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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

我國生物相似性藥品研發廠商海外市場進入策略之決策探討 / The research of the foreign market entry strategy for biosimilar manufacturers in Taiwan

歐俐岑, Ou, Li Tseng Unknown Date (has links)
隨著人口增長以及人口老化速度加劇,全球藥品消費需求快速成長。生物藥品因其具有針對特定疾病之專一性,在治療病毒性肝炎、癌症及後天免疫缺乏症候群(Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome,AIDS)等重大疾病上擁有相當大的發展潛力。除了積極研發全新生物藥品之外,我國生技製藥廠商亦將注意力放到生物相似性藥品的研發上。 但因我國藥品內需市場規模較小,一旦成功研發出生物相似性藥品,若無法將其外銷至海外市場,恐不能弭平鉅額的前期投入。而進入國際市場之際,倘若未制定適宜的進入策略,卻又極可能會以失敗收場。 基於生物相似性藥品本身之特性與法律上之定義,其研發藥廠在進入市場的順序上係處於後進者之地位。但為了成為早期追隨者而搶占部分先驅者優勢,廠商必須選擇恰當的進入模式及進入時機並適時的調整之。而進入障礙對於進入策略之擬定有相當大的影響,尤其以生物相似性藥品市場而言,影響最為深刻的是制度性的進入障礙。 本研究以全球前二大藥品市場─美國、中國大陸為標的,探討我國生物相似性藥品研發廠商進入海外生物相似性藥品市場時,所需跨越的制度性進入障礙可能為何?其他跨國性藥廠在面臨上述制度性進入障礙時,係採取何種因應方法,以及如何調整其進入策略?並從中總結出,對於我國生物相似性藥品研發廠商而言,較為可行的市場進入策略。 經研究分析後,本研究認為,生物相似性藥品市場的制度性進入障礙係來自於東道國的保護主義、專利相關法規與解決專利爭議之機制有所缺漏或偏頗,以及藥品上市審查及藥價管理相關法律規範過於嚴苛或過於鬆散。 而跨國性藥廠因有較充裕的資金及專利訴訟經驗,因此在面對因專利所形成之制度性進入障礙時,可以訴訟或法定行政程序等合法方式克服該專利障礙。對於藥品上市審查法規之要求,則可透過加大投資以求符合法規標準。至於東道國的保護主義,則多藉由與當地企業進行合作、成立合資企業等方式,突破該進入障礙。 因我國生物相似性藥品研發廠商之規模較小,較難獨自克服各生物相似性藥品市場的制度性進入障礙,所以在進入策略上,本研究建議,可積極尋求與原廠或國際生物相似性藥品研發廠商合作,致力於發展全新生物藥品。或是透過兩岸合作研發,於奠定一定基礎後,進一步開拓生物相似性藥品的海外市場。
2

生物相似性藥品之產業分析與法律評估: 以上市許可規範與智慧財產權為核心 / The industry analysis and legal assessment of biosimilars: focusing on approval regulations and intellectual property rights

