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本國正版廠商遊說與最適仿冒查緝率 / Lobbying by the domestic patentee and optimal enforcement rate高毓潞 Unknown Date (has links)
由於今日數位科技發達,仿冒成本日漸降低,導致仿冒產業充斥於社會中,處處可見盜版商品的蹤跡,故仿冒查緝在現今變得非常重要。本文討論本國正版廠商參與遊說的情況下,本國政府仿冒查緝率將如何制定以及本國正版廠商在何種情況下願意提供政治獻金。並且,我們為政府仿冒查緝的工作加入了查緝成本,研究其對於政府仿冒查緝率決策的影響。本文研究後發現,政府必須根據市場規模大小以決定最適查緝率為零或是查緝率上限,且惟有在市場規模為中段之時,本國正版廠商才有意願提供政治獻金進行遊說。此外,若加入仿冒查緝成本,則本國政府最適查緝率為零的可能性將會提高。 / Since the prevalence and availability of digital technologies, the cost of piracy becomes lower and lower. The society is full of counterfeiter and counterfeit, hence it is very important to protect the intellectual property. This paper assumes that the domestic company obtains the intellectual property. We try to discuss how the domestic government determines the optimal enforcement rate and to what extent is the domestic company willing to pay for political contributions if the domestic company is the only one lobbyist. Furthermore, considering the cost of crackdown on imitations, we find that the government decides the optimal enforcement rate according to the size of the market, and the domestic company has the desire to engage in lobbying only when the market is in the middle size. If there is some cost of squashing pirates, that optimal enforcement rate is more likely to be zero.
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最適仿冒品查緝率的制定 / Establishment of the optimal enforcement rate of counterfeit陳盈竹 Unknown Date (has links)
在這多元化社會,資訊及科技的高度發展除了帶給全民便利以及更充足完整的資訊外,卻也帶來了侵權與犯罪。本文根據王智賢與楊敦雅 (2008) 一文做進一步的延伸,採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 的菜單式拍賣模型,探討當智慧財產權等無形資產為外國正版商所擁有時,外國正版廠商、國內仿冒商,以及國內部份消費者所組成的團體,三者的利益分配相互衝突時,本國政府將如何制定國內的仿冒查緝率。此外,我們將模型設定了外生變數查緝率下限以盼能更貼近現實社會,透過本研究我們可以發現在增加查緝率下限後,雙方共同遊說之下均衡查緝率可能由原先的零大幅提高至仿冒商品剛好可以生存的門檻,並且在均衡時只會有一方願意提供給本國政府政治獻金。 / In this multiple society, although highly developing information and technology not only make all the people more convenient but also earn more sufficient information, it has brought the tort and crime as well. In this essay, we extend the essay written by Jue-Shyan Wang & Tun-Ya Yang (2008) and adapt a simple framework based on the Menu-auction Model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Discussing about how a domestic government decides optimal enforcement rate of counterfeit when intellectual property is held by a foreign company and foreign company、domestic consumers and domestic illegally copied company had a conflict between their benefit distribution. Furthermore, we are going to add a lower bound of enforcement rate as an external variable to close reality. After this study, we found that under the lobby of both foreign company and domestic consumers, the equilibrium of enforcement rate may change from zero to the entry barrier; what’s more, only one of the sides will be willing to pay political contributions to domestic government under equilibrium.
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