本研究探討私募對企業經營績效之影響，分別檢驗五種類型應募人之私募，其企業經營績效是否因私募而獲得顯著改善。本文採用配對t檢定，檢驗當應募人分別為策略投資人、內部人、積極投資人、消極投資人及單一投資人時，公司之經營績效於私募前後一年是否有顯著差異，並以營運現金流量報酬率、資產報酬率、股東權益報酬率及公司價值作為績效指標進行迴歸分析，探討不同類型應募人之私募，對經營績效之影響有何不同。 實證結果發現，私募會因應募人之不同，而對經營績效產生不同的影響。當應募人為策略投資人、內部人、積極投資人或單一投資人時，公司私募後一年的經營績效比私募前一年的績效好，表示當應募人為該四類投資人時，四項經營績效衡量指標皆顯示，私募會正面影響公司之經營績效；而當應募人為消極投資人時，私募對公司營運現金流量會造成負面的影響。 / This study classifies private placement investors into five types including strategic investors, insiders, active investors, passive investors, and single investors to investigate whether firm performance has been improved after issuing private placement. I use two-sample paired t-test to examine whether the performance is different between pre-placement and post-placement under each type of private placement investors, and use regression approach to analyze the impact of private placement investors on firm performance measured by operating cash flow returns, returns on assets, returns on equity, and Tobin’s Q. The evidence shows that the impact on performance varies with private placement investors. Firms have better performance after issuing private placement when the private placement investors are strategic investors, insiders, active investors, and single investors. On the contrary, when the private placement investors are passive investors, firms have poorer operating cash flow returns.

本研究探討企業宣告私募股權之動機對宣告時之折價幅度、異常報酬，以及其後續的執行率與經營績效之影響。並將私募案依投資人加以分類，區分為積極性私募、管理階層私募與消極性私募，各類私募分開探討其動機、執行率與經營績效。 實證結果發現，企業選擇私募股權融資的動機如下：(1) 進行積極性私募之動機，並無法以監督需求假說解釋之；(2)自利交易為進行管理階層私募之動機；(3) 進行消極性私募之動機，並無法以控制權鞏假說解釋之。 私募實際執行與否的影響因素方面，實證結果如下：(1) 積極性私募因為研究樣本過少，無法進行實證分析；(2) 管理階層私募方面，當預計發行股數佔流通在外股數比例較高時，實際執行的可能性較高；(3) 消極性私募方面，投資機會於宣告後增加，實際執行的可能性較高，然而當內部人持股比例低於5%或高於25%時，實際執行的可能性較低。 至於私募之執行與後續經營績效之關聯性，實證結果發現：(1) 積極性私募由於研究樣本過少，無法進行實證分析；(2) 執行管理階層私募之公司，其經營績效於執行後確實獲得提升；(3) 執行消極性私募之公司，其經營績效於執行後確實獲得提升，然而此發現並不支持控制權鞏固假說之預期。 / This research mainly discusses the motivations of firms which announce issuing private equity. The announcement motivations will influence the price discount and abnormal returns in the period of announcement, wills to execute the private placement, and the subsequent performance of those announcing firms. This study classifies private placements into three groups, including active placements, managerial placements, and passive placements. There are different motivations, situations of executions, and subsequent performances in different types of private placements. The empirical results on the motivations of firms that announce issuing equity privately indicate the following: (1) Monitoring hypothesis can’t explain why firms issue private equity to active investors. (2) Managerial self-dealing is the purpose of firms issuing private equity to insiders. (3) Managerial entrenchment hypothesis can’t explain why firms issue private equity to passive investors. The empirical results on the factors that influence firms execute the private placement or not indicate the followings: (1) Because of the sample constraints, this study can’t analyze in what situation firms will execute active private placements. (2) For managerial placements, those with higher percentage of the firm’s outstanding common stock represented by the placement tend to be executed. (3) For passive placements, when the investment opportunities increased after announcements, firms tend to execute the placement. However, when the ownership concentration is less than 5% or higher than 25%, firms’ wills to execute the placement are weaker. The empirical results on the association between the execution of private placements and its subsequent performance indicate the following: (1) Because of the sample constraints, this study can’t analyze the impacts of the execution of the active placement on the subsequent performance of the announcing fitm. (2) Firms executing managerial placements tend to have better subsequent performance. (3) Firms executing passive placements tend to have better subsequent performance. However, managerial entrenchment hypothesis can’t explain this result.

