This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role played by civilian leaders in the consolidation of democracy examining changes in levels of military influence over politics. This study departs from typical military-centric civil-military relations literature by employing a civilian-centric analysis. In particular, it shows how the former's focus on changing levels of internal threat cannot account for variations in the levels of civilian control over the military. The study instead adopts a framework that focuses on the incentive structure of civilian leaders as determined by competitive elections; the political capacity of leaders as reflected in their parliamentary majority, political experience and the effectiveness of their economic policies; and institutional rules, such as the system of government and organization of the parties. The thesis argues that, depending on their incentive structure and political capacity, the civilian leaders will either challenge a politically powerful military or ally with that military by adopting its preference structures. The relevance of this model for understanding civil-military relations in the aftermath of a transition to democracy is explored in the Turkish case by examining the shift from low to high levels of military influence between late 1980s and mid-1990s. The thesis identifies this shift by looking at the incentive structure and the political capacity of two civilian leaders: Prime Minister/President Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Tansu Ciller.

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Il s'agit d'étudier la tentative de la Turquie de se positionner comme une puissance sur les échiquiers eurasiens et caucasiens sous la présidence de Turgut Ozal / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished