本論文由三篇文章所構成。第二章主要針對參考點（reference points）的選擇問題。在綠色國民所得帳中，選擇哪個參考點作為扣除環境質損與自然資源折耗是很重要的。由於既有文獻中的參考點選擇大多過於極端，本文遂針對文獻上的缺失，建議以法定的環保標準做為參考點，使得環境質損、環境效益、自然資源折耗與服務都可顯示出來。 第三章則以台灣的烏魚業為對象，以不合作賽局分析大陸漁民在烏魚迴游路徑上捕魚以及溫室效應對台灣漁業及消費者造成的影響。 第四章則指出Huang and Cai (1994)一文在理論模型設計上的問題，並提出改正，以使其論點獲得支持。 / This dissertation is made up of three essays that address the issues of green net national product, renewable resources and pollution externalities. In Chapter 2, the issue of choosing reference points is discussed. The reference point is a key parameter for estimating the values of environmental degradation and natural resource depletion that are used to adjust the Net National Product. Most of the reference points used in the literature are extreme points in the spectrum of environmental quality and may thus result in estimated values of degradation and depletion that are not consistent with the standard theory of environmental economics. In this chapter, we argue that by using clearly defined standards as reference points, e.g., environmental quality standards, for managing environmental quality and natural resources, correct values of environmental degradation and services, and natural resource depletion and direct nature services, as well as green NNP can emerge. In Chapter 3, we examine the problem of non-cooperative fishing between Mainland China (MC) and Taiwan (TW) as well as the effects of rising sea surface temperature (SST) on the grey mullet fishery. By setting the three stages of the non-cooperative game, it is shown that the expansion of the fleets in MC and the rising SST cause the rent obtained from the TW fishery to decline, and that Taiwan may partially offset such an adverse effect by adjusting its fleet size. This essay also shows that Taiwan can expand its fleet to a greater extent when facing an imperfectly elastic demand for fish than when facing a perfectly elastic demand. In addition, when consumer welfare is included in the determination of the size of the fleet, fleet size can expand more than when profit is considered alone. In Chapter 4, we point out the problems in Huang and Cai (1994) that arise from the absence of a “pollution externality.” We modify their model by introducing the emission tax and find that it supports Huang and Cai (1994)’s claim that the share of private abatement expenditure is constant at all times, a claim that is criticized by Shieh, et al. (2001).

本文主要以Turnovsky (1996)和 Lai and Liao (2012)的模型架構為基礎，在政府基礎建設的支出以所得稅融通之下，建構一個開放經濟的內生成長模型，探討政策當局追求社會福利極大時，如何制定一套最適當的非線型所得稅制。依據本文的分析，可得到以下之結論： 一、在分權經濟體系的分析下，最適的所得稅尺度應等於基礎建設生產的 外部性，而課徵所得稅造成的代表性個人決策的扭曲，則由累退的 所得稅程度來矯正。當政府透過適當的非線型所得稅制矯正了所有分 權經濟體系決策行為的扭曲，使得總體經濟成長率極大化的同時，也 保證社會福利水準達極大。 二、在集權經濟體系的分析下，最適基礎建設的支出佔所得的比例應等於 基礎建設生產的外部性。再者，經過最適租稅結構的調整後，分權經 濟體系與集權經濟體系有相同的靜止均衡、總體經濟成長率和社會福 利水準，表示政府透過非線型所得稅矯正了分權經濟體系決策行為的 扭曲，使分權經濟體系的福利水準可達至最佳境界的狀態，即 Pareto 最適。

本文以Barro (1990)、Turnovsky (1997)與Lai and Liao (2012)的模型為基礎，建構一個小型開放經濟的內生成長模型，為凸顯資本市場移動性所扮演的角色，分別探討政府當局在面對資本完全移動及資本不完全移動時，該如何制訂一套最適之非線型所得稅以追求社會福利極大。根據本文的分析，可得出以下結論： 一、在資本完全移動的情況下，為矯正政府基礎建設的生產外部性，可透過課徵所得稅矯正市場失靈的扭曲，並利用累退稅率矯正因所得稅尺度所造成資本邊際生產力過低的扭曲。政府可以透過最適租稅結構矯正所有分權經濟體系的扭曲，使得經濟體系達到最佳境界的經濟成長率與福利水準。 二、在資本不完全移動的情況下，當最適的所得稅尺度等於基礎建設的生產外部性，矯正了基礎建設的生產外部性，並且透過累進／累退稅率矯正課稅後導致資本邊際生產力過低的扭曲，然而代表性個人在做最適決策時視國外利率為固定，總體決策中利率會隨著借債規模而變動，存在資本不完全移動性的扭曲，經數值模擬的結果得知，代表性個人相對社會最適借債過多，因而無法使得經濟體系達到柏拉圖最適境界。 / Based on the Barro (1990), Turnovsky (1997) and Lai and Liao (2012) model, this thesis specifies that on endogenous growth model of a developing economy facing an upward-sloping supply curve of debt. The analysis includes both perfect world capital market case and imperfect world capital market case. The government’s infrastructure expenditure is financed by nonlinear income taxation, and examine how the fiscal authority devises its nonlinear tax structure from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. Several main findings emerge from the analysis. First, in a world of perfect capital market, it is found that a suitable package containing two instruments can fully remedy the inefficiencies arising from the production externality and distortionary taxation, as a result, the Pareto optimality can be restored. Second, according to the calibration results, in the face of imperfect world capital market, there are three distortions in the economy: the production externality, the capital externality, and the financial externality association with the upward-sloping supply of debt. Two policy instruments for the tax scalar and tax progressivity/regressivity causing the distortion arising from the production externality and the capital externality to vanish. Consequently, one remaining distortion, namely, the financial externality association with the upward-sloping supply of debt, are present in the economy. As a consequence, the structure of the optimal tax policy that won’t permit the attainment of the first-best optimum.