This dissertation is an intensive investigation of the rending of the heaven and Temple curtain in Mark’s Gospel from a Christological point of view. The two rending events are examined for their thematic and structural functions in making up the textual and theological world of Mark’s Gospel; embodied in the most critical moments of Jesus’ ministry, his baptism and crucifixion, and of Mark’s narrative, the beginning and end, they are seen and argued as the monumental events that epitomize Mark’s apocalyptic and eschatological understanding of Jesus’ life and death. In line with the apocalyptic and eschatological nature of the Gospel, the motif of seeing, expressed especially in the verbs of seeing and ειδον in particular, plays an integral role in Mark’s depiction of the characters and events throughout his narrative. So it is that in two of the most apocalyptic and eschatological episodes in Mark, Jesus’ baptism and crucifixion, Mark is very careful to note that Jesus himself and the Gentile Roman centurion see the two epoch-making events, the rending of the heaven and the rending of the Temple curtain. As these two events are linked by verbs of the same root (σχιζομένους/έσχίσθη), the reference to spirit (πνευμα/εξεπνευσεν), the use of an identification formula referring to Jesus’ divine sonship (συ ει ο υιος μου/ουτς… υιος θεου ην), the occurrence of ‘seeing’ (ειδεν/ιδων), the Elijah symbolism present, and other theological correlations, it is clear that the motif of ‘seeing’ is incorporated into them also. Mark has deliberately created various corresponding elements between these two key events in Jesus’ ministry, designing these two events to be an inclusio which brackets the entire Gospel structurally, thematically, and contextually. Through the structure of inclusio, Mark set up one pillar of a symbolic event at the beginning of his narrative and of Jesus’ ministry, the rending of the heaven, announcing the apocalyptic commencement of God’s eschatological reign; and the positions another pillar of an event just as symbolic, the rending of the Temple curtain, at the end of his narrative and of Jesus’ ministry, enunciating the destruction of the Temple which further symbolizes the break-down of the old age and advent of the new in which distance and mediation through sacrificial rites and all they stood for are eradicated and access to God’s holy presence is offered to all.

Through the imaginative literary genius of the Scottish author George MacDonald (1824-1905) an exploration of the Mystery of Man and his/her relationship with and to God is explored along the lines of Theological Anthropology. Myth and the literary genre of fantasy (which, like religion is moral in character and relies on relationships with supernatural forces) are explored as vehicles for transmitting and articulating deep truths about what it means to be human. Moral and spiritual growth are explored from psychological sources (Existential and Humanistic Schools of Psychology), and religious sources (Cambridge Platonists and Thomistic Theology) with the goal seen as the perfection of love --deification; And this understood as an irrevocable destiny for all rational creatures.

This dissertation is fundamentally concerned with the comparative study of Christology in latin American liberation theology and Korean minjung theology. To meet this task the Christology of the former is examined in relation to that of the latter. The study is divided into three parts. Part one contains chapter I through to III. Chapter I is a presentation of liberation theology's motive which takes the suffering people in the current socio-economic political situation as the starting point for a politics-oriented Christology. Chapter II shows the detailed analysis of liberation theology's methodology which is definitely grounded in the principles of the social sciences. Chapter III consists of seeking to interpret Jesus, his words and deeds in the light of the Latin American conditions. Part two, which constitutes chapter IV through to VI, will try to examine a way of thinking about minjung theology within the same categories which we concentrate on the development of liberation theology and its Christological implication in part one, because the clarification between them is necessary for the purpose of this thesis. It may help to solve some of the suspicion whether the label minjung theology is practically synonymous with the label liberation theology in creating a new and appropriate mode of an adequate Christology for answering to the vital needs of the poor and oppressed today. In this observation, have liberation theology and minjung theology anything to say to each other? It is natural for the Christian church to look to them for light on the question. In this desire, part three in chapter VII through to X begins a comparative and critical discussion of the motive, methodologies and Christological implications of the two theologies.

Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.II starts from the contention that 'lq when a Fool hears 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. This is a special feature of the Pros.II argument which distinguishes the argument from other ontological arguments set up by, for example, Descartes and Leibniz. This is also the context which makes semantics necessary for evaluation of the argument. It is quite natural to ask 'lq What is understood by the Fool, and what is in his mind? It is essential for a proper consideration of the argument to identify the object which is understood by the Fool, and so, is in his mind. A semantics gives answers to the questions of 'lq What the Fool understands? and 'lq What is in the Fool's mind? If we choose a semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it makes an effective guide to identify the object. It is a necessary condition for a proper evaluation of the Pros.II argument to fix our universe of discourse, especially since, in the argument, we are involved in such talk about existing objects as Anselm's contention that 'when a Fool hears 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. The ontology to which a semantic theory commits us will be accepted as our scope of objects when we introduce our semantic theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, and this ontological boundary constrains us to identify the object in a certain way. Consistent application of an ontology, most of all, is needed for the evaluation of the logical validity of an argument. If we take Frege's three-level semantics, we are ontologically committed to intensional entities, like meaning, as well as extensional entities. Sluga contends that Frege's anti-psychologism for meanings should not be interpreted as vindicating reification of intensional entities in relation to Frege's contextualism, that Frege's anti-psychologism with his contextualism is nothing but a linguistic version of Kantian philosophy for the transcendental unity of a judgement. There is, however, another possible interpretation of Frege's contextualism. According to Dummett, the significance of Frege's contextualism must be understood as a way of explanation for a word's having meaning. If Dummett's view is cogent, we could say that Frege's contextualism does not prevent our interpreting his semantics as being committed to intensional entities. We need not worry that Frege's over all semantics, especially with his contextualism, would internally deny the ontological interpretation of his theory. We see Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Pros.II is an invalid argument if we introduce Frege's three-level semantics, i.e. if we acknowledge meanings of words as entities in our universe of discourse. We can also employ extensional semantics for the interpretation of the Pros.II argument. According to extensionalists, like Quine and Kripke, we need not assume intensional entities, like meaning, to be part of our ontological domain. They argue that we can employ our language well enough without assuming intensional entities. If we choose extensional semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it commits us only to extensional entities as objects in the Universe of our interpretation. In Sections 1.4 and 1.5, I show that extensional semantics makes the Pros.II argument a valid argument for the existence of God. 'lq Necessary existence is the central concept of Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.III. It has been said that, even if the argument is formally valid, it cannot stand as a valid argument for the existence of God, since 'lq necessary existence is an absurd concept like 'lq round square. And further that even if there is a meaningful combination of concepts for 'lq necessary existence, it cannot quality as a subject of an a priori argument. As objections to the interpretations which make the Pros.III argument valid, it has been argued that even if there is a concept of 'lq necessary existence which is meaningful and there is another concept of 'lq necessary existence which is suitable as a subject of an a priori argument, there is no concept of 'lq necessary existence which is meaningful and at the same time suitable as a subject of an a priori argument. In Chap.2 and Chap.3, I try to show that there can be concepts of 'lq necessary existence which are proof against these objections. Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogian Chap.II and Chap.III are logically valid arguments on some logical principles. Some fideists, K. Barth, for example, argue that Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogion are not proofs for the existence of God even if they are logically valid arguments. I raise the question how this attitude could be possible, in Chap.4 and Chap.5. Barth's fideistic interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion arguments does not find any flaw in the validity of the arguments, and it accepts the meaningfulness and truth of the premises even to the fool in Proslogion. If this is the case, i.e. if Barth's interpretation accepts the validity of the arguments and the truth of the premises, I raise the question, how can the arguments not be interpreted as proofs for the existence of God? How is it possible that the function of the arguments is not that of proving the existence of God? According to Wittgensteinian fideism, premises in the arguments should not be intelligible to those who do not believe in God's existence already, and so the real function of the arguments is the elucidation, the understanding of believer's belief, rather than proving articles of belief to unbelievers. Barth's fideistic interpretation of the arguments, however, fully recognizes the meaningfulness and truth of the premises in the arguments as well as the validity of the arguments. I argue that there could be a justification for the Barthian fideism. As Malcolm notices, there are still atheists who understand Anselm's arguments as valid, but the only possibility for the people who recognize the validity of Anselm's arguments still to remain atheists has been thought to be to challenge the truth of premises employed in the arguments. Now, of the atheistic possibility, we can change the direction of our attention, that is, to the question about the function of a logically valid argument itself. What has not been thought of in relation to Anselm's arguments is the significance of logical truth or the logical validity of an argument. We have not asked such questions as 'lq What does a logical truth say? and 'lq What does a logically valid argument guarantee with true premises? Let us assume that even the premises are accepted by atheists. Do they all convert to theism? If that were so, the disagreement between atheist and believer over the ontological arguments should turn only on the truth of premises. If that is not so, there is some point in raising this other question. If there are people who, recognizing the premises and validity of an argument, are still reluctant to accept the conclusion, we have reason to question the function of a valid argument. I argue that there is a way of being consistently reasonable while accepting the premises and the validity of the ontological arguments and yet remaining an atheist or an agnostic.

