O presente trabalho tem como objetivo discutir a viabilidade de governos minoritários no presidencialismo brasileiro. Seu objeto de estudo é a formação do governo Collor, momento em que se compôs um gabinete minoritário, e hipótese aqui advogada é a de que o presidente agiu racionalmente ao realizar a opção minoritária. Essa noção é contra-intuitiva porque vai de encontro à tradicional concepção de presidencialismo de coalizão que informa a literatura política nacional. Todavia, uma breve apreciação do estado-da-arte sobre o sistema político brasileiro evidencia uma dinâmica específica das relações Executivo-Legislativo que não impede a existência e viabilidade de governos minoritários. A partir dessa percepção, constrói-se um modelo analítico cujas variáveis nos permitem desvendar o cálculo presidencial que levou Fernando Collor de Mello a constituir seu governo com ministérios apartidários. Por fim, retomam-se as relações entre aquele governo e o PMDB, na votação do Plano Collor, para demonstrar que governos sem base nominal majoritária conseguem lograr êxito parlamentar, dada a conjuntura anteriormente exposta. / This paper aims at discussing the survival of minority governments under Brazilian presidentialism, with its focus on the formation of the Collor government, when a minority cabinet was assembled. The hypothesis put forth in this study is that the president acted rationally in picking the minority option, however counter-intuitive it might seem, given that it is not supported by the traditional concept of coalition presidentialism around which most of our political literature was built. We thus need to shed light on the state-of-the-art of the Brazilian political system, which evidences some specific dynamics of Executive-Legislative relations permissible to the existence and viability of minority coalition governments. Following this notion, we built an analytical model whose variables allow us to unveil the presidential calculus that led President Collor de Mello into forming his cabinet with nonpartisan portfolio-holders. In the end, the relationship between that government and the PMDB during the voting of the Collor Plan is brought to light, in order to demonstrate that governments lacking nominal majoritarian support are able to enjoy legislative success, given a particular juncture.

Este trabalho se propõe a traçar o cenário em que se desdobraram os acontecimentos que instigaram o gênio de Montesquieu a buscar um padrão cientifico para os fenômenos sociais e políticos que tão argutamente observava. Combinando as nuances doutrinárias de Montesquieu, pretende o estudo abordar as premissas conceituais básicas de federação e a ideia clássica da separação de poderes para, em seguida, examinar as atribuições da chefia de Estado numa república que adote o modelo federativo e a separação de poderes como seus nortes estruturais, no contexto de um sistema presidencialista de governo. Com base nas premissas deduzidas examina-se o alinhamento do modelo brasileiro àquelas premissas institucionais que o inspiraram. / The purpose of this research is to depict the events that unfolded within the scenario that provoked Montesquieu to search for a scientific pattern in order to explain the social and political phenomena that he carefully observed in his time. Drawing on the variations of Montesquieu’s doctrines, The work aims to explore the basic conceptual argument of federation as well as the classic idea of separation of powers. Thereafter, It intends to examine the roles of state leadership in a republic whose foundation lies upon the federative model and the separation of powers in a presidentialist system of government. Based on this, the study is going to consider the alignment of the Brazilian model to those institutional propositions that initially provoked Montesquieu’s mind.

