Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1975. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [125-132]).

Accusé par Albert Burgh de considérer sa propre philosophie comme étant la meilleure entre toutes, Spinoza rectifie : il sait seulement qu'est vraie la philosophie qu'il comprend. Mais on cherchera vainement une authentique définition, chez lui, de l'idée de philosophie, ainsi qu'un programme d'ensemble des connaissances rationnelles, comme s'appliquent à en dresser Bacon, Descartes ou Hobbes. Y a-t-il chez Spinoza une conception précise, voire singulière, de l'idée de philosophie? Étudier les occurrences, la nature de la définition, ce qu'enfin peut signifier le passage d'un titre pressenti de Philosophie à celui d'Éthique, produit autant d'indices d'une idée de philosophie conçue comme praxis de distinction ou, comme le disait Althusser, comme activité de tracer des lignes de démarcation. Mais une idée même de philosophie se constitue en ce geste, et seulement en ce geste, à savoir par le biais de relations nécessaires avec ce qui a priori n'est pas elle: le vulgaire, l'ignorant, le théologien, le souverain. L'idée de philosophie, en d'autres termes, s'autoproduit dans un système de rencontres singulières. En analyser les fruits permet alors de recomposer l'idée de « vraie philosophie» : elle est d'abord celle d'une pratique de production d'idées (comprendre, philosopher droitement, parler en philosophe) et de leur communication (s'adresser au vulgaire, au souverain, enseigner en tant que philosophe). Mais se fait jour, en outre, comme un naturel philosophe, effort s'éprouvant selon une réjouissance propre au « vrai philosophe », déjà sage en vertu de son mouvement de se perfectionner et d'accroître sa puissance. / Being accused by Albert Burgh of appraising his own philosophy as the best above all others, Spinoza rectified : only the philosophy he could understand did he know as true. But vainly will one seek any authentic definition, in his works, of the idea of philosophy, or an overall programme of rational knowledge, such as Bacon, Descartes or Hobbes endeavored to make out. Can one find in Spinoza a specific, singular indeed conception of the idea of Philosophy ? Studying occurrences, the nature of the definition, eventually what the change from the prospective title Philosophy to that of Ethics may signify, generates as many indications about an idea of philosophy conceived as a praxis of distinction, or, as Althusser would say, as activity consisting of drawing boundaries. But a very idea of philosophy constitutes itself by this movement, and only by this movement, namely via necessary relations with what, a priori, is not itself : the vulgar, the ignorant, the theologian, the sovereign. In other words the idea of philosophy generates itself within a system of singular encounters. Analyzing their fruits enables one, then, to recompose the idea of “true philosophy”: it is firstly that of a practice of producing ideas (understanding, philosophizing with rectitude, speaking as philosopher) and of communicating them (speaking to the “vulgar”, to the sovereign, disseminating as philosopher). Finally something like a philosophic natural disposition comes to light, an effort experienced in an exultation proper to the “true philosopher”, who is already wise by virtue of his movement toward perfection and his growing power.

No description available.

Thesis advisor: Jean Luc Solère / In my dissertation, I aim (1) to render, from Spinoza’s philosophical system, a critique of the State form or, more broadly, of political coercion and (2) to supply, on the basis of the same, a positive account of the alternative. It is, in essence, my goal to derive anarchism out of the sources of Spinozism. My claim is that, in Spinoza’s work, there obtains a tension between force and freedom as models for political organization. While other interpreters have tended to synthesize these opposing tendencies in one manner or another, I endeavor to highlight their incompatibility and to show that, for Spinoza, they produce two distinct forms of political life. One, the passive foundation of political union, which grounds the State. Two, the active foundation of political union, which grounds the rational community. Having identified this theoretical breach, I proceed to examine the affective structure of each foundation as conceived by Spinoza. I find an inescapable contradiction in the first, which — contrary to the best intentions of the founders of State — tends not only to maintain citizens in a condition of perpetual minority, but progressively erodes their capacity for autonomy, thus inviting a parallel and equally progressive enhancement of coercive intervention. This result implies the moral necessity of revolution, the spinozian contours of which I examine in detail. In the second, which I consider in both affective and ontological terms, I discover the opposite movement. That is, a progressive escalation of reason together with its affective modalities that enhances the human capacity for political and social harmony, rendering political coercion obsolete.

La presente investigación tiene por objeto indagar la relación entre los procesos afectivos, haciendo especial énfasis en el afecto del amor, y los primeros dos géneros del conocimiento en Spinoza: la imaginación y la razón. Para ello, el documento inicio con una indagación metafísica y física de la filosofía spinoziana, que procura un esclarecimiento del vínculo entre estos elementos y el conocimiento. Por último, la tesis adelanta la complicada relación, que Spinoza mantiene, entre los dos primeros géneros del conocimiento, el amor y la política. / Tesis

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 278-285). Also available on the Internet.

Zugl.: Zürich, Univ., Habil.-Schr., 2007

No description available.

Zugl.: Halle, Wittenberg, Univ., Diss., 2004

Zugl.: Zürich, Univ., Diss., 2005/2006