Post-Tridentine Western Christian theology introduced the notion of natura pura, which holds that one can know created nature in fact without reference to God or divine grace. The orders of grace and nature are thus on different plains. This ontology creates an extrincism between God and the world. Maximus Confessor’s doctrine of grace offers the paradox of nature already presuming grace but awaiting the supernatural grace of deification at the resurrection. Further, divine grace, or energy in Maximus’s theology, are not separate ontological realms between God and the world. Grace does not separate God’s essence from his energies. The Incarnation of the created and uncreated natures in Christ fully manifests the paradox of God’s grace as being fully on the side of creation and on the side of God, without remainder. Finally, Maximus’s theurgic ecclesiology in his Mystagogy reinforces the mediation of grace through created reality. All of these aspects of Maximus the Confessor’s theology of grace provide a Christian rendering of participation that does not result in the extrincism of grace from nature, their conflation together, or a real distinction in the being of God.

Olika typer av klorfenoler (CP) användes flitigt i impregneringsmedel under 1950–70-talen i Sverige. Det var under miljonprogrammet som CP fick sin största spridning, då en miljon hushåll skulle byggas där bland annat syllarna i husen skulle vara impregnerade med CP. På 1970-talet skedde också den så kallade Teckomatorpskandalen, där företaget BT Kemi, som tillverkade en mängd olika kemiska ämnen inklusive CP, hade grävt nercirka1000 tunnor med giftiga ämnen i marken. I samband med att skandalen uppdagades förbjöds CP år 1977-1978 i Sverige, detta innefattade även produkten KP-Cuprinol som använts som impregnering i miljonprogramhusen. Frågetecken kvarstår till hur plötsligt CP förbjöds utan att det förklarades varför. CP i trä-skyddsmedel har lett till stora inomhusproblem.

The aim of this study is to contribute to the task of Christian theology by exploring how accounts of the atonement might embrace all nature, human and non-human. Since Jürgen Moltmann's work has been ecologically oriented and has offered substantial discussion within the theological tradition, the heart of the study lies in its analysis of his underlying redemptive schema, which is tested for its adequacy as a model of atonement. The contribution of the study is fourfold. (i) It seeks to articulate what Moltmann has done in terms of the language and logic of atonement theory. (ii) It proposes that, although Moltmann himself does not make this clear, the key aspect of his underlying schema is the construal of a suffering God that functions as a working atonement metaphor, which he reiterates in other ways by analogous correspondence. (iii) It shows that he has neglected a necessary aspect of soteriological theory, namely, the atonement metaphor of sacrifice, and that a fundamental misunderstanding of sacrifice accounts for this. (iv) It proposes how this deficiency might be remedied, within his own theological framework, by developing a Christology of the cosmic suffering servant that is able to express the atonement metaphor of sacrifice in the context of the redemption of nature. The sequence of the argument is as follows. The first chapter sets out the broad context for this study within a Christian soteriological tradition where the non-human creation has not been a focus. It discusses a range of ways in which modern theology has responded to the ecological crisis, itself a part of the crisis of secularism, concluding that Moltmann's work is potentially helpful as a way forward. Chapter 2 narrows the context to an analysis of the language and logic of atonement theory, with particular application to their relation to the redemption of nature. The need for an objective account of atonement is shown and Moltmann provides again a helpful example. Chapter 3 depicts Moltmann's theologising as a whole as a response to secular modernity and indicates how his ecological theology grounds his soteriology and his call for a cosmic Christ. An exploration of the accounts of atonement within Moltmann's theology is provided in Chapter 4, which also establishes that he operates with an atonement metaphor of suffering related through categories of analogous correspondence to non-human nature. The final chapter highlights the deficiency of his redemptive schema in its neglect of the key atonement metaphor of sacrifice and proposes, as a further development of analogous correspondence, the atonement metaphor of sacrifice as expressed through the cosmic suffering servant.

