O primeiro presidente eleito diretamente após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 lidou com uma série de informações institucionais novas, muitas das quais fundamentais para o processo de modificação do status quo com base no que se convencionou chamar de presidencialismo de coalizão. Partindo deste contexto político-institucional, o presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar a existência da ineficiência na absorção deste novo conjunto de informações, capaz de desviar as ações estratégicas dos atores racionais do que seria esperado em equilíbrio, durante o processo de formação de coalizões. Mobilizada em conjunto à literatura mais recente sobre o sistema político brasileiro, a hipótese da ineficiência informacional passa a ser uma explicação alternativa para os níveis relativamente mais baixos de coordenação política verificados durante o governo Collor (1990-92), o qual incorporou parte do modus operandi do sistema político brasileiro dali em diante, mas com diferenças marcantes na compatibilização dos poderes legislativos da presidência com o da maioria no legislativo, bem como na gestão do governo da coalizão. As evidências iniciais aqui apresentadas corroboram a existência da ineficiência informacional no processo de formação das diferentes coalizões dentro de uma mesma presidência, mas contingentes à qualidade dos modelos existentes para predizer seu resultado de equilíbrio, quando a hipótese da ineficiência é testada de uma presidência para a outra. / The first Brazilian President elected directly after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 has dealt with a series of new institutional information, many of which are fundamental to the process of modifying the status quo, based on the so-called coalition presidentialism. Given this political and institutional context, the present study aims to show the existence of inefficiency in the absorption of this new set of information, which led to different strategic actions by the rational actors than the results expected in equilibrium, during the process of forming coalitions. When jointly mobilized with explanations about Brazilian political system, the informational inefficiency hypothesis turns out as a reasonable explanation for the relatively lower levels of political coordination verified during Collors mandate as President (1990-92). By lacking important aspects of the Brazilian politics modus operandi, his government was unable to promote the compatibility of legislative powers of the Presidency and legislative majority as well as in important aspects of coalition Government management. The initial evidence presented here confirms the existence of the informational inefficiency in the making of different coalitions within the same Presidency, but has little to say about the inefficiency hypothesis when considering the passage from a Presidency to the next one, given the poor quality of existing models to determine equilibrium conditions in government making.

O primeiro presidente eleito diretamente após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 lidou com uma série de informações institucionais novas, muitas das quais fundamentais para o processo de modificação do status quo com base no que se convencionou chamar de presidencialismo de coalizão. Partindo deste contexto político-institucional, o presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar a existência da ineficiência na absorção deste novo conjunto de informações, capaz de desviar as ações estratégicas dos atores racionais do que seria esperado em equilíbrio, durante o processo de formação de coalizões. Mobilizada em conjunto à literatura mais recente sobre o sistema político brasileiro, a hipótese da ineficiência informacional passa a ser uma explicação alternativa para os níveis relativamente mais baixos de coordenação política verificados durante o governo Collor (1990-92), o qual incorporou parte do modus operandi do sistema político brasileiro dali em diante, mas com diferenças marcantes na compatibilização dos poderes legislativos da presidência com o da maioria no legislativo, bem como na gestão do governo da coalizão. As evidências iniciais aqui apresentadas corroboram a existência da ineficiência informacional no processo de formação das diferentes coalizões dentro de uma mesma presidência, mas contingentes à qualidade dos modelos existentes para predizer seu resultado de equilíbrio, quando a hipótese da ineficiência é testada de uma presidência para a outra. / The first Brazilian President elected directly after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 has dealt with a series of new institutional information, many of which are fundamental to the process of modifying the status quo, based on the so-called coalition presidentialism. Given this political and institutional context, the present study aims to show the existence of inefficiency in the absorption of this new set of information, which led to different strategic actions by the rational actors than the results expected in equilibrium, during the process of forming coalitions. When jointly mobilized with explanations about Brazilian political system, the informational inefficiency hypothesis turns out as a reasonable explanation for the relatively lower levels of political coordination verified during Collors mandate as President (1990-92). By lacking important aspects of the Brazilian politics modus operandi, his government was unable to promote the compatibility of legislative powers of the Presidency and legislative majority as well as in important aspects of coalition Government management. The initial evidence presented here confirms the existence of the informational inefficiency in the making of different coalitions within the same Presidency, but has little to say about the inefficiency hypothesis when considering the passage from a Presidency to the next one, given the poor quality of existing models to determine equilibrium conditions in government making.

The system of government in modern democratic states can be categorized as presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary depending on its relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. This relationship is known as the separation of powers and is often regulated by a written constitution. While there are many studies explaining the ideal system, there are few researches made as to whether the states correspond with their theoretical ideals. This study aims at explaining the theories of Giovanni Sartori regarding these three different systems of government and thus creating an ideal for each system. With the help of case studies of three different states representing each system the study analyses as to whether the states of each system correspond with its ideals. The states chosen for this purpose is Australia as a representative of the parlamentaristic state, France as a semi-presidential system and USA which is a presidential system. All three of them are using a bicameral legislature and have a written constitution. The study aims to analyse the systems through a comparative method using a qualitative text analysis of the material used. The results of this study shows that while the states at large resembles its ideal, there are some deviations. Australia and the United States of America fulfills Sartoris three criterias for their respective system, while France deviates from a majority of its ideal criterias as a hybrid semi-presidential system.