應募人關連性指應募人與私募發行公司之關係。本研究將應募人關連性分為私募前關連性和私募後新關連。私募前關連性分為雇傭關連、合夥關連及治理關連，而私募後新關連則分為新雇傭關連、新合夥關連及新治理關連。本研究探討私募發行公司與應募人間的關連性，以及該關係對於異常報酬、公司治理與績效的影響。應募人與私募發行公司在私募前大都具有關連性，並且在私募完成後形成新的關連性，而新關連大部分為治理關連，即應募人成為新的董事及大股東。 本研究實證結果發現：第一、關連性應募人及新關連在私募宣告日會帶來正的異常報酬；第二、新的非董事關連較容易於私募後取得董事席次，進而改善公司治理；第三、關連性應募人可帶來私募後較佳的績效，但新關連改善績效的效果並不顯著。整體而言，本研究結果與過去私募文獻所探討的一致，即私募可增加對公司的監督，帶來較好的公司治理，因而替公司創造價值。 / This study classifies investor relationship into pre-placement relationships and new relationships. Pre-placement relationships are further classified into three categories: employment agreements, business arrangements, and governance-related relationships. New relationships include new employment agreements, new business arrangements, and new governance-related relationships. This study examines relationships between investors and issuers, and their impact on abnormal return, corporate governance and performance in private placement transactions. Most investors have a relationship with the issuer pre-placement and many new relationships are formed through the placement transactions, which are largely governance-related (board seats and/or 5% or greater blocks). We have three main findings. First, relationship investors and new relationships drive the positive stock price response at announcement. Second, investors with new non-director relationship ties to the issuer are more likely to gain directorships as part of the placement, and therefore improve corporate governance. Third, relationship investors are associated with stronger post-placement profitability, while new relationships are not. Overall, our findings are consistent with private placements creating value when they are associated with increased monitoring and strong governance.

本研究探討私募折價幅度及私募前後績效之影響因素，並將應募人分為內部人、積極投資人以及消極投資人三種，觀察不同應募人下的私募，其私募前及私募後是否有累計異常報酬。 實證結果發現，在私募前股價表現與私募對象之關係方面，當私募對象為內部人時，在私募前45日股價即開始下挫，之後的累計異常報酬皆為負值，其原因可能為內部人藉由套利交易，先行在集中市場上賣出手中原有持股，再用較低價格認購私募新股，此舉不但能使手中持股的成本降低同時也能維持既有股權。關於私募半年後的股價表現，內部人及積極投資人私募後的累計異常報酬顯著為正，代表內部人在投資私募新股時，可能隱含著未來公司有較好的投資機會；至於積極投資人後續績效為正，可能代表積極投資人未來將會扮演監督者的角色，有助於提高公司的價值。迴歸分析也顯示，當公司私募的價格相對於公司在私募定價日當時的股價折價越多時，私募之後的累計異常報酬越低，代表私募折價會降低公司價值，傷害現有股東的權益。 / This study investigates the effect of private placements on stockholder wealth before/after the events based on cumulative abnormal return for three categories of investors, namely, the insiders, active investors and passive investors. For private placements with insider investors, significant negative abnormal return prior to private placements may reveal sell arbitrage taken by insiders while significant positive abnormal return subsequent to private placements supports signaling theory. Evidence showing significant negative relation between price discount on private placements and subsequent business performance implies the price discount reduces market value and hence harmful to existing shareholders’ wealth.

本研究以適用於民國九十九年九月修法前之「公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項」辦理私募增資之上市櫃公司，並有內部人參與之私募案為研究對象，研究期間為民國九十四年十月十一日至九十九年八月三十一日，以探討私募應募人行為對經營績效與異常報酬之影響。 實證結果發現，當辦理私募公司前一年度為稅後淨損，並有內部人參與之私募案，若內部應募人於私募前後三個月內有老股出售之情事者，其私募後之會計經營績效較私募前差，但私募後之公司價值卻較佳。再將這類公司與其他私募案相比，其會計經營績效較差，公司價值仍較佳，皆顯示這類公司會計經營績效與公司股價於私募後未呈同向變化。另外，以事件研究法測試有內部人參與之私募案，發現其在董事會決議日前後確實有異常報酬，顯示私募訊息在董事會決議日前已走漏，陸續反映於股價。 / Based on firms’ net profit/loss before private placement and inside investors stock selling, this study classifies private placements with inside investors into four types to examine the effect of insiders’ activities and the operating condition on firm performance after private placement and the abnormal returns around private placement events. It’s shown that for firms with net loss before private placement while the insiders selling stocks around the event, the accounting performance worsens but Tobin’s Q gets better after the event. In addition, inside investors gain abnormal return around the board meeting. It implies that information leakage before board meeting is severe and the investors even gain abnormal return after the meeting.