Peru not only is a presidentialist country, but also is a democracy without parties and a state with poor politic system institutionalized. In this context, the president’s leadership is important to explain the dynamic politic of the country. Since the return of democracy in 2001, presidents enter with high levels of approval but end with low levels. Paradoxically, that dynamic develop in a context of growth economic and boom of commodities, debating with main explains of politic behavior focus in economic performance, party affiliation and politic leadership. However, the discussion about relationship with politic system and president’s dynamic in presidential approval was little. From an analysis of the processes and politics dynamics to the governments of Alan García (2006-2011) and Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), this investigation argues that there is a close relationship begin politic system post-Fujimori and highs levels of presidential’s disapprove. In that sense, the high level of presidential’s disapprove will be reflection of a political class delegitimized due to the permanence of an anti-government discourse, breach of electoral promises, absence of a solid party apparatus and a poorly redistributive economic system, these being the characteristics of the post-Fujimori political system. Finally, president’s personality, his management capacity and initiative, and control of politics joints will be crucial to demonstrate fragility of presidential figure. In this way, the dynamic of economic growth has demonstrated the institutional poverty of Peruvian political system demonstrating in the presidential disapproval. / El Perú es un país presidencialista que ha sido, además, caracterizado como una democracia sin partidos y un sistema político escasamente institucionalizado. En este contexto, el liderazgo presidencial es importante para explicar la dinámica política del país. Desde el retorno a la democracia en el 2001, los presidentes ingresan con altos niveles de aprobación y culminan con niveles muy bajos. Paradójicamente, esta dinámica se desarrolla en un contexto de crecimiento económico y el boom de los commodities, discutiendo con las principales explicaciones de comportamiento político centradas en desempeño económico, la afiliación partidaria y liderazgo político. Sin embargo, poco se ha discutido sobre la relación entre el sistema político y la dinámica presente en la aprobación presidencial. A partir de un análisis de los procesos y dinámicas políticas de los gobiernos de Alan García (2005 -2011) y Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), la presente investigación sostiene que existe una estrecha relación entre el sistema político peruano post-Fujimori y los elevados niveles de desaprobación presidencial. En este sentido, la alta desaprobación presidencial será el reflejo de una clase política deslegitimada debido a la permanencia de un discurso antipartido, incumplimiento de las promesas electorales, ausencia de un aparato partidario sólido y un sistema económico poco redistributivo, siendo estas las características del sistema político post-Fujimori. Finalmente, la personalidad del presidente, su capacidad de gestión e iniciativa, y el manejo de las coyunturas políticas serán cruciales para demostrar la fragilidad de la figura presidencial. De esta manera, la dinámica de crecimiento económico ha evidenciado la precariedad institucional del sistema político peruano reflejándose en la desaprobación presidencial.

This article analyzes the role of political scandals at different times of the government’sactivity, with the intention to verify if news of corruption differs in electoral and non-electoral periods. We try to verify in what contexts Argentinean and Brazilian governments are more permeable to political scandals and respond more actively. We consider the electoral schedule and the type of Presidentialism in Argentina and Brazil. We argue that after an accusation of corruption in media, public officials assess risks in order to consider if their reputation were erode by not facing scandals of corruption. During electoral periods politicians fear of punishment from voters through mechanisms of electoral accountability. Finally we say that the majority Presidentialism is less permeable to allegations that coalition one. To corroborate these hypotheses we investigate responses of governments in Argentina (as a case of majoritarian Presidentialism),and in Brazil (as a case of coalitional Presidentialism). / Este artículo se propone analizar el papel de los escándalos políticos en diferentes momentos de actividad de un gobierno, con la intención de verificar si existen variaciones en los niveles de denuncias de corrupción entre los períodos electorales y los no eleccionarios. Asimis- mo, se intenta verificar en qué contextos los gobiernos de Argentina y Brasil son más permeables a las denuncias mediáticas y responden más activamente. Para ello, consideramos el calendario electoral y el tipo de presidencialismo de cada país. Se argumenta que, tras una acusación de corrupción en los medios, los funcionarios públicos evalúan los riesgos de ver sus reputaciones erosionadas por no enfrentar la denuncia. El costo para contrarrestar la opinión pública tiende a ser mayor en los períodos electorales, ya que el temor al castigo de los votantes mediante mecanismos de accountability electoral también aumenta. Finalmente, afirmamos que el presidencialismo mayoritario resulta menos permeable a las denuncias que uno de coalición. Para corroborar estas hipótesis se investigan las respuestas de los gobiernos en Argentina, como caso de presidencialismo mayoritario, y en Brasil, como caso de presidencialismo de coalición.

The thesis "The political transformation of Kyrgyzstan after 1991: At the crossroads between democracy and authoritarian regime" focuses on the political development of Kyrgyzstan since independence in 1991 till nowadays. The thesis analyses the key aspects of the political development of the country, with particular emphasis on the specific role of local clans in the political system of Kyrgyzstan. The other analyzed subjects are inter-ethnic and interconfessional relations, constitutional development, electoral process and the phenomenon of the fall of regimes of Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev as a result of the Tulip Revolution and events of 2010.

(English) Brazil is not gifted by greatest conditions for its existence - president do have strong legislative powers, which allow him to dominate politics, and he is confronted by severely fragmented legislature. This kind of political constellation should cause strong political crises and should be responsible for unstability of political regime. In this paper, we are trying to describe reasons why it is not so. Thanks to the change of international ideological and political context (i.e. end of Cold War) democracy has been internalized by various political actors and army returned back to barracks. Parliament and president were left alone to face their own fate. Even though president dominates legislative process (thanks to his strong powers) and can structure parliament's choices, constitution (de facto) forces him to seek support in parliament and create wider coalitions. On the other hand parliament has strong tools how to offer president alternative proposals and de facto decides if president's policy will be permanent or not. In extreme cases (i.e. political crises) is parliament proactive actor, which controls presidents survival.