The Russian and Ukrainian constitutions—like those in many other post-Soviet states—have concentrated political power in exclusive “super” presidencies. However, the concentration of power has persisted in only one of the two cases. Russian presidential authority was resilient in the face of attempts to increase legislative strength in the 1990s, even when severe economic and political crises undermined the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. In contrast, Ukrainian presidential power fluctuated over time, with “Orange Revolution” constitutional reforms shifting power to the parliament in 2004 and their annulment returning power to the president in 2010. What explains the different trajectories of Russia’s and Ukraine’s presidential systems? Using process-tracing to parse out the actions of elites during the 1990s and 2000s in combination with analyses of the electoral foundations of elite competition in the two cases, this dissertation develops an argument about the origins of super-presidential systems and the prospects for constitutional change in such systems. Concentrated executive power in Russia and Ukraine: (1) depended on elites’ preferences for more or less concentrated political authority; (2) these preferences depended on how elites perceived their political prospects for capturing and holding presidential power; (3) elites’ perceptions of their prospects for gaining and holding presidential power were conditioned by the relative balance of power between major political forces; and (4) this balance of power was very vulnerable to pressure from social forces. It was this final factor that distinguished the Ukrainian and Russian cases. Ukraine had more balanced political competition because of its coherent ethno-linguistic cleavage, and consequently more uncertainty about rival elites’ political fortunes, which produced challenges to super-presidentialism. Russia’s experience with regional politics, by contrast, has not produced a similarly stable balance of power between rival forces, because the country’s minority groups were too diverse and dispersed to form a unified constituency that could challenge the political dominance of the center. The structural underpinnings of elite competition help to explain why the preferences of self-interested politicians to concentrate or disperse political power changed over time in ways that promoted unstable super-presidentialism in Ukraine compared to much more durable super-presidentialism in Russia. / text

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South Africa has been considered a bastion of democracy on the continent of Africa since its first fully democratic election in 1994. Yet, under its second president since apartheid, Thabo Mbeki, the consolidation of South Africas democratic gains tended to slow or even stagnate. This thesis develops a theoretical backdrop by explaining competing theories of leadership and development in Africa. With Thabo Mbekis promotion of the African Renaissance he should be considered to of promoted a good governance model of growth and leadership within South Africa. To determine whether Mbeki actively followed through in implementing good governance practices as leader of South Africa and the ANC this thesis analyzes three aspects of the African National Congress (ANC): centralization, corruption and the 2007 leadership succession. Through this analysis of these three aspects of the ANC under Mbeki the thesis moves to determine whether the former president should be considered to have cultivated a good governance regime while in office or whether his leadership of South Africa embraced more neopatrimonial logic.<p> This study finds that under Mbeki neopatrimonialism expanded significantly, particularly within the ruling ANC, and can to a certain extent be used to explained Mbekis actions while president of South Africa. Despite actively promoting a good governance agenda this thesis argues that Mbeki contributed to the stagnation of democratic gains in South Africa. This legacy will continue to effect future South African leaders including Mbekis arch-rival Jacob Zuma.

South Africa has been considered a bastion of democracy on the continent of Africa since its first fully democratic election in 1994. Yet, under its second president since apartheid, Thabo Mbeki, the consolidation of South Africas democratic gains tended to slow or even stagnate. This thesis develops a theoretical backdrop by explaining competing theories of leadership and development in Africa. With Thabo Mbekis promotion of the African Renaissance he should be considered to of promoted a good governance model of growth and leadership within South Africa. To determine whether Mbeki actively followed through in implementing good governance practices as leader of South Africa and the ANC this thesis analyzes three aspects of the African National Congress (ANC): centralization, corruption and the 2007 leadership succession. Through this analysis of these three aspects of the ANC under Mbeki the thesis moves to determine whether the former president should be considered to have cultivated a good governance regime while in office or whether his leadership of South Africa embraced more neopatrimonial logic.<p> This study finds that under Mbeki neopatrimonialism expanded significantly, particularly within the ruling ANC, and can to a certain extent be used to explained Mbekis actions while president of South Africa. Despite actively promoting a good governance agenda this thesis argues that Mbeki contributed to the stagnation of democratic gains in South Africa. This legacy will continue to effect future South African leaders including Mbekis arch-rival Jacob Zuma.