李昕彥, Li, Hsin Yen Unknown Date (has links)
生物藥品是很多先前具致命性和難以治療的疾病領域,像是癌症、自體免疫疾病及神經系統疾病內最被看好的現行新穎療法。近年來,隨著探索出突破性小分子藥物愈趨困難,加上生物藥品在新藥研發過程中有較低的折損率與較高的成功產出率,使得越來越多藥廠紛紛轉向開發利潤豐厚的大分子生物產品。此外許多暢銷生物藥品專利期即將屆至,從而帶來對相對價廉、通常被稱為原廠生物藥品仿製版本之「生物相似性藥品」的龐大治療需求。然而,由於生物藥品和小分子藥物在分子大小及結構複雜程度方面存在截然不同的特性與本質差異,因此建立一套專屬於生物相似性藥品的上市許可規範勢在必行。 作為於2010年3月23日正式簽署公告之「患者保護及可負擔照護法案」中的一部分,美國國會通過了「生物藥品價格競爭與創新法」(BPCIA)。BPCIA的生效被視為製藥產業最重要的變革之一,旨在藉由競爭達到維護公眾健康、促進生物技術創新和控制醫療支出之目的,同時取得適當之三方利益平衡。BPCIA即以Hatch-Waxman法案下的化學學名藥核准途徑為模版,創建生物藥品簡易上市申請程序。 本論文的結構主要區分為兩大部分進行研究,其一提供了製藥產業概觀與全球生物藥品市場的發展趨勢,其二則聚焦在BPCIA新建立的核准前專利爭端解決程序下,生物相似性藥品面臨「專利舞蹈」時的法律評估及智慧財產權管理。 論文的第一部分係根據從各種市場研究報告收集、整理而成的統計數據,以系統性的方式深入介紹全球製藥產業,並分析生物相似性藥品的市場機會和潛在隱憂。另外此部分亦詳細說明了生物相似性藥品的生理活性、知識斷層與製程依賴性之間的關係、分析技術對生物產品做完整定性的不足以及生物相似性藥品的開發流程。 論文的第二部分則以討論BPCIA的重要條文規定為主,包括專利舞蹈制度和上市審查要求,諸如生物相似性之證明、可互換性之認定與適應症外推。其他相關議題,包含參考藥品的法定專屬權保護期長度、生物相似性藥品自動替換之立法化、專利資訊交換機制的可能濫用及原廠與生物相似藥廠達成反競爭協議之風險皆會予以進一步探討。除此之外,本部分也介紹了歐盟和台灣生物相似性藥品上市法規的沿革與現況。 本文試圖透過對生物相似性藥品的全方位綜合研究成果,提出可行的市場進入方案及善用專利和營業祕密優勢之智慧財產權保護佈局策略。 / Biologics represent many of the most promising novel therapies for previously deadly and intractable disease areas like cancer, autoimmune disease and neurological disorders. As discovery of breakthrough small-molecule drugs becomes more difficult, together with lower attrition rate and higher productivity of biologics in the new drug research and development (R&D) process, pharmaceutical companies are increasingly turning to develop lucrative large-molecule biological products in recent years. In addition, the patents on numerous blockbuster biologics treatments will soon expire, bringing soaring demand for relatively inexpensive generic versions of originator biologics, generally known as “biosimilars.” However, due to contrasting characteristics and natural differences in terms of size and structural complexity between biologics and small-molecule drugs, it is necessary to create a regulatory pathway solely for biosimilars. As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act which was officially signed into law on March 23, 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). The BPCIA is considered one of the more significant overhauls to the pharmaceutical industry, aiming to strike a proper balance among securing public interests, stimulating biotechnology innovation and controlling healthcare expenditure through competition. It established an abbreviated approval pathway for biosimilars modeled closely after the Hatch-Waxman Act’s approval process for generic chemical drugs. The structure of this thesis is divided into two major parts, of which the first part provides an overview of pharmaceutical industry and trends in the global biologics market, whereas the second part focuses on the legal assessment and intellectual property management of biosimilars under BPCIA’s new pre-approval patent dispute resolution process, the “patent dance”. The first part starts from the in-depth systematic introduction of global pharmaceutical industry based on statistics collected from various market research reports, then analyzes the market opportunities and potential concerns for biosimilars. Moreover, this part illustrates the physiological properties, the relationship between “knowledge gap”and manufacturing path-dependence, the insufficieny of analytical techniques in fully characterizing biological products, and the development process of biosimilars in details. The second part discusses key provisions of the BPCIA, including the patent dance procedures and regulatory requirements, such as demonstrating biosimilarity, interchangeability and extrapolation. Other relevant issues include the length of statutory exclusivities granted to reference products, legislations on biosimilar automatic substitution, potential abuses of patent information exchange mechanism and risks of reaching anti-competitive agreements between pioneers and biosimilar manufacturers will be further discussed. Besides, this part describes the timeline and status quo of EU and Taiwan’s biosimilar approval regulations. With comprehensive study on multiple aspects of biosimilars, this article tries to propose feasible market access plans and robust intellectual property protection strategies capitalizing upon patents and trade secrets.

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