本研究以上海市社會局為主體，探討其從1945年10月至1949年4月間各項業務執行的情況及其市民生活的關係。首先從社會局的職權與人事談起，社會局最早成立於1927年7月，負責農工商業相關行業的註冊、處理勞資糾紛與相關統計。一年後職權增加了對人民團體和社會福利機構的管理，也負責各種度量衡器具的檢定，戰後再增加糧食管理及書報影劇審查兩項工作。就人事方面而言，社會局局長以吳開先在任的時間最長，同時他也出任市黨部的執行委員會委員。另外針對1948年社會局全體公務員的學經歷進行分析，發現49歲以下的職員占絕大多數，以學歷而言，超過半數的男性職員受過不同程度的高等教育，女性職員是以中學學歷者占多數，附屬機構的公務員則更年輕，學歷也相對較低。與戰前的社會局相比最大的特點在小學以下的成員大幅減少和隨著局長異動而大量換人的情形也不復存在。 本研究的其他部分皆與社會局如何執行它的職權有關，分為四大主題：(1)報紙、雜誌、通訊社審查；(2)電影戲劇審查；(3)調整工資及調解勞資爭議；(4)對人民團體的管理。 在報紙、雜誌、通訊社審查部分，共舉行了三次大規模清查措施，只有1949年3-4月的「報刊總清查」才有比較主動的抽查措施。在獲准發行的報紙與雜誌中有一個特點，就是越晚獲得許可的刊物轉呈次數越多，可見社會局沒有最終決定權。在沒有獲得發行的報紙與雜誌中，社會局常以「申請手續不完整」的理由(包括各種文字)讓申請案無法通過，數量上甚至多過發行後才被查禁的。 社會局對電影影片的審查是某種形式上的複審，重點是核對內政部發給的准演執照是否相符。劇團、票房和俱樂部審查強調的重點是表演內容，包括所有劇本、科白與節目流程都要申請核准方能表演。總計3202部電影中未通過審查的只有28部，凡是有墮落的、不符現實的場景與情節都會被要求刪減或修改。劇本審查方面，可能出於受戰爭影響無暇創作或比較容易通過審查，大多以重演舊的劇目為主。 工人工資的調整以市政府每月發佈的生活費指數乘上1937年6月的底薪為計算方式，與糧食價格互相比較，貨幣購買力逐確實漸下降，使得多數工人不足以養家活口，所以勞資爭議越來越多。而就勞資爭議進行分析，以有沒有發生罷工停業分為兩類，有罷工停業的案件有589件，沒有罷工停業的則有5521件。就行業類別來看，與上海的產業結構相符，以紡織業最多。從具體的個案討論中，社會局確實努力促成和解，但卻沒有能力預防與阻止勞資爭議與暴力衝突。 人民團體分為資方的同業公會、勞方的工會、與一般民眾的社會團體，三者的數量在戰後四年間皆有顯著的成長。從電影院公會的例子可以看出，公會與社會局爭執的焦點在票價的調整，還有公會也必須負責各種臨時性或經常性的賑災捐款。相關資料也顯示，社會局對於勞工福利設施推行不力，也無法控制工會基層組織，在那些被共產黨吸收的工會中，社會局只能在警察局取締之後，解散工會再加以重組，無法有效防止共產黨的滲透。社會團體的問題在於社會局僅僅做到登記的工作而無法加以有效的管理，即使是國民黨成立的團體也是如此。 整體來說，社會局在這四年的時間裡，雖然進行很多種的社會統計，也透過機關刊物向民眾進行法令宣傳，但被動的登記成效比較好而主動執行力不足，其中又以無法有效防止勞資爭議與積極管理各種人民團體為主要缺點。 / This thesis draws on archival data from Shanghai’s Bureau of Social Affairs (Shehui ju 社會局) to examine how this organization undertook its duties between October 1945 and April 1949 (the period of the Chinese Civil War), as well as its impact on the lives of ordinary citizens. Founded in July 1927, the Bureau was initially responsible for the registration of agricultural and industrial sectors, resolution of wage disputes, and compilation of business statistics. It was subsequently burdened with additional duties, including the oversight of civic organizations and social welfare institutions, examination of measurement tools, regulation of foodstuffs, and censorship of publications. The thesis begins with a discussion on the Bureau’s administrative structure and personnel. Director Wu Kaixian had the longest incumbency of all the staff members, and also served as a commissioner in the Executive Committee of the KMT’s City Party Office. In terms of the backgrounds of public servants who worked at the Bureau, the data collected indicates that in the year 1948 most were less than 49 years of age. Over half of the male civil servants had received various higher education degrees, while the most of the women merely had secondary educations. The staff members of the Bureau’s affiliated institutions were generally younger and had lower educational levels. The period covered by this study differed from the prewar years in witnessing fewer people with only preliminary educational background, while personnel changes became less relevant following the appointment of new Directors. The rest of the thesis centers on how the Bureau executed its authority and carried out its duties, with the subject matter being divided into the following four categories: 1) Censorship of newspapers, magazines, and news agencies; 2) Censorship of motion pictures and dramas; 3) Reconciliation of wage and labor disputes; 4) Governance of civic organizations. Three large-scale censorship campaigns involving newspapers, magazines, and