La question de la durée du mandat présidentiel est indissociable de la réflexion sur l’équilibre des pouvoirs et sur la nature de la Ve République. Le quinquennat présidentiel, envisagé en1973 puis définitivement adopté par référendum le 24 septembre 2000, s’inscrit dans un mouvement de présidentialisation des institutions entamé depuis 1962 et l’élection du Président de la République au suffrage universel. En prévoyant une durée de mandat égale pour le chef de l’Etat et l’Assemblée nationale, le quinquennat entend redéfinir la dyarchie exécutive et mettre fin à l’arythmie électorale et à la cohabitation. Alors que la Constitution de 1958 privilégiait la souplesse pour répondre à toutes les situations politiques, le quinquennat fait le choix de l’efficacité en favorisant la concordance des majorités parlementaire et présidentielle. Mais le quinquennat est davantage un commencement qu’une fin. Poursuivi par l’inversion du calendrier électoral en 2001 et par une révision constitutionnelle majeure en 2008, le quinquennat a ouvert la voie à un régime présidentiel dont les effets se font déjà sentir à travers la reconfiguration du rôle du chef de l’Etat, le renforcement du poids de l’élection présidentielle, la présidentialisation des partis politiques et la bipolarisation de l’espace partisan. Dix ans après son entrée en vigueur, le quinquennat place la Ve République face à un choix : corriger le présidentialisme majoritaire dans le cadre des institutions actuelles ou achever la transition vers la VIe République et le régime présidentiel. / The issue of the length of the presidential term of office cannot be separated from the question of the balance of power in the Fifth Republic, and thus the question of its very essence. The five-year term of presidency, foreseen in 1973 and definitively enacted by referendum on September 24, 2000, comes out of a tendency toward expansion of presidential powers since1962, as well as from the decision to elect the President of the Republic by direct popular vote. Aligning the five-year term with that of the Assemblée nationale redefines shared governance between the President and the Prime Minister by removing the electoral unbalance that created the “cohabitation” (i.e. opposing camps of political goals and parties inpower) as in the past. Although the 1958 Constitution stressed its ability to adapt to any political situation, the five-year term makes the clear choice of effectively favoring concurrent majorities, both parliamentary and presidential. However, this choice is more of a beginning than an end. In 2001 a new electoral agenda followed the five-year term reform. Subsequently, there was a major revision of the Constitution in 2008. As a result we have seen a reconfiguration of the President’s role, a net increase in the importance of presidential election, and finally, political and partisan polarization. Ten years after its inception, the five year term forces the Fifth Republic to choose either to adapt the majoritarian presidentialism within and among existing divisions of government or to initiate a transition toward a Sixth Republic and a purely presidential regime.

O objetivo dessa dissertação de Mestrado é examinar os poderes institucionais de controle da agenda legislativa dos Presidentes nas Constituições latino-americanas e analisar a importância das mudanças constitucionais determinantes para cada prerrogativa legislativa dos presidentes. A pesquisa empírica buscou entender a influência dessas mudanças para o relacionamento entre os poderes e para o processo legislativo. Os dados dos poderes institucionais abrangem uma amostra de 17 países em seus períodos democráticos entre 1945 e 2003. O trabalho adota uma perspectiva diacrônica de análise dos textos constitucionais. A análise é informada pelas hipóteses da literatura institucional acerca dos problemas enfrentados pelo presidencialismo, mais especificamente do conflito que seria inerente à separação institucional dos poderes Executivo e Legislativo e a supremacia dos presidentes com fortes poderes institucionais no processo decisório. Tal perspectiva procura enfatizar a importância das mudanças ocorridas no presidencialismo em diferentes períodos, isto é, o caráter dinâmico da estrutura institucional do presidencialismo, verificável pela análise das reformas constitucionais e a relação do contexto dessas mudanças com os presidentes legislativamente dominantes no processo legislativo. / The objective of the Master´s dissertation is to examine the institutional details of agenda setting in Latin American Constitutions and analyse the changes in constitutional provisions. Moreover, the study tries to understand the influence of those changes for the executive-legislative relations and for the legislative process. The changes in constitutional rules is the focus to reassess the commom assumptions of Latin American presidential regimes. I have studied the agenda setting institutions in 17 Latin American presidential countries since 1945 in their democratic periods. The enphasis are the constitutional provisions wich give power to Presidents. I argued that constitutional powers in presidential regimes are changing along the period, because of that the consequences for Executive-Legislative relations should not be derived from a static analyse of constitutional provisions. Accounting for the effects of political institutions and other factors, my findings suggest that demands for constitutional amendments make the executive-legislative relations a dynamic process of political changes.

