本研究採用個案研究方法，以德隆及復星兩大中國民營上市集團企業為對象，從最終控制者的觀點，針對股權結構及董事會組成分析中國民營集團企業之控股型態，以及公司治理指標衡量之議題進行探討。具體而言，本研究首先分析中國民營企業股權結構特性，發展大陸上市公司股份控制權、盈餘分配權及席次控制權的衡量方法，並比較兩個案集團在控股型態及公司治理模式上的異同。 研究結果顯示，德隆及復星企業集團（系）股權仍屬集中，集團旗下上市公司均有持股超過三成的單一大股東，且均透過金字塔之股權結構控制其集團企業，但交叉持股情形不明顯。其中，德隆系大都透過未上市公司取得集團內上市公司持股控制，復星系則大都透過集團內上市公司轉投資未上市公司，並經由各未上市公司再持股其他上市公司(屬間接互相持股性質)，取得股權控制。以傳統偏離指標（盈餘分配權與股份控制權之偏離）上，兩集團偏離程度相近；但以盈餘分配權與席次控制權或以席次控制權與股份控制權之偏離比率來衡量偏離程度時，德隆系偏離程度明顯高於復星系。此外，兩大集團均設有獨立董事，及由職工代表出任監事會；但分析結果亦顯示，法令雖規定應由職工代表監事席次，但集團內仍有部分上市公司未依法設置。 / Based on an ultimate controller(s) perspective and using a case study approach to two private business groups—DeLong and Fuson—in China, this research analyzes the ownership structure, board structure, and measurement of governance indicators of theses groups. In specific, this research first discuss the attributes of ownership structure of the individual business group, followed by the computation of voting rights, cash-flow rights, the degree of control through board seats (board-seat control), and the related deviation between theses control power owned by the ultimate controller. In addition, in-depth comparisons of governance features between these two groups are also performed. The analysis indicates that the concentration of ownership is relatively high for both DeLong and Fuson groups. There exits one single largest shareholder with more than 30% of shareholdings, and the formation of pyramidal ownership structure is also common for both groups. However, cross-holding is not obvious for either group. In DeLong, the ultimate owners exercise their voting control through their unlisted companies. In contrast, the ultimate owners of Fuson exercise their voting rights through unlisted companies that invested by the listed companies. The deviation between cash-flow rights and voting rights of these two business groups are similarm while the deviation between cash-flow rights and board-seat control and the deviation between voting rights and board-seat control is significantly higher for DeLong groups. Furthermore, the corporate boards of DeLong and Fuson groups are composed of both independent board directors and workers' representatives on the supervisory board. Although it is mandatory to have a minimum numbers of workers' representatives on the supervisory board, it is not uncommon to find the lack of full compliance to this requirement.