本論文主要是在探討延展性權利金(reach-through royalty)條款的競爭法規制。首先，本文對於研究工具專利及延展性權利金條款的意義及概念作一說明，接著簡介目前各國之競爭法制與專利法制的權衡概況，並探討一些與延展性權利金條款有關之授權條款，以了解目前競爭法對於延展性權利金條款所可能導致之相關效應的評價，作為後續分析該條款適法性的基礎，再來整理美國實務及學說對於延展性權利金條款的看法，最後綜合檢討相關論述，提出本文見解。經研究後，本文認為，延展性權利金條款有其促進競爭效應(如提供風險分攤機制、幫助起始公司解決現金壓力問題以及提供授權雙方較佳的協商估價基礎)亦有其限制競爭效應(如降低被授權人研發誘因而有限制研發的效果及權利金堆疊效應)，因此一概禁止或一概允許此種條款皆非適當，而應視個案情形依合理原則的標準加以權衡，以決定系爭行為的適法性。 / The present article discusses the antitrust regulation for reach-through royalty provisions which mainly used in biotechnology research tool patent licensing. First, this article introduces the meanings of research tool patent and reach-through royalties. Second, it illustrates antitrust regulations for patent licensing in foreign countries specifically in U.S., European Union, together with R.O.C. and, furthermore, it also discusses provisions similar or related to reach-through royalties. Third, this article introduces the discussions about reach-through royalty provisions in U.S., including the NIH Guideline, case law regulations and other related discussions by scholars. Finally, the present article analyzes the effects of reach-through royalties more deeply based on the mentioned discussions and makes a suggestion for the regulation of reach-through royalties. This article argues: since reach-through royalties have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects, a total ban or allowance is not appropriate and a “rule of reason” inspection should be applied to such provisions for better efficiencies.