本研究探討損害賠償計算方法理論對請求金額與判賠金額間差距幅度之影響。本研究以請求金額與判賠金額的差距幅度作為應變數，以三大損害賠償計算方法作為解釋變數，並設定三大群組變數作為控制變數。本研究之樣本為智財法院所審理之專利侵權求償判決，樣本期間為2008年9月至2010年9月。 本研究所建立之回歸模型解釋該差距幅度的變異量達45.1%。實證結果顯示，我國專利侵權損害賠償訴訟之差距幅度，顯著地受到總利益說及總銷售額說之兩種損害賠償計算方法的影響，但受合理權利金說之影響並不顯著。該等實證結果指出，總利益說的採用對於縮短請求差距幅度的影響能力，優於總銷售額說，代表著專利權人於訴訟中應詳盡地提出損害賠償相關事證，以獲得較高的賠償救濟。 / This research explores the association of the patent-damage calculation theories with the Variance between the amount of damage claimed and that awarded. Specifically, it tests the relationship between the Variance and three explanatory variables, namely, patent-damage calculation theories based on the profit, sales, and reasonable royalty, along with control variables including the case specifics, patents-at-issue, and litigants information. Its sample includes 186 patent infringement cases decided in Taiwan Intellectual Property Court from 2008/9 to 2010/9. The empirical regression model explains 45.1% of the variation in the Variance. The results show significance associations of the Variance with the profit approach and the sales approach, but not with the reasonable royalty approach. Such findings point out that the profit approach is more successful at reducing the Variance, implying that the patentee should present more detailed evidence during litigation to get more awards.

懲罰性賠償金為英美法傳統下之制度，其目的在於以超越實際損害數額之賠償金，制裁主觀惡性程度特別重大之侵權人，與一般用以填補損害之補償性賠償金有本質上之差異。昔日多適用於被害人尊嚴遭嚴重侵犯之案件，然隨現代經濟社會之發展，亦漸用於處罰公司法人、制裁經濟犯罪。 我國侵權行為法主要繼受德國之體系，以損害填補為原則，故僅於特定領域之立法中承認懲罰性賠償金制度。現行專利法採取懲罰性賠償金之立法例，而目前經濟部之修法草案則擬廢除。 本研究首先介紹美國法發展趨勢、實務重要案例與晚近之專利改革法案，歸納其趨勢為「嚴格限制故意侵權之構成、提高專利權人舉證責任、限縮懲罰性賠償金之適用範圍」；其次，以實證方式分析台灣智慧財產法院歷年相關之判決結果，認為實務運作有「大多數請求懲罰性賠償金之案例，連侵權責任都尚未構成，有請求浮濫、逼迫被告和解之嫌」、「法院認定侵權人故意，實質上往往僅論及侵權人『知悉系爭專利存在』即可，相較於現行法標準實過於寬鬆」；最後，綜合美國法發展趨勢、我國實務情形、懲罰性賠償金功能論與法律經濟分析觀點，認為我國尚不宜廢除專利侵權懲罰性賠償金制度，惟應將其限縮適用於「搭便車」與「專利有效性毋需再確認」之故意侵權情形，以降低社會研發成本、賦與從事研發者挑戰垃圾專利之機會，方切合專利法促進研發之本旨。 / Punitive damages, a traditional system under the common law, aims to sanction those infringers having substantially subjective malice by awarding enhanced damages beyond the actual damages. It is naturally different from compensatory damages. Punitive damages were originally used to dealing with serious violations of the victims’ dignity of the cases. With the development of economic society, this system was gradually used to punishing corporations and sanctioning economic crimes. Since Taiwanese tort laws are mainly inherited from German laws, which only permit plaintiffs claiming for compensatory damages. Punitive damages were only adopted in several specific kinds of tort laws, as in the patent law. However, the provision of punitive damages was revoked in the current patent reform act drafted by Ministry of Economic Affairs. This study starts out by introducing the trend of American law, the essential practical cases, and the recent patent reform acts. It concludes the trend to have the following three characteristics: 1. Strictly limit the constitution of willful infringement; 2. Increase patentee’s burden of proof; and 3. Restrict the scope of awarding punitive damages. The study then empirically analyzes the related judgments of Taiwan Intellectual Property Count over the years. It finds that in majority of the cases claiming punitive damages, most plaintiffs can even not to prove that defendants have infringed their patents, yet force defendants to settle. Also, the court in Taiwan usually award patentees punitive damages loosely only if they can prove that infringers had known the existence of the patent . This phenomenon makes the standard in practice not strict as the standard in law. Lastly, this study sums up the aspects from the development trend of American patent law, current practice in Taiwan, the theory of punitive damages function, and economic analysis of law, and finds that it would be inappropriate to revoke the provision of punitive damages in patent infringement cases. This study suggests that punitive damages should be awarded only in two types of willful infringement: 1. when the defendant is a “free rider, or 2. when the validity of the patent need not be challenged anymore. This way, it may lower the cost of research and development, give developers more chance to challenge junk patents, and finally reach the purpose of patent law – encourage innovation.