University of Macau / Institute of Chinese Medical Sciences

We investigate why a firm hold “Sleeping Patents” in a two period model. Two main results are found by our simulation analysis. First, the larger the depreciation measure of the new patent goods is, the greater the possibility of not exercising new patent is, even if the new patent is still more profitable than the old in one-stage model. Second, the possibilities to exercise the less profitable patent increases if a monopolist can commit its stage-two quantity in stage one.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-95). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-95). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1951. / Typescript. Vita. Title from PDF title page (viewed Nov. 10, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 268-285). Online version of the print original.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Marburg.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1951. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 268-285).

No description available.

Thesis advisor: Julie Mortimer / Non-practicing entities (NPEs) – firms that do not produce goods or services but license to and sue other companies with portfolios of patents – have drastically increased patent infringement litigation since 2006. Over the same period, the USPTO has granted an increasing amount of patents, indicating that American innovation has strengthened by one measure. This paper finds fault with equating patents granted to innovation and develops a new metric of innovation – the ratio of a firm’s intangible to total assets. Through empirical analysis this study concludes that lawsuits initiated by NPEs between 2006 and 2011 do not affect the rate of American innovation. However, this study also finds that NPEs inflict at least a $567 million innovation cost to the top twenty-five most litigated against firms in the United States. This cost represents money that could be allocated towards research and development or investment, but it is not a dead-weight loss – it is the cost associated with firms’ growth measured in inflation-adjusted total assets. Ultimately, this study highlights the need for continued research into the impact of NPEs on the American economy but provides empirical evidence that the patent troll classification is unwarranted. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: International Studies Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: International Studies.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1992. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [568]-572).