news agencies were undertaken, but only the “General Censorship” from March to April 1949 witnessed proactive measures. In considering censored newspapers and magazines, it seems especially noteworthy that the latter publications were released more often than being transferred, which suggests that the Bureau did not have the authority to make final decisions. The reason given by the Bureau for banning certain newspapers and magazines from publication was usually “incomplete application procedure.” The quantity of such publications was even greater than those banned after publication. The Bureau’s process of re-examining motion pictures focused on the validity of licenses issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The criteria of censorship adopted by theatres, box offices, and clubs placed greater emphasis on performance content, including scripts, voiceover, and program rundowns. Of 3,202 movies examined by the Bureau, only 28 failed to pass, with discouraging and unrealistic scenarios usually being deleted or modified. Most of the adopted scripts were somewhat dated, perhaps due to wartime lack of creativity and productivity. The adjustment of the labor wages was based on the product of the government-issued monthly cost of living index multiplied by salary levels of July 1937. Against the background of rising food prices, purchasing power parity proved relatively low, which rendered blue-collar workers less able to sustain their families and sparked increasing wage disputes. Such conflicts can be categorized by whether or not they resulted in strikes, with those triggering strikes numbering 589 and those that did not 5,521. Like Shanghai’s overall industrial structure, the textile industry led others in terms of such disputes. The Bureau did intervene by trying to promote reconciliation, yet it failed to prevent such disputes and resulting acts of violence. Civic organizations included employers’ associations, labor unions, and ordinary social groups formed by citizens. The number of all three kinds of organizations increased significantly during the four years of the Chinese Civil War. As can be seen in the case of the Cinema Association, the major point of conflict between Bureau and the Association centered on adjustments of ticket prices and the Association’s assuming responsibility for all kinds of charitable donations on a regular or temporary basis. The records reveal that the Bureau was not serious about the welfare infrastructure for laborers, and proved unable to control the grassroots organization of the labor unions. The Bureau could not prevent the Communist Party from exerting increasing influence over unions, but did dissolve them after police crackdowns and then attempted to reorganize them. The main issue with these civic organizations was that the Bureau was only in charge of registration yet proved unable to manage effective mobilization, a phenomenon that applied even to those organized by the KMT. In conclusion, the thesis argues that during the four years covered by this study, despite the fact that the Bureau was able to compile extensive sociological statistics and disseminate rules of law via its publications, its ability to execute policy decisions turned out to be far less effective. Moreover, the Bureau could not effectively suppress labor disputes and mobilize relevant civic organizations.