生物藥品是很多先前具致命性和難以治療的疾病領域，像是癌症、自體免疫疾病及神經系統疾病內最被看好的現行新穎療法。近年來，隨著探索出突破性小分子藥物愈趨困難，加上生物藥品在新藥研發過程中有較低的折損率與較高的成功產出率，使得越來越多藥廠紛紛轉向開發利潤豐厚的大分子生物產品。此外許多暢銷生物藥品專利期即將屆至，從而帶來對相對價廉、通常被稱為原廠生物藥品仿製版本之「生物相似性藥品」的龐大治療需求。然而，由於生物藥品和小分子藥物在分子大小及結構複雜程度方面存在截然不同的特性與本質差異，因此建立一套專屬於生物相似性藥品的上市許可規範勢在必行。 作為於2010年3月23日正式簽署公告之「患者保護及可負擔照護法案」中的一部分，美國國會通過了「生物藥品價格競爭與創新法」(BPCIA)。BPCIA的生效被視為製藥產業最重要的變革之一，旨在藉由競爭達到維護公眾健康、促進生物技術創新和控制醫療支出之目的，同時取得適當之三方利益平衡。BPCIA即以Hatch-Waxman法案下的化學學名藥核准途徑為模版，創建生物藥品簡易上市申請程序。 本論文的結構主要區分為兩大部分進行研究，其一提供了製藥產業概觀與全球生物藥品市場的發展趨勢，其二則聚焦在BPCIA新建立的核准前專利爭端解決程序下，生物相似性藥品面臨「專利舞蹈」時的法律評估及智慧財產權管理。 論文的第一部分係根據從各種市場研究報告收集、整理而成的統計數據，以系統性的方式深入介紹全球製藥產業，並分析生物相似性藥品的市場機會和潛在隱憂。另外此部分亦詳細說明了生物相似性藥品的生理活性、知識斷層與製程依賴性之間的關係、分析技術對生物產品做完整定性的不足以及生物相似性藥品的開發流程。 論文的第二部分則以討論BPCIA的重要條文規定為主，包括專利舞蹈制度和上市審查要求，諸如生物相似性之證明、可互換性之認定與適應症外推。其他相關議題，包含參考藥品的法定專屬權保護期長度、生物相似性藥品自動替換之立法化、專利資訊交換機制的可能濫用及原廠與生物相似藥廠達成反競爭協議之風險皆會予以進一步探討。除此之外，本部分也介紹了歐盟和台灣生物相似性藥品上市法規的沿革與現況。 本文試圖透過對生物相似性藥品的全方位綜合研究成果，提出可行的市場進入方案及善用專利和營業祕密優勢之智慧財產權保護佈局策略。 / Biologics represent many of the most promising novel therapies for previously deadly and intractable disease areas like cancer, autoimmune disease and neurological disorders. As discovery of breakthrough small-molecule drugs becomes more difficult, together with lower attrition rate and higher productivity of biologics in the new drug research and development (R＆D) process, pharmaceutical companies are increasingly turning to develop lucrative large-molecule biological products in recent years. In addition, the patents on numerous blockbuster biologics treatments will soon expire, bringing soaring demand for relatively inexpensive generic versions of originator biologics, generally known as “biosimilars.” However, due to contrasting characteristics and natural differences in terms of size and structural complexity between biologics and small-molecule drugs, it is necessary to create a regulatory pathway solely for biosimilars. As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act which was officially signed into law on March 23, 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). The BPCIA is considered one of the more significant overhauls to the pharmaceutical industry, aiming to strike a proper balance among securing public interests, stimulating biotechnology innovation and controlling healthcare expenditure through competition. It established an abbreviated approval pathway for biosimilars modeled closely after the Hatch-Waxman Act’s approval process for generic chemical drugs. The structure of this thesis is divided into two major parts, of which the first part provides an overview of pharmaceutical industry and trends in the global biologics market, whereas the second part focuses on the legal assessment and intellectual property management of biosimilars under BPCIA’s new pre-approval patent dispute resolution process, the “patent dance”. The first part starts from the in-depth systematic introduction of global pharmaceutical industry based on statistics collected from various market research reports, then analyzes the market opportunities and potential concerns for biosimilars. Moreover, this part illustrates the physiological properties, the relationship between “knowledge gap”and manufacturing path-dependence, the insufficieny of analytical techniques in fully characterizing biological products, and the development process of biosimilars in details. The second part discusses key provisions of the BPCIA, including the patent dance procedures and regulatory requirements, such as demonstrating biosimilarity, interchangeability and extrapolation. Other relevant issues include the length of statutory exclusivities granted to reference products, legislations on biosimilar automatic substitution, potential abuses of patent information exchange mechanism and risks of reaching anti-competitive agreements between pioneers and biosimilar manufacturers will be further discussed. Besides, this part describes the timeline and status quo of EU and Taiwan’s biosimilar approval regulations. With comprehensive study on multiple aspects of biosimilars, this article tries to propose feasible market access plans and robust intellectual property protection strategies capitalizing upon patents and trade secrets.