Cette recherche se rapporte à une représentation programmatique au sein des démocraties présidentialistes de l’Amérique Latine pendant la première décennie du siècle XXI. Représentation programmatique est un phénomène lié au processus électoral qui comprend les promesses faites au cours des campagnes et leur accomplissement par les présidents élus. Une étude théorique initiale argumente que la représentation comme promettre et s’acquitter des promesses est une forme de créer de la liberté politique dans les démocraties libérales. Dans ce sens, une démocratie capable de réaliser une représentation programmatique doit obtenir un plus grand consentement des citoyens. Pour aborder les promesses électorales il a été formé la Banque d’Assertions Programmatiques avec les données de 138 programmes de gouvernement, tout en utilisant une stratégie d’analyse de contenu développée par la recherche. Du point de vue électoral, la représentation programmatique est favorisée par (a) l’existence d’alternatives idéologiquement différentes parmi les candidatures partidaires/électorales, (b) par une organisation historiquement consistante de ces candidatures et, en même temps, (c) par la sensibilité des candidatures aux opinions et intérêts des électeurs. Après les élections, la représentation programmatique est favorisée si l’action gouvernementale possède une relation avec les promesses faites tout au long des campagnes (congruence idéologique). Ces conditions sont testées pour 48 élections dans les 16 pays étudiés. Après le développement de la recherche empirique, on conclue que la représentation programmatique dans les élections présidentielles est une manière viable de rapport entre les citoyens et la politique publique dans les démocraties de l’Amérique Latine et que son existence se rapporte au o assentiment (satisfaction) des citoyens au système démocratique. / Esta é uma pesquisa sobre a representação programática nas democracias presidencialistas da América Latina durante a primeira década do século XXI. Representação programática é um fenômeno atrelado ao processo eleitoral que compreende as promessas feitas durante as campanhas e seu cumprimento pelos presidentes eleitos. Um estudo teórico inicial argumenta que a representação como prometer e cumprir promessas é uma forma de criar liberdade política nas democracias liberais. Neste sentido, uma democracia capaz de realizar representação programática deve obter maior consentimento dos cidadãos. Para abordar as promessas eleitorais foi formado o Banco de Asserções Programáticas com dados de 138 programas de governo, utilizando uma estratégia de análise de conteúdo desenvolvida para a pesquisa. Do ponto de vista eleitoral, a representação programática é favorecida pela (a) existência de alternativas ideologicamente diferentes entre as candidaturas partidárias/eleitorais, (b) por uma organização historicamente consistente destas candidaturas e, ao mesmo tempo, (c) pela sensibilidade das candidaturas às opiniões e interesses dos eleitores. Após as eleições, a representação programática é favorecida caso a ação governamental possua relação com as promessas feitas durante as campanhas (congruência ideológica). Estas condições são testadas para 48 eleições nos 16 países estudados. Após o desenvolvimento da pesquisa empírica, conclui-se que a representação programática nas eleições presidenciais é uma forma viável de relacionamento entre os cidadãos e a política pública nas democracias da América Latina e que sua existência está relacionada com o consentimento (satisfação) dos cidadãos ao sistema democrático. / This is a research about the programmatic representation in presidential democracies of Latin America, over the first decade of XXI century. Programmatic representation is a phenomenon linked to the electoral process which comprises the promises made during the campaigns and the fulfilment of them by elected presidents. An introductory theoretical study argues that the representation as it makes promises and fulfills these promises is a form of create political liberty in liberal democracies. In this sense, a democracy capable of generate programmatic representation should obtain citizens’ compliance. The Database of Programmatic Assertions were made in order to approach the electoral promises, with the data them 138 electoral platforms, through a strategy of content analysis developed for this research. In the elections, the programmatic representation is favored by (a) the existence of ideological alternatives in the presidential candidatures; (b) by the historical consistence of the organizations behind the candidatures and, at the same time; (c) by the sensibility of the candidatures to the opinions and interests of the electors. After the elections, the programmatic representation is favored when the governmental actions are related to the promises made during the electoral campaign (ideological congruence). These conditions are tested for 48 elections in the 16 countries of the study. After the development of the empirical research, conclusion are that the programmatic representation in presidential elections are a viable form of relationship between the citizens and the public policy in Latin American democracies, as well as the existence of programmatic representation is associated with the citizens’ consentient (satisfaction) with the democratic system.

