Thesis advisor: Julie Mortimer / Non-practicing entities (NPEs) – firms that do not produce goods or services but license to and sue other companies with portfolios of patents – have drastically increased patent infringement litigation since 2006. Over the same period, the USPTO has granted an increasing amount of patents, indicating that American innovation has strengthened by one measure. This paper finds fault with equating patents granted to innovation and develops a new metric of innovation – the ratio of a firm’s intangible to total assets. Through empirical analysis this study concludes that lawsuits initiated by NPEs between 2006 and 2011 do not affect the rate of American innovation. However, this study also finds that NPEs inflict at least a $567 million innovation cost to the top twenty-five most litigated against firms in the United States. This cost represents money that could be allocated towards research and development or investment, but it is not a dead-weight loss – it is the cost associated with firms’ growth measured in inflation-adjusted total assets. Ultimately, this study highlights the need for continued research into the impact of NPEs on the American economy but provides empirical evidence that the patent troll classification is unwarranted. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: International Studies Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: International Studies.

This dissertation explores the influence of corporate venture capital (CVC) on the innovation of startups. Applying the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and propensity score matching approach to the CVC investment data on China’s listed companies, we document that the CVC investment can determine the innovation level of startups.For further insight, invention patents and utility patents will be considered, in addition to a separate examination of the number of patent applications and patent grants. It is found that CVC participation, the number of CVC syndicate investors, and the level of CVC involvement, all have significantly positive effects on the total patent applications, total patent grants, utility patent applications, and utility patent grants in those listed startups after four years of their Initial Public Offering. However, CVC investments have no significant influence on the number of invention patent applications and patent grants. This result indicates that the influence of CVC investments on the innovation level of startups is still in the preliminary stage, and CVC investments only slightly affect the development of more challenging invention patents. / Business Administration/Finance