Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).

While each of us has an intuitive sense of what a reason is, when considered more carefully the concept is not so clear. There are a number of questions to which any successful account of reasons will provide some answer. For example, on some accounts reasons may appear to be metaphysically odd entities, unlike other sorts of facts in our world. From here there are very serious questions which spring up regarding the motivational efficacy of reasons: given the nature of reasons, as respective accounts describe them, how is it that reasons get a grip in an agent? Further, whatever reasons are, and in whichever relation agents stand to reasons, how is it that agents get in touch with truths about reasons? How in theory – and importantly, in practice – do agents figure out which reasons apply to them? I will be defending a view of reasons in which reasons are primitive. This is what T.M. Scanlon calls 'Reasons Fundamentalism'. In particular, I will defend this view against charges which claim that an account of reasons as primitive or fundamental fails us in the following three respects: 1) it cannot provide us with an adequate account of what sorts of facts reasons are, and how they intermingle with other sorts of facts; 2) it cannot provide us with adequate account of how a consideration can count as a reason for an agent even if that agent fails to be gripped by the consideration, and; 3) it cannot provide us with an adequate account of how we figure out, in principle and in practice, what count as reasons and which reasons apply to us. If reasons are fundamental, existing and applying to us independently of anything already true of particular agents and are the sorts of things we can come to understand through reflection, it seems that such a story also succeeds in capturing our phenomenological experience of practical reasoning in our every day lives. This, I will suggest, goes some distance toward setting it apart from – and ahead of – other accounts. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-07 20:05:36.934

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).

Thesis (PH. D.)--Columbia university, 1935. / Vita. Published also as Psyche monographs, no. 3. Bibliography: p. 216-223. Also available in print.

Thesis (PH. D.)--Columbia university, 1935. / Vita. Published also as Psyche monographs, no. 3. Bibliography: p. 216-223. Also available as E-Book.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-72).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-72).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1918. / Typewritten. "Abstract": 9 leaves at end. Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right offers a defense of exclusionary reasons as originally conceptualised by Joseph Raz. Exclusionary reasons are second-order reasons to refrain from acting for some reasons and are used to explain the ordered nature of practical normativity, and the various normative concepts that are said to follow from it, i.e. mandatory rules, rule-following, authority, and promises to name just a few. Exclusionary reasons differ from other kinds of defeaters in that they exclude valid reasons, i.e. reasons that still justify or make eligible the actions they count for. According to Raz, this is because excluded reasons are defeated not qua reasons, but as reasons we can act for, or that motivate, which explains why exclusionary reasons are reasons to refrain from acting for a reason. However, the coherence and distinctiveness of the idea of an exclusionary reason—understood in this way—has faced serious challenges. I take up these challenges in what follows. Chapter one presents a coherent account of exclusionary reasons as reasons to refrain from acting for a reason, or to ‘not-φ-for-p’. It both clarifies the sense in which exclusionary reasons concern motivations and motivating reasons, and rejects alternative accounts according to which exclusionary reasons have as their object other normative reasons. It is argued that when they are understood as excluding some considerations as reasons that can rationally motivate, exclusionary reasons confer value on or point to an agent’s not acting for otherwise valid reasons. That is, they justify our not being responsive to certain values on some occasions. Chapter two vindicates the notion of acting-for-a-reason on which Raz’s account relies. It considers objections which claim that not acting for otherwise valid reasons presupposes a level of control over our reasons and motivations that is incompatible with the rational constraints on attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.), and shows how exclusionary reasons, as they are restated in chapter one, avoids them. Perhaps surprisingly, it is argued that instances where exclusionary reasons are relevant, when properly understood, are not instances where reasoning about what we ought to do involves choice. Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right concludes by considering the implications the account offered herein has for rationalist approaches to obligations and authority. Namely, it makes clear how fully rational agents can ever be moved to act for, or out of an awareness of their obligations. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right investigates the distinctiveness and coherence of the idea of an exclusionary reason—a reason to not act for other reasons (i.e. promises, rules, commands, etc.). It first defends exclusionary reasons as reasons to ‘refrain from acting for some reason(s)’. Understood in this way, exclusionary reasons are relevant where it matters not just what we choose to do, but how we choose to do it. Promises, rules, commands, etc. are features of the world that make it valuable to or justify our not acting for otherwise good reasons when they apply. It then considers what ‘refraining from acting for some reason(s)’ consists in. While exclusionary reasons are thought to be reasons to have motivations of certain kinds, they are not reasons to choose to be motivated in some way. They are instead, reasons that determine for us the reasons we ought to act for. It is argued that while there are some instances where determining what we have reason to do is up to us, exclusion is not one of them. Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right concludes by considering the implications the account offered herein has for rationalist approaches to obligations and authority.