Cette recherche se rapporte à une représentation programmatique au sein des démocraties présidentialistes de l’Amérique Latine pendant la première décennie du siècle XXI. Représentation programmatique est un phénomène lié au processus électoral qui comprend les promesses faites au cours des campagnes et leur accomplissement par les présidents élus. Une étude théorique initiale argumente que la représentation comme promettre et s’acquitter des promesses est une forme de créer de la liberté politique dans les démocraties libérales. Dans ce sens, une démocratie capable de réaliser une représentation programmatique doit obtenir un plus grand consentement des citoyens. Pour aborder les promesses électorales il a été formé la Banque d’Assertions Programmatiques avec les données de 138 programmes de gouvernement, tout en utilisant une stratégie d’analyse de contenu développée par la recherche. Du point de vue électoral, la représentation programmatique est favorisée par (a) l’existence d’alternatives idéologiquement différentes parmi les candidatures partidaires/électorales, (b) par une organisation historiquement consistante de ces candidatures et, en même temps, (c) par la sensibilité des candidatures aux opinions et intérêts des électeurs. Après les élections, la représentation programmatique est favorisée si l’action gouvernementale possède une relation avec les promesses faites tout au long des campagnes (congruence idéologique). Ces conditions sont testées pour 48 élections dans les 16 pays étudiés. Après le développement de la recherche empirique, on conclue que la représentation programmatique dans les élections présidentielles est une manière viable de rapport entre les citoyens et la politique publique dans les démocraties de l’Amérique Latine et que son existence se rapporte au o assentiment (satisfaction) des citoyens au système démocratique. / Esta é uma pesquisa sobre a representação programática nas democracias presidencialistas da América Latina durante a primeira década do século XXI. Representação programática é um fenômeno atrelado ao processo eleitoral que compreende as promessas feitas durante as campanhas e seu cumprimento pelos presidentes eleitos. Um estudo teórico inicial argumenta que a representação como prometer e cumprir promessas é uma forma de criar liberdade política nas democracias liberais. Neste sentido, uma democracia capaz de realizar representação programática deve obter maior consentimento dos cidadãos. Para abordar as promessas eleitorais foi formado o Banco de Asserções Programáticas com dados de 138 programas de governo, utilizando uma estratégia de análise de conteúdo desenvolvida para a pesquisa. Do ponto de vista eleitoral, a representação programática é favorecida pela (a) existência de alternativas ideologicamente diferentes entre as candidaturas partidárias/eleitorais, (b) por uma organização historicamente consistente destas candidaturas e, ao mesmo tempo, (c) pela sensibilidade das candidaturas às opiniões e interesses dos eleitores. Após as eleições, a representação programática é favorecida caso a ação governamental possua relação com as promessas feitas durante as campanhas (congruência ideológica). Estas condições são testadas para 48 eleições nos 16 países estudados. Após o desenvolvimento da pesquisa empírica, conclui-se que a representação programática nas eleições presidenciais é uma forma viável de relacionamento entre os cidadãos e a política pública nas democracias da América Latina e que sua existência está relacionada com o consentimento (satisfação) dos cidadãos ao sistema democrático. / This is a research about the programmatic representation in presidential democracies of Latin America, over the first decade of XXI century. Programmatic representation is a phenomenon linked to the electoral process which comprises the promises made during the campaigns and the fulfilment of them by elected presidents. An introductory theoretical study argues that the representation as it makes promises and fulfills these promises is a form of create political liberty in liberal democracies. In this sense, a democracy capable of generate programmatic representation should obtain citizens’ compliance. The Database of Programmatic Assertions were made in order to approach the electoral promises, with the data them 138 electoral platforms, through a strategy of content analysis developed for this research. In the elections, the programmatic representation is favored by (a) the existence of ideological alternatives in the presidential candidatures; (b) by the historical consistence of the organizations behind the candidatures and, at the same time; (c) by the sensibility of the candidatures to the opinions and interests of the electors. After the elections, the programmatic representation is favored when the governmental actions are related to the promises made during the electoral campaign (ideological congruence). These conditions are tested for 48 elections in the 16 countries of the study. After the development of the empirical research, conclusion are that the programmatic representation in presidential elections are a viable form of relationship between the citizens and the public policy in Latin American democracies, as well as the existence of programmatic representation is associated with the citizens’ consentient (satisfaction) with the democratic system.