Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 327-346).

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the conduct of judge-led commissions of inquiry in Canada could be improved, and rendered more consistent with purposive values embodied in the rule of law, were judicial commissioners to observe a principle of fidelity to adjudication. The rule of law, practically understood as a political and legal ideal, treats independence as integral to the judicial role in interpreting and applying law, safeguarding the Constitution, and honouring individual rights. Public confidence in the independence and integrity of Canada’s judiciary flows not just from constitutional safeguards, however, but from judicial observance of adjudicative procedure. So too does confidence that in exercising their functions, judges respect the boundaries commanded by the separation of powers. Contrary to categorical distinctions that are often drawn between commissions of inquiry and courts, adjudicative procedure is an essential feature of many inquiries. This is so because the participants in such inquiries legitimately demand an assurance of justice equivalent to that associated with traditional judicial proceedings. Recognizing this commonality does not mean burdening public inquiries with the evidentiary and procedural rigidity of courts. It does suggest, however, that adjudication has a valuable (if non-exclusive) role to play in the conduct of some inquiries, establishing a compelling reason why judges should be their leaders. Fidelity to adjudication directs judicial commissioners to account for this reality when confronting common dilemmas and challenges in inquiry conduct. I explore the methodological implications of fidelity to adjudication in two broad areas, first concerning procedural fairness, and second concerning the protection of a commissioner’s independence. Finally, I consider how fidelity to adjudication establishes boundaries cautioning against judicial service in inquiries that demand different conceptions of justice, or advance different notions of truth-seeking, than those in which judges are traditionally informed. A principled alignment is thus established between judicial service on commissions of inquiry, judicial methods and skills, and observance of the rule of law.

No description available.

The system of government in modern democratic states can be categorized as presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary depending on its relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. This relationship is known as the separation of powers and is often regulated by a written constitution. While there are many studies explaining the ideal system, there are few researches made as to whether the states correspond with their theoretical ideals. This study aims at explaining the theories of Giovanni Sartori regarding these three different systems of government and thus creating an ideal for each system. With the help of case studies of three different states representing each system the study analyses as to whether the states of each system correspond with its ideals. The states chosen for this purpose is Australia as a representative of the parlamentaristic state, France as a semi-presidential system and USA which is a presidential system. All three of them are using a bicameral legislature and have a written constitution. The study aims to analyse the systems through a comparative method using a qualitative text analysis of the material used. The results of this study shows that while the states at large resembles its ideal, there are some deviations. Australia and the United States of America fulfills Sartoris three criterias for their respective system, while France deviates from a majority of its ideal criterias as a hybrid semi-presidential system.

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A constitution is a basic law to constitute a country and protect human right, it has a height attribute of politics, hence it regulates and interacts the real development of country. General national security strategy is based on national destinations and benefits, then it brings up a definite source of threat and priority, and arranges the strategies to react, besides it should be considered all the situations to come up with near, middle and far national security strategy. Furthermore, according to the guideline which decided by the strategy, the departments can make policy, then they have the direction to obey. Moreover, nation fulfill its policy includes ¡upolicy-making¡vand ¡ubills or budgets be approved¡vtwo parts, which to fulfill policy and obey the order of law. However, our country brings up national security strategy and act it are different from the above parts. This thesis discusses that our nation made national security strategy in different phase and use it to evaluate the change of our constitution. to focus on the questions and to analyze, to review and to predict.

This article releases of Constitutional Interpretation No.613 of Grand Justices, Judicial Yuan.Discussion jurisdiction and legislative power of separation of power boundary.Judicial review since U.S.A.'s Marbury v.s Madison case is developed in 1803 .Safeguards the people's basic right not the illegal violation.The most countries introduces for the world. Grand Justices enjoy the good name of ¡§the constitution protector¡¨.Is only short of the public opinion to be authorized and counter-majoritarian diffculty, Causes the democratic validity to be subject to the question, between ¡§the judicature is positive¡¨ and ¡§the judicature is negative¡¨,it is become Judicial review development mechanism the important topic. Administration, legislation and judicial is also known as trias politica, Performing its own functions, doctrine of separation of powers for most important constitutional government principle, The Congress direct gathering people meaning indicated that.Is on behalf of the Popular Sovereignty for State agency, three read through the law, suffers unexpectedly declares invalid, and has the abstract standard potency, sends the Judicial review from ¡§the constitutional interpreter¡¨ to become ¡§the legislator¡¨ or ¡§framers of constitution¡¨ the negative appraisal. This article advocated that the Judicial review should distinguish the people's basic right or the pure institution in advance disputes and so on, is safeguarding the people's basic right case, should involve positively, being suitable of the non-judicial self-restraint principle. The Judicial review should not take the doctrine of political question the separation of power the only boundary, should accumulate the case type, develops standard of the difference, avoids fording into the pure institution jurisdiction dispute. Constitutional Interpretation article should not ¡§the legalization¡¨, be supposed to establish the mechanism of ¡§retires after meritorious service¡¨.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by Michael J. Coppedge for the Department of Political Science. "April 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 263-277).

This research examines the relationship between courts and legislatures in a comparative perspective. Specifically, I examine how 1) the ideological composition of the bench; 2) the propensity of court involvement in a given policy area; 3) the disposition of court decisions in a given policy area; and 4) judicial institutional rules shape judicial-legislative relations and subsequently influence bill introductions and policy enactments by state legislatures. By examining HMO regulation and education policy in the American states during the 1990s, I find evidence that judicial influence does impact legislative policymaking, in both introduction and enactment stage, across both policy areas. Education policy demonstrates a stronger judicial impact than HMO regulation. While traditional scholarship has depicted the judicial branch as having minimal impact on policy formation, and subsequently social change, the findings of this study suggest that we have overlooked an important policymaking role of the judicial branch. Furthermore, state policy research has not given adequate attention to judicial influence as an explanation for policy formation in the American states.

<p>In this project, I examine why the judicial authority of the United States Supreme Court has increased. I propose a theoretical explanation of endogenous institutional change at the Court whereby the actions of the Court---specifically its decisions and the opinions in which it announces those decisions---have, over the long-run, altered the structures of the American separation-of-powers system. The Court has built up public support for the institution of judicial review to such a degree that its rulings are respected even when opposed by strong political actors---including the public. I evaluate this theory by analyzing three important transitional periods of Supreme Court history. The first case study explores the Court under Chief Justice John Marshall, and examines how the Court established judicial review as the most important means of constitutional interpretation. The second case study explores the Court's first cases interpreting the three Reconstruction Amendments, and shows that through these decisions the Court established itself as the arbiter of the meaning of these new amendments. The third case study looks at the Court's decision to hear reapportionment cases and its articulation of the political question doctrine that provided a legalistic method of expanding the political power of the Court. I conclude from these case studies that my theory provides a useful explanation for the expansion of judicial authority.</p> / Dissertation