<p>Mercosur, som i dag består av Argentina, Brasilien, Paraguay, Uruguay och Venezuela, bildades 1994 i ett försök att förstärka det ekonomiska samarbetet och befästa den omogna demokratin i regionen. Regionalt samarbete inleddes även i avsikt att öka stabilitet och säkerhet i regionen då samarbetet föddes ur askan av en instabil och nedbruten ekonomi. Den dramatiska förändringen från ett inåtvänt militärt styre under större delen av 1900-talet till en liberalisering av både den ekonomiska och politiska sfären, var en annan anledning till regionalt samarbete. Den här uppsatsen behandlar sambandet mellan dessa två fenomen; regional integration och demokrati, och deras parallella utveckling. Den regionala integrationen i området kring Mercosur är annorlunda än andra integrationsprojekt genomförda i världen. Detta är till stor del på grund av den starka statliga interventionalism och presidentialism som historiskt haft en framträdande roll, tillsammans med avsaknad av insyn och brist på civil delaktighet i den politiska sfären. Dessa karakteristiska drag gör det svårt att applicera redan framtagna teorier på Mercosur då dessa främst är utarbetade med hänsyn till Europeiska Unionen. Utvecklingen mot demokrati är betraktad som nödvändighet i förändringsprocessen mot ett förbättrat regionalt samarbete och därmed också regional integration, trots att demokratin fortfarande är begränsad.</p> / <p>Mercosur, which today includes the member states Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezula, was created in 1994 in an attempt to enhance economic cooperation and consolidate democracy in the region. Regional cooperation was also initiated in order to increase stability and security in the region. This since the integration project surged out of the ashes of an unstable, broken economy and a recent shift from an introvert military regime towards a liberalisation of both the economical and the political sphere. This thesis treats the connection between these two phenomena; regional integration and democracy, and their parallel development. The regional integration through Mercosur is different to other integration projects. Among other things this is due to the strong history of state intervention and scarce civil participation, as well as a prominent presidentialism and a current lack of transparency. This makes the implementation of already existing theories that may explain the development of Mercosur hard to apply, since these theories are developed with consideration to the European Union. The development towards democracy is seen as an essential cornerstone in the shift towards a more cooperative stance between the regional neighbours. Even though democracy in the region still is of limited nature, its emergence promoted regional integration.</p>

I challenge the common assumption in the literature that executives' powers vis-à-vis each other can change solely as the result of the norms and practices consequential of institutional change. I argue instead that a fixed institutional design can also generate changes in power distribution, through informal rules, norms, and practices of an institution, without necessitating formal or constitutional transformation. I contribute to both the literature on institutional change and the literature on democratic regimes by providing a systematic assessment of the factors that explain why there are shifts in the power distribution between political executives in semi-presidential regimes. I propose to test the key factors of power variation proposed in the literature on the power relationship between presidents and prime ministers, through two major studies, France's Fifth Republic and post-1993 Ukraine, and three suggestive studies of Finland, post-1993 Russia, and post-1990 Poland.This study tests those three set of theoretical explanations through historical analysis and develop a model explaining the causes of changes in the power relationship between presidents and prime ministers in semi-presidential regimes. More precisely, I try to assess the importance of the institutional design in semi-presidential regimes versus the impact of non-institutional factors, highlighting the role of the specific national context (partisan politics, non-institutional factors) in shaping political practice between political executives.The examination of institutional practice through the lens of the power relationship between political executives in the semi-presidential regimes demonstrates that this claim needs to be revisited. Theoretically, the results of the historical analysis support historical, sociological, and normative institutionalist theories, which have stressed the need to go beyond orthodox institutionalist theories. Globally, results show the theoretical need to capture the political, social, international, and economic context in order to define and predict the power distribution between political actors in semi-presidential regimes. This study highlights the need to dismiss the claim that institutional unpredictability is solely observed in unstable country and showcases the complex dynamic that (a) institutions adapt to their political environment, while (b) the political environment adapts to the institutions.

Nos últimos anos, a maior parte da literatura sobre as relações executivo-legislativo em sistemas presidencialistas vem enfatizando o papel da formação de coalizões governamentais, através da distribuição de ministérios, na obtenção de maiorias legislativas. Contudo, essas coalizões formadas raramente são iguais, já que umas são maiores e, por causa disso, mais propensas à problemas coordenativos e de agência. Mas o que explica a decisão de um presidente de incluir mais ou menos partidos em seu gabinete? Com um banco de dados original contendo informações sobre 168 coalizões na América Latina entre 1979 e 2012, este artigo testa algumas das hipóteses correntes sobre o fenômeno. Entre outros, os resultados mostram que legislativos fortes e efetivos, presidentes que dispõem de maiores poderes legislativos e maior fragmentação partidária aumentam a probabilidade de ocorrência de coalizões sobredimensionadas em diversas especificações. / Research on executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have emphasized how presidents use cabinet appointments to form and manage government coalitions in the absence of majority legislative support. Yet not all coalitions look alike, as some are bigger and, consequently, more prone to agency and coordination problems than others. But what shapes presidents’ decision to include more or less parties in their coalitions? While several hypotheses exist in the literature, few have been tested in a systematic fashion, none focusing on why surplus coalitions form. This paper intends to fill this gap by examining an original time-series cross-sectional dataset comprising 168 unique coalitions in all 18 Latin American presidential countries since 1979. In particular, I find that strong and effective assemblies, presidents with great legislative powers and high levels of party fragmentation are associated with oversized coalitions in different model specifications.