隨著1997的亞洲金融風暴、1998下半年陸續發生的台灣上市公司財務危 機事件，以及2001年底美國大型公司企業弊案的層出不窮，除了一再地打擊投資人的信心，擾亂資本市場秩序外，也使投資者與證券主管機關體認到，完善的公司治理機制（corporate governance），是健全資本市場與吸引國際資金的關鍵因素之一。 公司組織的代理關係衍生出盈餘操縱與公司治理的相關問題，本研究在 第一個部分所欲探討的是公司治理的機制是否能抑制管理階層進行盈餘操 縱?另外，一般投資大眾所關心的是他們的投資標的是否為其帶來優異的報酬，而公司股價報酬率是否能提高，除了外在總體經濟的因素外，不外乎是公司本身的變數，因此本研究以董監事特性、經理人特性、關係人特性及股權結構四個構面之公司治理變數，以及盈餘操縱程度為控制變數，探討公司治理與投資人的股價報酬二者間之關係。 研究結果顯示：當董事長兼任總經理時，公司盈餘操縱程度較高。超額 關係人資金往來比例越高，盈餘操縱幅度越高。董事會規模越大，盈餘操縱程度越低。監察人總人數、董監事質押比例、控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度、董事會獨立程度、超額關係人進銷貨比例、機構投資人持股比例、大股東持股比例與盈餘操縱的幅度都沒有顯著相關性。 董事會規模與公司公司股價報酬率呈負相關。監察人總人數與公司股價 報酬率成正相關。董監事質押比率與公司股價報酬率呈負相關。董事會獨立程度與公司股價報酬率呈正相關。超額關係人進銷貨比例與股價報酬率呈正相關。控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度、經理人是否由董事長兼任、超額關係人資金往來比例、機構投資人持股比例、外部大股東持股比例均與股價報酬率無顯著相關性。 / Along with Asia monetary crush in 1997, Taiwan business financial crisis happened one after another in 1998 and American large enterprise fraud cases appeared again and again in 2001, not only to beat investors’ confidence and to disturb capital market order, but also make investors and the authorities concerned recognize that a complete corporate governance mechanism is a key factor of healing capital market and attracting international capital. The agency relation of business organization derives problems about earnings manipulation and corporate governance. The first part of this research is want to discuss if corporate governance mechanism can restrain management level from manipulating earnings. The most concern of common investors is that whether their invest target can bring them well return. If we want to raise the stock-price return of a company, in addition to macro economic factors, the condition of business itself is really important. The second part of this research set broad characteristics, management characteristics, related party transaction and equity structure as research variables and earnings manipulation degree as control variables to discuss the relation between corporate governance and stock-price return. The result of the first portion of research shows that when CEO simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board and exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse is higher, the firms have higher earnings manipulation. There is a negative relation between broad size and earnings manipulation. Total number of supervisors, the rate of directors’ and supervisors’shareholdings that are pledged, the deviation between cash-flow right and seating right, broad independence, exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with earnings manipulation. The result of the second portion of research shows that total number of supervisors, broad independence and exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales have positive relation with stock-price return. There is a negative relation between stock-price return and broad size and the rate of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings that are pledged. CEO simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board, the deviation between cash-flow rights and seating rights, exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with stock-price return.