臺灣的政黨候選人在選舉競選過程中時常發生政治禮讓參選的狀況，相關新聞報導政黨整合同黨內或是政治理念較接近的不同政黨，可凝聚較多力量來提升選舉的勝選機率。本文引進參選人可以在他方參選人參選時，選擇是否採取禮讓決策的賽局模型來分析禮讓參選決策的合理性，而在參選人一方不知道他方參選人實力的強弱情況下，我們發現強者型態的他方參選人比例較大、他方參選人給予較多的禮讓好處時，使參選人較容易啟動禮讓機制。 / In Taiwan, there is a common phenomenon that the candidates of the party give in to other candidates in the election campaigns. The relevant news reports a political party can integrate with the same party or different political parties with closer political ideas. By integrating, a political party can gather more political power to enhance the winning probability of election. This paper establishes a model of game theory which candidates can choose whether to make a concession decision of election when other party candidates are running for the election. This model is used to analyze the rationality of making a concession decision of election. In the case of candidates who do not know the capability of other party candidate, the candidates are easier to start the concession mechanism when the proportion of strong type of other candidates is larger and the other party candidates give more concessional benefits.