot provide us with an adequate account of how we figure out, in principle and in practice, what count as reasons and which reasons apply to us. If reasons are fundamental, existing and applying to us independently of anything already true of particular agents and are the sorts of things we can come to understand through reflection, it seems that such a story also succeeds in capturing our phenomenological experience of practical reasoning in our every day lives. This, I will suggest, goes some distance toward setting it apart from – and ahead of – other accounts. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-07 20:05:36.934
2

The role of reason in The cloud Of unknowing

Morgan, Douglas C. January 2000 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).
3

The role of reason in The cloud Of unknowing

Morgan, Douglas C. January 2000 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).
4

The role of reason in The cloud Of unknowing

Morgan, Douglas C. January 2000 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).
5

Imagination and human nature

Welch, Livingston, January 1935 (has links)
Thesis (PH. D.)--Columbia university, 1935. / Vita. Published also as Psyche monographs, no. 3. Bibliography: p. 216-223. Also available in print.
6

Imagination and human nature

Welch, Livingston, January 1935 (has links)
Thesis (PH. D.)--Columbia university, 1935. / Vita. Published also as Psyche monographs, no. 3. Bibliography: p. 216-223. Also available as E-Book.
7

The role of faith and reason in Thomas Aquinas's epistemology

Waita, Jonathan M. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-72).
8

The role of faith and reason in Thomas Aquinas's epistemology

Waita, Jonathan M. January 2004 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-72).
9

The Conception of practical reason as employed by Henry Sidgwick ... /

Williams, Sterling Price. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1918. / Typewritten. "Abstract": 9 leaves at end. Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.
10

Realizing Reason in History: How Cunning Does It Have to Be?

Fillion, Réal January 1991 (has links)
The expression, "Realizing Reason in History," has at least two senses, both of which Hegel tries to bring out in his philosophy of history. The first suggests that there. is reason in history. That is, the task of the philosopher is to show how reason has developed itself through history. The second sense suggests that, not only does history show us that reason has developed over time, but the task of history is precisely to develop or realize reason in time. There is reason in history because that is what history brings about. Thus, the "realization" of reason in history is both something that is recognized and something that must be done. This "realization" is accomplished, willy-nilly, through the doings and sufferings of concrete human beings. Hegel wants to show that history is not a cold, anonymous process which simply sweeps up human lives and never looks back. Indeed, his philosophy of history is primarily concerned with the concrete doings and sufferings of human beings, and wishes to rescue from meaninglessness all those ephemeral human lives which populate the historical process. That, according to Hegel, is what the philosophy of history is all about.

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