面對未來全球人口成長、可耕地減少等現象，生物技術在農業上的應用日益增加。其中，基因改造技術等基因層次相關的平臺應用技術更是提升農作物價值的關鍵—透過跨物種功能應用，大幅提升育種效率。自1996年基改作物商業化種植開始至今，美國都是全球最大種植國家，也是基改作物研發先驅國家。生技農業政策以及和基因改造作物有關法規之制訂使基改作物在美國蓬勃發展，尤其是專利保護對於種子產業之影響尤為深遠。專利權所提供的完善保護使大量資本進入種子產業，投入資源將農業生物技術應用於種子培育上，此舉也促成Monsanto等跨國農業生技公司之興起，主導全球基因改造作物之市場。 Monsanto將研發重心放在基改種子之研發，其在生技種子相關營業比重遠高於同業，同時，其投入特殊性狀之基改種子研發之回收遠高於其他公司之相同營業項目之投資報酬率。Monsanto積極藉由併購取得基因、基因轉殖技術以及種子種源。掌握關鍵基因、基因轉殖技術以及大量且優良種源使含有Monsanto轉殖基因作物在市場上佔有極大的比例。在美國，超過一半以上之主要作物種植面積為基因改造作物，尤其是基因改造大豆，佔大豆總種植面積之比例高達94%。市面上絕大多數基改大豆係Monsanto的抗嘉磷塞（RounupReady，RR1Y）基改大豆種子。藉由智慧財產保護策略，Monsanto並進一步限制RR1Y及其他基改作物之使用方式。 惟RR1Y專利將在2014年到期，農民可在2014年時留種種植基改大豆種子而不用每年購買種子，或購買學名（generic）抗嘉磷塞轉基因大豆種子。在美國所種植之大豆約有四成會外銷，而外銷國家基改作物規範法規是出口與否之關鍵。若未取得歐盟、中國等主要外銷國家基改作物主管機關之批准，呈交包括基因之轉殖植物對環境衝擊之風險評估、包含該基因之轉殖植物所製成食品之安全性評估等基改作物資訊，則抗嘉磷塞基因大豆無法進入該國糧食市場。然而，在目前美國農業生技基改作物相關規範下，學名基改種子廠必須在專利種子專利到期後，才能進行實驗及田間試驗，呈交相關資料以符合基改作物主管機關之要求。透過建立學名基改作物快速獲得核准查驗登記之程序，允許學名廠依賴專利基改作物原廠之實驗及田間試驗資料以建立其學名基改作物之安全性與性狀表現有效性，同時，允許學名基改作物在原基改作物開發廠專利期滿前即可開始進行試驗，可以使學名抗嘉磷塞大豆種子以及其他學名基改種子能在原專利基改作物種子專利到期後順利進入市場，促使基改作物種子價格競爭，並對於專利基改作物研發公司進行適度之補償，以促進產業發展。 / The development of new technologies in plant breeding has led to improvements in the efficiency scientists produce improved plant varieties. Genetic modification is among the developments that support plant breeding. The introduction of genetically modified crops has revolutionized the agriculture industry. With patent protection available on GM traits, varieties and other aspects of seed production, private R&D investments in the seed industry have increased tremendously. Monsanto has been the leading company in investing agricultural biotechnology and has obtained a dominant position in the GM traits found in soybeans, cotton, corn and other commercialized crops. Currently, over 90 percent of soybeans planted in the United States were herbicide-resistant, with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready being the dominant soybeans planted. In 2014, however, the agriculture industry will be facing the expiration of a patent for Roundup Ready soybeans. Despiate the fact that the patent expiration date is approaching, the agricultural biotech industry has no guideline in place to tell its players exactly how to transition seamlessly from patent monopolies to generic competition. The transition problem is espectially significant for soybeans exported to oversea markets as more than 40 percent of the soybeans grown in the U.S. are exported. In order for those soybeans to be accepted in the grain channel, regulatory approvals are required in countries that import soybeans. Obtaining data, which includes scitific data on the trait being developed, for regulatory approvals can take years to complete. If a generic trait is to reach market immediately after the original trait go off patent, the data generation process should begin before patent expiration. A Hatch-Waxman type patent infringement defense for activities necessary to obtain regulatory approvals for biotech traits can ensure that seed companies have sufficient time to obtain registrations for a generic Roundup Ready trait or other generic traits. Current legislation should be modified to adequately oversee the transition to the generic use of genetically modified crops and, in the mean time, ensure the availability of generic modified crops.