This thesis is a work in biblical interpretation and Christian theology, which seeks to develop and apply a missional hermeneutic to the book of Job; that is, to offer a reading of Job in the light of what I see as the missional nature of the Bible. Part one concerns the development of a missional approach to Job. I begin in chapter one by framing Christian mission using the concepts of missio Dei and holistic mission. Drawing on the emerging conversation on missional hermeneutics, I then set out an understanding of the missional nature of the Bible; that is, the Bible as a product, record and means of God’s mission. In chapter two I evaluate the use of Job in previous scholarship that has brought together the Bible and mission, identifying a number of themes and concluding that there remains significant room for a more intentional, substantial, sustained and nuanced treatment of Job in relation to mission. In chapter three I develop a framework for such a treatment with specific reference to missional hermeneutics, concluding with several adapted lines of enquiry that I follow through in the rest of the thesis. Part two concerns the application of this missional hermeneutic to the book of Job. In chapter four I pay particular attention to the universalising impulse evident in Job, seen especially in the non-Israelite theme in the book and in relation to the missio Dei. Of particular significance is my contention that in the book of Job, the very mission of God is at stake. I then compare the book with several similar Ancient Near Eastern texts to demonstrate Job’s distinctly Israelite beliefs, which contribute to the Bible’s articulation of Yahweh faith in contrast to competing renderings of reality. In chapter five I develop the reading by addressing the treatment of the poor in Job. By framing this missionally, I tie Job’s ethical teaching on poverty to the shaping of the Christian church’s participation in the missio Dei. The thesis demonstrates that a missional reading of Job is not only possible, but highly profitable, and contributes to the developing missional hermeneutics conversation in constructive ways. To conclude the thesis, in chapter six I revisit the concept of the missional nature of the Bible, this time by focusing on the book of Job as a product of mission, in relation to the story of God’s mission, and as a means of God’s mission. I then set out my contribution to scholarship and conclude with some suggestions for further research.

The Catholic Church's stated teachings on the interpretation of scripture provide a mandate for exegetes to interpret the biblical text in light of the historical-critical method, including attention to its literary genres, so as to yield findings that can contribute to the development of doctrine. With particular reference to myth, Catholic exegetes have adopted an understanding of the genre as the symbolic expression of limitations and possibilities that characterize the human experience, rather than a reconstruction, even in figurative terms, of specific historical events involving particular personages. In view of these hermeneutical considerations, this thesis proposes that the Church's presentation of the doctrine of Satan should be emancipated from a historicized interpretation that appeals to mythical narratives as though they affirm the existence and historical misdeeds of Satan as a particular ontological being. The myths that give rise to the doctrine of Satan have long explored possibilities in the relationship between the Creator and free-willed creatures. As such, the doctrine can be developed so as to express the possibility that a person might irrevocably reject God's invitation to friendship, and hence experience the condition traditionally referred to as 'hell', yet still be sustained by God's unconditional commitment to being.

Over the second half of the 20th Century and the beginning part of the 21st Century, major change has occurred in the worship practice of many churches. Within this time frame enormous change has occurred in the social, economic, political, technological, scientific and religious framework of British society. Worship practice has been influenced by these changes. This doctoral dissertation sets out to explore how British Methodist worship has changed over the same time period. The focus of this dissertation is on change in the practice of non-Eucharistic worship in British Methodism. This is the form of worship practiced most frequently in the British Methodist Church. It examines the form, content, style and ordering of worship and explores how the very ethos of worship has altered. In this time period there has been expressed discontent about worship. This thesis examines what the Liturgical Movement has promoted as a way toward renewal of worship, and explores how British Methodism might appropriate from the Liturgical Movement ideas and lessons that would aid the renewal of worship in the Methodist Church.